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A flash, a mantling, and the ferment rises,
Thus, in this moment, hope materializes,
A mighty project may at first seem mad,
But now we laugh, the ways of chance forseeing: 
A thinker then, in mind’s deep wonder clad,
May give at last a thinking brain its being.
[…]
Now chimes the glass, a note of sweetest strength,
It clouds, it clears, my utmost hope it proves,
For there my longing eyes behold at length
A dapper form, that lives and breathes and moves.
My mannikin! What can the world ask more?
The mystery is brought to light of day.
Now comes the whisper we are waiting for:
He forms his speech, has clear-cut words to say.
Goethe, Faust
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1. Introduction
Consciousness is extremely important to us. Without consciousness, 
there is just nothingness, death, night. It is a crime to kill a person who 
is potentially conscious. Permanently unconscious people are left to die. 
Religious people face death with hope because they believe that their 
conscious souls will break free from their physical bodies.
We know next to nothing about consciousness and its relationship 
to the physical world. The science of consciousness is mired in 
philosophical problems. We can only guess about the consciousness 
of coma patients, infants and animals. We have no idea about the 
consciousness of artificial systems.
This book neutralizes the philosophical problems with consciousness 
and clears the way for scientific research. It explains how we can 
develop mathematical theories that can make believable predictions 
about consciousness.
The first obstacles that need to be overcome are the metaphysical 
theories of consciousness. Some people claim that consciousness is a 
separate substance; other people believe that it is identical to the physical 
world. These theories generate endless debates and it is very difficult to 
prove or refute them. This book eliminates some of these theories and 
suspends judgement about the rest.
The next obstacle is the hard problem of consciousness. This typically 
appears when people try and fail to imagine how colourful conscious 
sensations are related to the colourless world of modern physics. This 
book breaks the hard problem of consciousness down into a pseudo 
problem, a difficult problem and a set of brute regularities. 
Some problems with consciousness cannot be solved. For example, 
we cannot prove that a person is conscious. These problems affect our 
ability to measure consciousness through first-person reports. This book 
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neutralizes these problems by making assumptions. The results from the 
science of consciousness can then be considered to be true given these 
assumptions.
When these obstacles have been overcome the scientific study of 
consciousness becomes straightforward. We can measure consciousness, 
measure the physical world and look for mathematical relationships 
between these measurements. We can use artificial intelligence to 
discover mathematical theories of consciousness.
Eventually we will discover mathematical theories that map between 
states of consciousness and states of the physical world. We will use 
these theories to make believable predictions about the consciousness of 
infants, animals and robots. We will measure the consciousness of brain-
damaged patients. We will build conscious machines, repair damaged 
consciousnesses and create designer states of consciousness.
The scientific study of consciousness is clarified by this book. As 
you read it the philosophical problems will dissolve and you will gain a 
clear vision of consciousness research. You will no longer worry about 
whether consciousness is a separate substance. You will not be troubled 
by a desire to reduce consciousness to particles or forces. You will 
understand that a scientific theory of consciousness is a mathematical 
relationship between a formal description of consciousness and a formal 
description of the physical world. 
This book starts with a definition of consciousness. In daily life 
we treat colour, sound and smell as objective properties of the world. 
Over the last three hundred years science has developed a series of 
interpretations of the world that have stripped objects of their sensory 
properties. Apples used to be red and tasty; now physical apples are 
colourless collections of jigging atoms, probability distributions of 
wave-particles. The physical world has become invisible. When science 
eliminated sensory properties from the physical world it was necessary 
to find a way of grouping, describing and explaining the colours, 
sounds and smells that we continued to encounter in daily life. We 
solved this problem by inventing the modern concept of consciousness. 
‘Consciousness’ is a name for the sensory properties that were removed 
from the physical world by modern science. 
 51. Introduction
The next chapter examines some ‘hard’ problems with consciousness. 
First, it is impossible to imagine the relationship between consciousness 
and the invisible physical world. Second, we find it difficult to imagine 
the connection between conscious experiences of brain activity and 
other conscious experiences. Third, there are brute regularities between 
consciousness and the physical world that cannot be broken down or 
further explained. None of these problems are unique to consciousness 
research. They can also be found in physics and they do not affect 
our ability to study consciousness scientifically. We can measure 
consciousness, measure the physical world and look for mathematical 
relationships between these measurements.
Scientists measure consciousness through first-person reports, 
which raises problems about the reliability of these reports, the 
possibility of non-reportable consciousness and the causal closure of the 
physical world. The fourth chapter addresses these issues by making 
assumptions that explain how consciousness can be measured. First, 
we need to identify the systems that we believe are conscious. Then we 
need to make other assumptions to ensure that consciousness can be 
accurately measured in these systems.
The fifth chapter explains how we can develop mathematical theories 
of the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. 
Scientists have carried out pilot studies that have looked for correlations 
between consciousness and brain activity. We are now starting to create 
compact mathematical theories that can map between physical and 
conscious states. Computers could be used to discover these theories 
automatically. 
Chapter 6 discusses theories that link consciousness to patterns in 
physical materials—for example, electromagnetic waves or neuron 
firing patterns. With physical theories the materials in which the patterns 
occur are critical—if the same patterns occur in different materials, 
they are not claimed to be linked to consciousness. Physical theories of 
consciousness are similar to scientific theories in physics, chemistry and 
biology.
Some people have claimed that information patterns are linked to 
consciousness, regardless of whether they occur in a brain, a computer 
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or a pile of sand. The seventh chapter shows that this approach fails 
because information is not a property of the physical world and any 
given information pattern can be extracted from both the conscious and 
unconscious brain. Information theories of consciousness should be 
reinterpreted as physical theories of consciousness.
Other people believe that consciousness is linked to the execution 
of computations. They claim that some computations are linked to 
consciousness regardless of whether they are executing in a brain or 
a digital computer. Chapter 8 argues that computations cannot be 
linked to consciousness because computing is a subjective use that we 
make of the world. Computation theories of consciousness should be 
reinterpreted as physical theories of consciousness.
Chapter 9 explains how theories of consciousness can be 
experimentally tested. This can only be done on systems that we assume 
are conscious, such as normally functioning adult human brains. We 
can also use our theories of consciousness to make deductions about 
the consciousness of brain-damaged people, animals and robots. 
These deductions cannot be verified because we cannot measure the 
consciousness of these systems.
When we have discovered a reliable theory of consciousness we will 
be able to use it to modify and enhance our consciousness. For example, 
we could change the shape of our conscious body or increase our level 
of consciousness. Chapter 10 explains how we can use a theory of 
consciousness to identify the physical state that is linked to a desired 
conscious state. If we could realize this physical state in our brains, we 
would experience the desired conscious state. It will be many years 
before this will become technologically possible.
The eleventh chapter suggests how a reliable theory of consciousness 
could be used to create conscious machines and make believable 
deductions about the consciousness of artificial systems. Silicon brain 
implants and consciousness uploading are interpreted as forms of 
machine consciousness, and the chapter discusses whether conscious 
machines could threaten human existence and how they should be 
ethically treated.
 71. Introduction
The conclusion summarises the book, highlights its limitations and 
suggests future directions of research. The appendix lists the definitions, 
assumptions, lemmas and constraints. 
The main text of this book is short and self-contained and can be 
read through without referring to the endnotes or bibliography. The 
endnotes contain more detailed discussions of individual points and 
full references to the scientific and philosophical literature.

2. The Emergence of the Concept 
of Consciousness
2.1 Naive Realism 
I am immersed in a colourful moving noisy tasty smelly painful spatially 
and temporally extended stream of things. During a nuclear explosion 
I see a grey mushroom cloud, hear a detonation, feel heat, touch wind 
and taste synthetic strawberry bubblegum in my mouth. I do not infer 
the presence of these things—they are just there before me as the world 
at this place and time seen from my perspective.
When Cro-Magnon man peered out of his cave he saw a bright 
pattern of green leaves, heard a river and tasted sweet-tart berries in his 
mouth. The green of the leaves was present to him, framing the entrance 
to his cave, just as the river was crashing and roaring to his left. No 
complicated theories about consciousness troubled Cro-Magnon man: 
the world was simply present to him. In this idealised naive and simple 
time people simply saw the world, unclouded by theories of perception.
When a child opens its eyes it does not see a collection of qualia1 or 
conscious representations: just a red balloon ascending into the warm 
summer sky. 
Most modern adults most of the time have a direct relationship 
with the world around them. We are immersed in a world of colourful 
moving noisy tasty smelly things. As we slog through our workaday 
lives we are not philosophizing—the blue of my computer screen is the 
colour of an object in the world; the tinny speaker sound is part of the 
world. We go outside and see cold grey skies and are lashed by cold 
lashing rain.
For me at least, the colourful cheerful world is the most important 
thing there is. I long to drink in more of the visible audible tasty moving 
© David Gamez, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0107.02
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world. What I hope for in any afterlife is that some kind of a world 
will continue, ideally in a reasonably pleasant way. While one can make 
abstract ethical points about the value of life, its real value for me is this 
immersion in a sensuous world.
This relationship with the world is often called naive realism: an 
interpretation of perception in which we directly see the world and the 
world is as we see it. However, there is nothing naive or realistic in our 
everyday encounters with the world—‘naive realism’ is a convenient 
label that we use to contrast our everyday immersion in the world with 
other theories of perception. 
I am standing in my sitting room staring dully through dirty net 
curtains at nothing in the street outside. I cannot see the body of my 
aunt. It is out there in the garage. I walk into the garage and open the 
blue plastic sack. Now I can see the body of my aunt.
When I look at my aunt’s body it appears as three-dimensional, 
although I can only see part of it at one time. From one perspective I can 
see my aunt’s grey lips and clouded eyes, but I cannot see her whole 
head or body. I have to move relative to her body to see her thin grey 
hair and the matted dried blood on the back of her head. 
My aunt’s body changes independently of my interactions with 
it. Each time I return to the garage I observe subtle changes in colour 
as her body decays. Her body has an objective existence that can be 
systematically probed in different ways. I can perform chemical tests; I 
can measure its hardness and weight.
Other people cannot see the body of my aunt. The police cannot see it. 
Uncle Henry, on holiday in Tahiti, is staring at the gyrating buttocks of a 
young woman in a grass skirt. He is not looking at the body of my aunt.
Naive realism is not simultaneous and all-embracing access to every 
object in existence. We see a small number of the world’s objects from 
one perspective. Objects have an independent existence that enables them 
to be perceived by other people. Different people see different things. 
We can perceive the same object on multiple occasions. Objects can be in 
different states at different times.
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In our naively realistic encounters with the world we use the 
language of perception to indicate those things and those aspects of 
things that are present to us and to acknowledge that objects continue 
to exist when they are not being perceived. Instead of saying that my 
aunt’s body is there, I talk about perceiving my aunt’s body to indicate 
that it is currently present to me. Uncle Henry is not perceiving her 
body: it is not present to him in Tahiti. 
Perception is similar to a bubble that we ‘carry around’ with us that 
contains the objects that are currently present to us. I will call this a 
bubble of perception. We are immersed in our bubbles of perception. When 
an object appears in my bubble of perception I see it from a perspective 
that is centred on my body.2 
A visual representation of a bubble of perception is shown in Figure 
2.1b. This is inaccurate because it shows the person’s body from a third-
person perspective, whereas we experience our bubbles of perception 
from the inside—we look out from our bodies onto the world. This 
illustration has the further limitation that it only shows the visual aspect 
of a bubble of perception. Bubbles of perception also include tastes, 
sounds, smells, body sensations and emotional states.
In naive realism objects have the properties that we perceive them 
to have. The plastic sack is blue; my aunt’s body is cold; her clothes have 
a mothball and urine odour. Objects have these properties independently 
of whether they are inside or outside a bubble of perception. The plastic 
sack continues to be blue when it is in the garage and not being perceived 
by anyone (Figure 2.1a).
I sit in the kitchen and imagine my aunt’s body in the garage. Now 
the contents of the sack are fleeting and unstable, colours are washed 
out and the smell of moth balls and urine is not present. I dream of my 
aunt’s body. This is more vivid than imagination, but my aunt’s face 
changes from moment to moment, and it is difficult to inspect details 
and maintain consistency over time. I go for a walk in the forest and eat 
a mushroom. One hour later my aunt rises from the ground before me: 
her eyes are dark geometric spirals; her hair is a writhing mass of white 
maggots.
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We no longer believe that imagined, dreamt or hallucinated objects 
are objectively present in a second spiritual world. It no longer makes 
sense to say that we perceive imagined, dreamt or hallucinated objects. 
This is particularly true now that perception is associated with theories 
about electromagnetic waves, sound vibrations, and so on. To address 
this issue I will replace ‘bubble of perception’ with the more inclusive 
term ‘bubble of experience’, and distinguish between two types of 
bubble of experience:
• Online bubbles of experience are connected to the world: their 
states change in response to changes in the world and detailed 
information about the world can be accessed on demand. 
Figure 2.1. Visual representation of a bubble of perception. a) Domestic scene. In 
naive realism the sack in the garage continues to be blue when no-one is looking 
at it. b) A visual representation of a bubble of perception. This uses a third-person 
perspective to represent our sense of inhabiting a body and looking out at a world. 
Although this is substantially different from an actual bubble of perception, 
which we experience from inside our bodies, it is the best way that I have found of 
depicting a bubble of perception. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
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They typically have vivid colours, clear sounds, strong 
odours and intense body sensations. In an online bubble of 
experience objects are stable, we can view the same object on 
multiple occasions and people generally agree on an object’s 
properties. We are immersed in online bubbles of experience 
when we perceive and interact with the world.
• Offline bubbles of experience are not connected to the current 
environment, although they might correspond to past or 
future states. They are often unstable, low resolution and low 
intensity. Colours are washed out; smells, tastes and body 
sensations are rarely present. Offline bubbles of experience are 
typically weakly perceptual—we cannot interact with objects 
in a systematic way, and it can be difficult to repeatedly view 
the same object from multiple perspectives or to examine 
small details. People typically do not agree about the objects 
that they encounter in offline bubbles of experience. We are 
immersed in offline bubbles of experience when we dream, 
remember, hallucinate and imagine.
A bubble of experience can have a mixture of online and offline 
contents. When I hallucinated my aunt the forest was an online 
component of my bubble of experience; the aunt and maggots were 
offline.3
2.2 Invisible Explanations
The flowers in my living room appear in my online bubble of experience 
on multiple occasions. I can see them from multiple perspectives and 
uncover more of their properties. They appear in other people’s bubbles 
of experience. The flowers are part of an independent world, which is 
often called the physical world. 
The physical world has regularities. If I throw a pig out of a window, 
its pink colour and screams move together and its rate of acceleration 
can be calculated using a simple equation. If I mix one part glycerine 
with three parts nitric acid, I obtain an explosive mixture that can 
alleviate angina.
We explain these regularities by postulating the existence of invisible 
objects and properties in the physical world. These do not appear in 
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our bubbles of experience—we believe in their existence because they 
improve our ability to make predictions about objects in our bubbles of 
experience. 
X-rays are invisible waves that were posited to explain the appearance 
of patterns on photographic plates. These patterns can easily be 
explained if there is a form of radiation that cannot be perceived with the 
human eye. Our belief in X-rays was strengthened by the development 
of other methods for detecting them. Only the effects of X-rays appear in 
our bubbles of experience—the rays themselves are invisible.
Visible and invisible gods are often used to explain regularities in 
our bubbles of experience. A statue of Tlaloc might be considered to be 
Tlaloc himself, something that Tlaloc inhabits to some extent or just a 
representation of Tlaloc. Sometimes the Judeo-Christian god is depicted 
as a beardy bloke floating in the clouds; more often he is assumed to be 
invisible. 
Prayers, sacrifices and moral rectitude encourage the gods to bestow 
rain, fertility and a good harvest on their virtuous subjects (see Figure 
2.2). Murder, incest and eating prawns anger the gods, who inflict 
earthquakes, floods and infertility on people who stray from the path 
of righteousness. 
Figure 2.2. The presence of an invisible god explains regularities in the visible 
world. a) Worshippers of Tlaloc offer up sacrifices and prayers for rain. b) The 
psychology and actions of the invisible god explain the appearance of the rain. 
Image © David Gamez, CC BY.
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Early astronomers explained the regular movements of the heavenly 
bodies by claiming that they are embedded in concentric crystalline 
spheres. These spheres were invisible to human observers on Earth, but 
they probably believed that they could have touched them if they could 
have reached them. 
Newton explained the movements of the heavenly bodies by 
claiming that they exert an invisible gravitational force on each other, 
whose strength is given by a simple equation. Newton could not explain 
how masses attract each other at a distance—at best he could point to 
magnetism as an example of a similar force. However, the invisible 
gravitational force, along with the equations describing it, made good 
predictions about the movements of the heavenly bodies, and so it 
became an accepted part of the physical world. While we can observe 
the effects of gravity in our bubbles of experience—a feeling of heaviness, 
movement of objects towards the Earth—gravity itself is invisible.
The ancient atomists hypothesized that the world is composed of 
invisible entities called atoms. They used the movements, swerves 
and interactions of the atoms to explain the visible properties of the 
world.4 This view was revived in the seventeenth century and later 
used to explain phenomena, such as the pressure and temperature 
of a gas. Although our theories about elementary particles have been 
substantially revised, atomism continues to play an important role in 
our understanding of the physical world.
Atoms and their constituent particles are invisible explanations 
because they never directly appear in our bubbles of experience. An 
atom might emit an electromagnetic wave that leads to an experience 
of red, but we experience the red, not the atom itself. We can generate 
pictures of atoms using a scanning tunnelling microscope, but these are 
the result of a complex technological process—not a direct view of the 
atoms themselves.
Our modern invisible explanations have become increasingly 
abstract. We now use complex mathematical equations to describe the 
behaviour of wave-particles and highly folded fields. These invisible 
explanations can be used to make accurate predictions about the 
behaviour of objects in our bubbles of experience. 
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Invisible physical explanations are extremely important to us. For 
non-religious people the physical world is all there is: a complete 
understanding of it would be a complete understanding of everything.
Whichever invisible explanations you accept, their common factor is 
that they are, by definition, invisible. They are hypotheses that go beyond 
our experiences in order to explain and make sense of our experiences. 
The effects of invisible entities appear in our bubbles of experience, never 
the invisible entities themselves.
2.3 Primary and Secondary Qualities
The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire, or snow, are 
really in them, whether anyone’s senses perceive them or no: and therefore 
they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. 
But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them, than sickness 
or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see 
light, or colours, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the 
nose smell, and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds as they are such 
particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. 
bulk, figure, and motion of parts.
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding5
Some honey is in my bubble of experience. It feels warm and sticky. It 
is a dark semi-translucent brown colour. I taste the honey—it is sweet. I 
put the honey in a box and close the lid. Although the honey is no longer 
in my bubble of experience, it is natural to assume that it continues to be 
sweet, warm, sticky, and semi-translucent dark brown in colour.
I pass the honey to Zampano. He tastes the honey. ‘Cor blimey stab 
me vitals,’ he says, ‘that’s some bitter honey.’ In his bubble of experience 
the honey is bitter. So is the honey sweet, bitter, both sweet and bitter, or 
neither when it is outside our bubbles of experience?6
The honey changes colour when I put it in different contexts and 
expose it to light of different colours (see Figure 2.3). What is the colour 
of the honey in and of itself? What is the colour of the honey when it 
is outside my bubble of experience? When it is in the dark? When it is 
viewed by a snake?
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These contradictions in an object’s 
properties can be resolved by an account 
of perception that attributes some 
properties to the physical world and other 
properties to the interaction between the 
physical world and the senses. A good 
example of this approach is Galileo’s and 
Locke’s distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities.7 Primary qualities, 
such as size, shape and movement, are 
properties of the objects themselves. 
Secondary qualities, such as colour, 
smell and sound, arise when the physical 
world interacts with the senses—they are 
not properties of physical objects. 
The size, shape and movement of 
honey are primary qualities: properties 
that honey has regardless of whether it 
is perceived or not. These properties are 
intrinsic to all physical objects. The colour 
and sweetness of honey are secondary 
qualities that arise when honey interacts 
with a person’s senses. When honey is 
outside all bubbles of experience it is not 
sweet, bitter or coloured in any way. 
Different bodies have different sense organs and interact in 
different ways with their environment. This explains how the same 
physical object can produce different secondary qualities in different 
people. When honey interacts with my senses it produces sensations of 
warmth, sweetness and a dark semi-translucent brown colour. When 
it interacts with Zampano’s senses it produces coldness, bitterness 
and a dark semi-translucent orange colour. This account of perception 
avoids the attribution of contradictory properties to the same physical 
object. It explains how honey can be perceived as sweet by some people 
Figure 2.3. Colour illusion. 
The jars of honey are identical; 
the shaded background makes 
the top jar appear to be darker 
in colour. Image © David 
Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
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and as bitter by others; why the same patch has different colours in 
different contexts.8
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities was 
developed in response to the revival of atomism in the seventeenth 
century. Atoms were hypothesized to be the fundamental constituents 
of the physical world and primary qualities were properties of the 
atoms. Interactions between atoms in the environment and atoms in our 
bodies led to the appearance of secondary qualities, such as redness and 
sweetness (see Figure 2.4). 
Locke believed that the primary qualities in our bubbles of experience 
resemble primary qualities in the physical world:
[…] the ideas of primary qualities of bodies, are resemblances of them, and 
their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas, 
produced in us by these secondary qualities, have no resemblance of them at 
all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves. 
They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to 
produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue or warm in idea, 
is but the certain bulk, figure and motion of the insensible parts in the 
bodies themselves […]9
When I am hugging a moving medium-sized bear in my online 
bubble of experience there is a moving medium-sized bear in the 
physical world. According to Locke the size, shape and motion of the 
bear in my bubble of experience match the size, shape and motion of the 
bear in the physical world. However, there is no growling sound, brown 
colour or pungent bear-smell in the physical world. Air vibrations, 
electromagnetic waves and molecules in the physical world interact 
with my sense organs to produce the growling sound, brown colour, 
and pungent bear-smell in my bubble of experience. 
The primary qualities of physical objects are perceived through their 
secondary qualities. We cannot discover the size, shape or motion of 
an object without perceiving its colour, hearing its sound or touching 
it. Objects might possess their primary qualities independently of our 
perception of them, but these primary qualities can only appear in our 
bubbles of experience when they are clothed in secondary qualities. 
Physical objects are completely invisible without secondary qualities.
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Figure 2.4. Primary and secondary qualities. The physical world consists of atoms 
with primary qualities, such as size, movement and shape. When atoms interact 
with a person’s sense organs they give rise to secondary qualities, such as colour, 
smell, taste and warmth, that appear in their bubble of experience. Image © David 
Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
2.4 Bubbles of Experience and the Brain
When I hit my head my bubble of experience is filled with bright 
points of light. Stimulation of my brain with electrodes evokes visual, 
auditory and somatic sensations. Brain damage damages my bubble 
of experience. My experiences can be altered by changing my brain’s 
chemical state. 
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The link between my bubble of experience and my brain is not 
logically necessary—it would not be a contradiction if a blow to my liver 
produced bright points of light. However, in this world, with these laws 
of nature, the strong correlations between my bubble of experience and 
my brain suggest that without my brain I would not have a bubble of 
experience at all.
Some people believe that bubbles of experience are linked to 
spatiotemporal patterns that are distributed across the brain, body and 
environment.10 This can be broken down into two claims: 
1. Offline bubbles of experience are linked to spatiotemporal 
patterns in the brain, body and environment.
2. Rich vivid stable bubbles of experience are linked to 
spatiotemporal patterns in the brain, body and environment.
Offline bubbles of experience occur when there is little or no 
interaction between the brain, body and environment. This suggests that 
the first claim is false and offline bubbles of experience are solely linked 
with brain states. The second claim is difficult to test because rich vivid 
stable bubbles of experience typically occur when a brain is interacting 
with its environment (when a bubble of experience is online). However, 
given everything that we know about the brain, I believe that it is more 
reasonable and economical to assume that all bubbles of experience are 
linked with brain activity alone.11 This assumption cannot be proved 
at the present time, and it should be revised if it can be shown that 
a body and environment are essential for rich vivid stable bubbles of 
experience.12
When we are immersed in an online bubble of experience our bodies 
are interacting with our environment and our sense organs are passing 
streams of spikes13 down our nerves and changing the states of our 
brains (see Figure 2.5). When we are immersed in an offline bubble of 
experience the states of our brains are changing independently of our 
body and environment. In both cases I will assume that our bubbles of 
experience are only linked with states of our brains.
In the previous section it was suggested that primary qualities are 
perceived through secondary qualities and that the primary qualities in 
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Figure 2.5. The relationship between a bubble of experience and a brain. I have 
assumed that the brain is the only part of the body that is linked to a bubble of 
experience. Signals from the world interact with the sense organs, which send 
streams of spikes down the nerves to the brain. The resulting brain state is linked 
with a bubble of experience. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
an online bubble of experience directly correspond to primary qualities 
in the world. The pungent bear-smell did not exist in the physical world; 
the size, shape and movement of the bear in my bubble of experience 
matched or resembled the size, shape and movement of the physical bear.
Modern science has interposed the brain between bubbles of 
experience and objects in the physical world. Our experiences of size, 
shape and movement are now thought to be linked to firing patterns 
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in populations of neurons. Now there is no direct connection between 
bubbles of experience and the physical world. Why, then, should we 
assume that primary qualities in our bubbles of experience resemble 
primary qualities in the physical world? Why should we believe that 
space and time in our bubbles of experience resemble space and time in 
the physical world?14
A computer is driving a car. Its memory consists of voltages that 
are updated by cameras, lasers and GPS. As the information in the 
sensors changes the voltage patterns change, and the program uses 
this information to calculate signals that are sent to control the brakes, 
accelerator, gears and steering. The computer’s voltage patterns are 
connected to the environment through the sensors, but they do not 
resemble the environment. The voltage pattern that encodes the shape 
of the road does not curve and it is not the same size as the road. The 
motion of the car is held as a single voltage pattern that does not move 
like the car and only changes when the measured velocity changes.
Back in Locke’s day the physical world was believed to be composed 
of atoms, which were easy to imagine as tiny bouncing grey spheres. 
It was natural to assume that the physical world was just like the 
perceived world, except for the secondary qualities, which were added 
by the process of perception. The motion, size and shape of the objects 
were identical to the motion, size and shape of our experiences of the 
objects—we were indeed seeing the things themselves. 
Today the physical world has become unimaginable. We cannot 
imagine what a wave-particle or a ten-dimensional superstring is like. 
We have lost all reasons for believing in resemblance between our 
bubbles of experience and the physical world. We have no grounds for 
attributing either the primary or the secondary qualities of our bubbles 
of experience to the invisible world described by modern physics.15
We cannot prove that a physical bear is not identical to the appearance 
of a bear in a bubble of experience. And we have little reason to believe 
that a physical bear does resemble a bear in a bubble of experience. We 
just don’t know and cannot know. We cannot reach beyond our senses to 
see the physical world as it is in itself. We have to suspend judgment 
about what the physical world is really like.16
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Figure 2.6. Interpretation of physical objects as black boxes. We have to suspend 
judgement about the appearance of the physical flowers and treat them as a 
black box that is a source of electromagnetic waves, molecules and mechanical 
stimulation. These signals stimulate the sense organs, which pass streams of spikes 
along nerves to the brain. The resulting brain activity is linked with a bubble of 
experience in which coloured, smelly, tasty, spatially and temporally extended 
flowers appear. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.17
As far as we are concerned physical objects are black boxes that 
interact with each other in accordance with the laws of physics. They 
are also sources of signals that enter our senses and are processed into 
spiking patterns that are sent along nerves to our physical brains, where 
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they are transformed into more spiking patterns, which have some 
kind of connection with bubbles of experience that contain the coloured 
warm smelly faces of the people we love (see Figure 2.6). Russell makes 
this point well:
Modern physics, therefore, reduces matter to a set of events which 
proceed outward from a centre. If there is something further in the 
centre itself, we cannot know about it, and it is irrelevant to physics. 
[…] Physics is mathematical, not because we know so much about the 
physical world, but because we know so little: it is only its mathematical 
properties that we can discover. For the rest, our knowledge is negative. 
In places where there are no eyes or ears or brains there are no colours 
or sounds, but there are events having certain characteristics which 
lead them to cause colours and sounds in places where there are eyes, 
ears and brains. We cannot find out what the world looks like from 
a place where there is nobody, because if we go to look there will be 
somebody there; the attempt is as hopeless as trying to jump on one’s 
own shadow.18
You are holding a brain in your hands: it is soft, warm and slightly 
sticky with blood. You lick it. It tastes of blood. You smell it—a humid, 
fresh, slightly meaty smell. It is reddish grey in colour. You drop it 
onto a marble worktop—a thwacking splat of sound. It has a size and a 
convoluted texture. It moves when slapped or thrown through the air. 
This is how the brain appears in your bubble of experience. 
Now remove the properties that appeared when the brain interacted 
with your senses. Now the brain is colourless, silent, odourless; it is 
neither warm nor cold, neither soft nor hard; in fact it has no perceptible 
properties at all. Drop the illusion that the motion, size, shape, 
and spatiotemporal properties of the physical brain are preserved 
unchanged in your bubble of experience. All of these properties are 
transformed beyond all recognition by the neural encoding process. 
The physical brain vanishes: it can no longer appear as it is in itself in 
your bubble of experience. As far as you are concerned, physical brains 
are black boxes, just like every other object in the physical world. This 
is illustrated in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7. The relationship between a bubble of experience and an invisible 
physical brain. As far as we are concerned all objects in the physical world, 
including our bodies and brains, are black boxes. The arrows show the interactions 
between these objects in accordance with the laws of physics. Objects in the 
environment are sources of signals that lead to brain activity that has some kind 
of connection with a bubble of experience. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
2.5 The Emergence of the Concept of 
Consciousness
I look to the right and see a dirty grey wall. I look to the left and see a 
black lamppost with scratches and flaking paint. Ahead of me a decrepit 
old man hobbles along a derelict street. I am awake, not dead, but 
consciousness is not present anywhere—there is no consciousness in the 
man’s stained trousers, no consciousness in the dirt, no consciousness 
in the smell of dog piss. Nor does consciousness appear when I turn my 
attention to my ulcerating stomach and painful feet. Consciousness is 
completely absent from my bubble of experience as I view the street. My 
reports are not driven by a thing or property called consciousness. I can 
describe everything without mentioning consciousness once.
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Within naive realism there is no need for a concept of consciousness. 
People perceive different things with different levels of clarity and have 
different levels of wakefulness. Primary and secondary qualities are 
properties of the objects themselves, which they possess independently 
of whether they are being perceived. 
The scientific revolution revived atomic theories and led to an 
unimaginable world of superstrings and wave-particles. As our physics 
developed, the objects that we encountered in naive realism were 
stripped of their colours, sounds, tastes and smells and sank into an 
invisible physical world. A tree ceased to be a tree—it became a colourless 
collection of jigging atoms, a probability distribution of wave-particles.
Physical trees became black box sources of signals; green trees 
continued to creak and sway in our bubbles of experience. We 
attempted to explain them away, and yet there they were in front of us 
with properties that could not be neatly shoehorned into the world of 
physics. We had to find a way of grouping, describing and explaining 
the colourful, smelly, noisy properties that were originally attributed to 
objects in naive realism.
We solved this problem by inventing the modern concept of 
consciousness. ‘Consciousness’ became a name for bubbles of experience, 
which were reinterpreted in relation to an invisible physical world. This 
is formally stated as follows:19
D1. Consciousness is another name for bubbles of experience. A state of 
a consciousness is a state of a bubble of experience.20 Consciousness 
includes all of the properties that were removed from the physical 
world as scientists developed our modern invisible explanations. 
Initially the modern concept of consciousness emerged in response 
to the renaissance of atomism. In the seventeenth century the physical 
world was believed to only have primary qualities—secondary qualities 
were excluded from this world and developed a separate existence of 
their own that demanded an explanation. The solution was to package 
up secondary qualities with the concepts of mind, thinking substance 
and consciousness. This interpretation of consciousness is nicely 
summarized by Galileo:
 272. The Emergence of the Concept of Consciousness
Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, 
I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having 
this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, 
and in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at 
rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and as being one in 
number, or few, or many. From these conditions I cannot separate such 
a substance by any stretch of my imagination. But that it must be white 
or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of sweet or foul odour, my 
mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments. 
Without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided would 
probably never arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes, 
odours, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the 
object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only 
in the consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all 
these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated. But since we have 
imposed on them special names, distinct from those of the other and real 
qualities mentioned previously, we wish to believe that they really exist 
as different from those.21
The twentieth century developed the concept of consciousness to 
its logical conclusion. Our theories about the physical world became 
mathematical and abstract—they make beautiful predictions, but they 
are no longer based on the everyday properties and objects that we 
encounter in our bubbles of experience. The twentieth century also 
developed theories about how bubbles of experience are linked to the 
brain. This eliminated our reasons for believing that primary qualities 
in our bubbles of experience resemble primary qualities in the physical 
world. While physics is perceived to be the true or ultimate reality, we 
continue to be immersed in bubbles of experience in our daily lives: 
our need to express and address this issue led to the modern concept of 
consciousness. This trajectory from naive realism to twentieth century 
science and consciousness is illustrated in Figure 2.8.
The contents of a person’s consciousness are the objects and properties 
in their bubble of experience. When a burning bush is in my bubble of 
experience, the colour, smell, taste, heat and sound of the burning bush 
are the contents of my consciousness. When I say ‘I am conscious of 
hissing sap and orange flames,’ I am stating that hissing sap and orange 
flames are in my bubble of experience. 
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Many consciousness experiments are based on the idea that a 
person has a particular level of consciousness. A person’s overall level 
of consciousness can be defined as the average intensity of the contents 
of their bubble of experience.22 A high intensity, vivid, stable bubble 
of experience with high resolution is consciousness at a high level. A 
bubble of experience that contains a few faint and unstable objects is 
consciousness at a low level. We say that Zampano is conscious when 
his physical brain is associated with a bubble of experience that has non-
zero intensity.23 We say that Zampano is unconscious when his physical 
brain is not associated with a bubble of experience.
The distinction between online and offline bubbles of experience can 
be expressed in terms of online and offline conscious contents:24
• Online conscious contents are linked to states of the 
environment and are updated in response to changes in the 
environment. The environment is functionally connected to 
online conscious contents.25
• Offline conscious contents are independent of the environment. 
There is no functional connection between the current 
environment and offline conscious contents.
Consciousness can contain a mixture of online and offline contents. 
When I worship at the tombs of my ancestors the shadowy form of 
my grandfather rises from his grave, winks and raises his hat. My 
grandfather and his hat are offline conscious contents; the tombs and 
surrounding graveyard are online conscious contents.26
A suggestive piece of evidence for a link between the rise of science 
and the emergence of the concept of consciousness is Wilkes’ observation 
that there was no word for consciousness in the English language prior 
to the seventeenth century or in ancient Greek or Chinese: 
Two intriguing facts. First, the terms ‘mind’ and ‘conscious(ness)’ are 
notoriously difficult to translate into some other languages. Second, in 
English (and other European languages) one of these terms—‘conscious’ 
and its cognates—is in its present range of senses scarcely three 
centuries old. […] In ancient Greek there is nothing corresponding to 
either ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ […] In Chinese, there are considerable 
problems in capturing ‘conscious(ness)’. And in Croatian, ‘mind’ poses 
interesting difficulties.27
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There are contexts in which our modern English word for consciousness 
can be translated into ancient Greek or Chinese—for example, by 
‘psyche’, ‘Sophia’, ‘nous’, ‘metanoia’ or ‘aesthesis’ in ancient Greek, or 
by ‘yìshì’ in Chinese. However, Wilkes claims that there is no generally 
adequate translation that captures our current use of ‘consciousness’. 
According to Wilkes, this linguistic data shows that the modern 
concept of consciousness covers a number of disparate phenomena:
• Whether someone is awake or asleep.
• Body sensations, such as itches and pains.
• Sensory experience—for example, colours, tastes and smells.
• Ascription of propositional attitudes, such as deliberating, 
pondering, desiring and believing.
This leads Wilkes to conclude that consciousness is unlikely to be a 
natural kind or something that we can study scientifically:
Essentially, I am trying to say two distinguishable things. First, that in all 
the contexts in which it tends to be deployed, the term ‘conscious’ and 
its cognates are, for scientific purposes, both unhelpful and unnecessary. 
The assorted domains of research, so crudely indicated by the ordinary 
language term, can and should be carved up into taxonomies that cross-
classify those which emphasis on ‘consciousness’ would suggest. Second, 
that we have little if any reason to suppose that these various domains 
have anything interesting in common: that is, consciousness will not just 
be a (cluster) natural kind.28
However, Wilkes’ observations about ‘consciousness’ can be 
interpreted to support the idea that consciousness is a modern name 
for a bubble of experience. Bubbles of experience are natural kinds that 
are common to all people speaking all languages. We all see red objects, 
feel heat, smell flowers and taste meat. However, scientific theories 
about an invisible physical world are a recent product of a great deal 
of conceptual, technological and experimental effort. Earlier societies 
lacked our interpretation of physical reality, so it is not surprising that 
our modern concept of consciousness is absent from ancient Greek, 
Chinese and the English language prior to the seventeenth century. 
Bubbles of experience were once understood in relation to an invisible 
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world of gods and spirits. Once we started to believe in a physical world 
of atoms and forces, the colourful conscious world (that is manifestly not 
composed of atoms and forces) emerged as a separate area of inquiry.
One potential problem for this interpretation of consciousness is 
that it was not developed by the ancient atomists. Since they believed 
that colours, sounds and smells are not properties of atoms, it would 
have been natural to place them in a second substance, such as mind or 
consciousness. So why was consciousness (or a similar concept) absent 
from ancient Greek, but developed by atomists in the seventeenth 
century?
This problem would be resolved if the ancient atomists did invent 
a word for consciousness that did not enter common usage and was 
lost, or if they expressed the concept in a more indirect way. Although 
very little material is left from the ancient Greek atomists, it might be 
possible to find traces of a concept of consciousness in their work. A 
second possibility is that the ancient atomists might have believed that 
secondary qualities could be reduced to primary qualities. Plenty of 
people today believe that consciousness can be reduced to the physical 
world, so it would not be surprising if the ancient atomists had a similar 
view.29 It is also possible that the consequences of ancient atomism were 
not fully worked out. At the time atomism was one of a large number of 
highly speculative theories about the world and it is conceivable that the 
small number of people who believed in atomism did not have the time 
or resources to develop it fully. Today our theories about the physical 
world are subject to wide agreement, which has led to a general need 
for a concept of consciousness to contain the properties that have been 
excluded from the physical world.
2.6 Summary
Most of our lives are spent in a state of naive realism in which we attribute 
colours, sounds and smells to objects in our environment. I developed 
the concept of a bubble of experience to describe how we only perceive 
part of the world at one time, and to accommodate observations about 
dreams, imagination and hallucination.
32 Human and Machine Consciousness
The physical world is an invisible source of signals that interact with 
our sense organs to produce patterns in our brains that are somehow 
connected with our bubbles of experience. There is unlikely to be any 
resemblance between the contents of our bubbles of experience and the 
physical world.
When science eliminated sensory properties from the physical world 
it was necessary to find a way of grouping, describing and explaining 
the colours, sounds and smells that we continue to encounter in 
daily life. We solved this problem by inventing the modern concept 
of consciousness. ‘Consciousness’ is another name for our bubbles of 
experience, which contain the sensory properties that science removed 
from the physical world. 
3. The Philosophy and Science of 
Consciousness
3.1 Understanding Consciousness
How should I understand and explain my wife? I can describe the 
changes in her hair and skin colour as she moves about in the light. I can 
objectify her body or relate to her as the Other—she faces me, crushes 
me, makes me feel guilty. I can use Eros and Thanatos to analyze her 
psychology, or interpret her mind as an intricate neural mechanism. I 
can provide an evolutionary explanation of her features (noting a trace 
of Homo heidelbergensis in her face).
How should we understand and explain consciousness? 
Phenomenologists bracket off the physical world and describe the 
structure of consciousness from a first-person perspective.1 The starting 
point for phenomenology is our immersion in conscious experience; 
the end point is a description of consciousness that sets aside scientific 
theories about the physical world.
Science has triumphed in the last three hundred years. We send 
people to the moon and grow babies in test tubes. Many people believe 
that science provides a complete description of the world. The predictive 
success of science exerts a commanding weight: we believe in the physical 
world; we are convinced by our scientific explanations and cannot ignore 
them. We need phenomenological descriptions of consciousness, but we 
cannot bracket out scientific theories. Phenomenology is not enough.
Many people explain consciousness by reducing it to features of 
the physical world.2 This is not convincing. It is far from obvious that 
© David Gamez, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0107.03
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colours, sounds and smells can be reduced (with a wave of the hand) to 
wave-particles, superstrings or fields. Colour appears in consciousness 
when colourless electromagnetic waves interact with the physical sense 
organs and change the brain’s activity. But brain activity is silent and 
without smell. Colour and smell are linked to brain activity; they are not 
identical to colourless odourless brain activity.
Bubbles of experience and the physical world are both important 
phenomena. It would be premature to bracket either out or to claim 
that one can be reduced to the other. Both have to be taken seriously. We 
have detailed descriptions of consciousness and a good understanding 
of the physical world—the key gap in our knowledge is the relationship 
between them. 
3.2 The Limits of Imagination
Imagination is an offline bubble of experience.3 We can change the 
contents of this bubble of experience without changing our physical 
environment. We fill it with novel things—recombine the elements of 
our experience in new ways. As I sit at my desk I imagine that I have lost 
my limbs and lie naked on a rocky plain beneath a burning sky. A raven 
is feeding on my liver. 
We use our imagination to solve scientific problems. On separate 
unrelated occasions mutating DNA, tumours, cigarette smoke and 
unregulated cell growth appear in my bubble of experience. I use my 
empirical knowledge about the links between these phenomena to 
visualize the correct sequence from smoking to the appearance of a 
tumour. I do not need direct knowledge of the physical world to do 
this. It is enough that the appearance of cigarette smoke in my bubble of 
experience corresponds to the presence of smoke in the physical world, 
that the appearance of mutating DNA in my bubble of experience 
corresponds to the presence of mutating DNA in the physical world, 
and so on (see Figure 3.1). We have an intuitively satisfying explanation 
of the relationship between phenomena when we can visualize the 
intermediate steps between them.
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Figure 3.1. The use of imagination to solve a scientific problem. a) On separate 
occasions mutating DNA, tumours, cigarette smoke and unregulated cell growth 
appear in my bubble of experience. I observe sequential relationships between 
pairs of these phenomena, but never the whole story. b) My empirical knowledge 
about the connections between these phenomena enables me to imagine the 
correct sequence of steps from smoking to the appearance of a tumour in the 
lungs. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
Online and offline bubbles of experience have the same properties—
colour, smell, taste, sound and body sensations. These are typically less 
intense in offline bubbles of experience and some are not present at all. 
Objects can vary in wild ways in an offline bubble of experience, but we 
cannot imagine new properties. We cannot imagine properties that we 
have not encountered in an online bubble of experience.
Imagination is an inductive engine that reassembles previous 
experiences. We can imagine pigs playing the piano because we have 
seen pigs and pianos before. If we had never seen pianos and pigs, then 
it is unlikely that piano-playing pigs would enter our imagination.4 
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We have a limited ability to wilfully transform our offline bubbles 
of experience. It is difficult to imagine radically different forms of 
consciousness. It is difficult or impossible to wilfully morph our bubbles 
of experience into a bat’s bubble of experience (assuming it has one).5 
We cannot imagine things that cannot become conscious. We cannot 
imagine an invisible physical world that has none of the properties that 
we encounter in our bubbles of experience. We can imagine large brains, 
small brains, blue brains, green brains, brains made of cheese, and so 
on. But the physical brain cannot be imagined as it is in itself, outside all 
bubbles of experience.6 
3.3 A Failure of Imagination
How is it possible for conscious states to depend upon brain states? How 
can technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter? What 
makes the bodily organ we call the brain so radically different from 
other bodily organs, say the kidneys—the body parts without a trace of 
consciousness? How could the aggregation of millions of individually 
insentient neurons generate subjective awareness? We know that brains 
are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, no 
understanding whatever of how this can be so. It strikes us as miraculous, 
eerie, even faintly comic. Somehow, we feel, the water of the physical 
brain is turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw a total blank 
on the nature of this conversion. Neural transmissions just seem like 
the wrong kind of materials with which to bring consciousness into the 
world, but it appears that in some way they perform this mysterious feat.
Colin McGinn, Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?7
In 1989 the philosopher Colin McGinn asked the following question 
“How can technicolor phenomenology arise from soggy gray matter?” 
[…] Since then many authors in the field of consciousness research 
have quoted this question over and over, like a slogan that in a nutshell 
conveys a deep and important theoretical problem. It seems that almost 
none of them discovered the subtle trap inherent in this question. The 
brain is not gray. The brain is colorless.
Thomas Metzinger,  
Consciousness Research at the End of the Twentieth Century8
With furrowed brow, buried deep in his leather-bound armchair, the 
Philosopher seeks to untangle the mysteries of consciousness. One of 
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the greatest and hardest problems of his time, or so he has read. He 
imagines the physical world, a grey lifeless sort of place. He imagines 
the brain, a squishy grey thing floating dismally in the air above his 
dirty glass coffee table. He imagines the colour RED. Bracing himself for 
the challenge, he attempts to solve the Hard Problem of Consciousness. 
Many have failed before him, but his obvious brilliance and intellectual 
arrogance will surely enable him to triumph. Perspiration breaks out on 
his brow. ‘Gee this is a tough one.’ He struggles to imagine how activity 
in the grey brain could cause or be the colour red. Or how the colour 
red could be reduced to activity in the grey brain. He changes position, 
scratches his crotch, picks his nose. He is sure that he can solve it, write 
that brilliant paper, receive the rapturous admiration of his peers. ‘Just 
a bit more time; perhaps a coffee will help.’
The relationship between consciousness and the physical world is 
often addressed in a thought experiment in which we bring to mind an 
image of the brain (coloured grey) and an image of something conscious 
(the colour red), and try to imagine how they are related. This is often 
described as a hard problem of consciousness because it is impossible 
for us to imagine how neural activity could cause or be the colour red.9
The physical brain has none of the properties that are present in 
consciousness. It is not grey; it is not soggy—it is invisible and cannot 
be imagined by us. So thought experiments and imagination cannot be 
used to study the relationship between invisible physical brains and 
conscious experiences. They can only be used to study the relationship 
between our conscious experiences of brains and other conscious 
experiences. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
3.4 Regularities in Conscious Experiences
We can observe regularities in our conscious experiences. Suppose I am 
connected to a device that shows the state of my brain on a screen. When 
an ice cube is placed in my left hand I observe brain pattern p1 on the 
screen. When I have memorized p1 I can make an imaginative transition 
from p1 to a cold sensation: whenever I think about p1 I imagine an ice 
cube. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3.10
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Figure 3.2. Imagination cannot be used to understand the relationship between 
consciousness and the invisible physical world. A philosopher imagines a child 
with her brain exposed holding a red balloon. He wants to understand the 
relationship between the colour red and the invisible physical brain, but he can 
only imagine the relationship between the colour red and his conscious experience 
of a grey brain. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
We find it hard to imagine how our conscious experiences of brains 
are related to other conscious experiences because we have had little 
exposure to this relationship.11 Imagination is an inductive engine—it 
needs to be exposed to an association between A and B before it can 
imagine a transition from A to B. As technology develops we will have 
more conscious experiences of brain activity, which will enable us to 
develop intuitive links between our conscious experiences of brain 
patterns and other conscious experiences. This is nicely illustrated by 
Rorty’s example of the Antipodeans:12
In most respects, then, the language, life, technology, and philosophy of 
this race were much like ours. But there was one important difference. 
Neurology and biochemistry had been the first disciplines in which 
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Figure 3.3. Learnt association between consciously experienced brain activity and 
the sensation of an ice cube. a) The subject wears a device that displays his brain 
activity on a screen. When an ice cube is placed in his left hand he observes and 
memorizes the brain pattern, p1, that appears on the screen. b) At a later time the 
subject views p1 when he is not holding an ice cube. He makes an imaginative 
transition from his conscious experience of p1 to a conscious experience of an ice 
cube. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0. 
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the technological breakthroughs had been achieved, and a large part 
of the conversation of these people concerned the state of their nerves. 
When their infants veered towards hot stoves, mothers cried out, 
“He’ll stimulate his c-fibers.” When people were given clever visual 
illusions to look at, they said, “How odd! It makes neuronic bundle 
G-14 quiver, but when I look at it from the side I can see that its [sic] 
not a red rectangle at all.” Their knowledge of physiology was such 
that each well formed sentence could easily be correlated with a readily 
identifiable neural state.13
We can observe regularities in our consciousness without raising 
hard philosophical problems. But our rudimentary brain scanning 
technology does not show us the relationship between conscious 
experiences of brain activity and other conscious experiences, so we 
cannot imagine this relationship. The Antipodeans have better access to 
their brains, so they can easily imagine the connection between activity 
in neuronic bundle G-14 and a conscious experience of a red rectangle.14
3.5 Brute Regularities
We might still ask how or why activity in the physical brain is linked to 
conscious states.
When we observe a connection between two physical events we 
can typically drill down to a more detailed account of the relationship 
between them. In the smoking example, we can fill in the link between 
cigarette smoke and DNA mutations with a more detailed story about 
biochemical reactions, which can be explained in terms of atomic and 
subatomic events. We can have conscious experiences that very roughly 
correspond to each intermediate stage. 
In the case of consciousness we are looking for a relationship between 
something that is physical and properties that are not attributed to the 
physical world (colour, smell, etc.). However much data we gain about 
consciousness and the brain there is bound to be a gap in the imaginative 
story. We can learn everything there is to know about links between 
conscious experiences of brain activity and other conscious experiences, 
but we will still reach a point at which we simply have to accept that a 
particular brain state is connected with a particular conscious state. A 
physical brain activity pattern could simply be associated with red—this 
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might be a brute regularity that cannot be broken down and analyzed 
any further.
Brute regularities exist in the other sciences. At a certain point we 
simply have to accept that the physical world works in a way that we can 
describe but cannot explain. For example, the behaviour of superstrings 
or elementary wave-particles can be described but not explained—it 
is the starting point for higher level physical explanations.15 Scientists 
cannot say why physical brute regularities exist. They are simply how 
the universe works. 
Physics gives a detailed hierarchical description of the relationships 
between physical things, ranging from the interactions between 
elementary wave-particles up to the behaviour of planets and galaxies. 
Brute regularities lie at the bottom of this hierarchy—at the level of 
superstrings and elementary wave-particles.16
Our understanding of the relationship between consciousness and 
the physical world is at an early stage of development. We have no idea 
what the brute regularities of consciousness science will be. They could 
be simple relationships between novel physical properties and atoms of 
conscious experience, or they could be more complex regularities linking 
distributed brain activity patterns to complex conscious experiences. 
Some people think that brute regularities are hard problems. But 
genuine brute regularities are not problems at all. They are basic facts 
about the way the universe works. Other phenomena pose problems 
that can be solved in terms of brute regularities. The brute regularities 
themselves can only be described—they cannot be understood or 
explained.
3.6 Summary
Idealists reject the physical world; phenomenologists suspend 
judgement about it; physicalists claim that consciousness is the physical 
world. None of these positions is convincing. Consciousness and the 
physical world both have to be taken seriously as real phenomena. We 
can study the relationship between them and suspend judgement about 
the metaphysical debates.
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We cannot imagine the invisible physical world. So thought 
experiments and imagination cannot be used to study the relationship 
between invisible physical brains and conscious experiences. They can 
only be used to study the relationship between our conscious experiences 
of brains and other conscious experiences. As brain-scanning technology 
improves we will find it easier to make imaginative transitions between 
conscious experiences of brain states and other conscious experiences. 
At some point the science of consciousness will encounter brute 
regularities in the relationship between consciousness and the physical 
world that can be described, but not explained. Brute regularities exist 
in the other sciences. We have no idea what the brute regularities of 
consciousness science will be.
The rest of this book suggests how a systematic science of 
consciousness can be developed. We can measure consciousness, 
measure the physical world and develop mathematical theories of 
the relationship between these measurements. Scientists measure 
consciousness using first-person reports, which raises traditional 
philosophical problems of zombies, solipsism, colour inversion and 
inaccessible consciousness. These problems cannot be solved, but they 
can be neutralized using the framework of definitions and assumptions 
that is set out in the next chapter.
4. The Measurement of 
Consciousness
Consciousness just is not the sort of thing that can be measured directly. 
What, then, do we do without a consciousness meter? How can the 
search go forward? How does all this experimental research proceed?
I think the answer is this: we get there with principles of interpretation, 
by which we interpret physical systems to judge the presence of 
consciousness. We might call these preexperimental bridging principles. 
They are the criteria that we bring to bear in looking at systems to say (1) 
whether or not they are conscious now, and (2) which information they 
are conscious of, and which they are not.
David Chalmers,  
On the Search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness1
4.1 First-Person Reports about Consciousness 
(C-Reports)
I am standing with my friend Olaf in a field of poppies. ‘Look Olaf,’ I 
say, ‘the poppies are red, the sky is blue and the leaves are green.’ ‘By 
the blood of Grendel,’ he replies, ‘I can hear the sound of a bird singing 
and feel a sensation of warmth in my left foot.’ 
In earlier times my chat with Olaf would have been interpreted 
as a conversation about the world. Over the last three hundred years 
science has sucked colour, sound and warmth out of the world and 
reinterpreted them as consciousness. Statements like ‘The poppies are 
red’ or ‘There is a rusty helmet on the ground’ have become descriptions 
of consciousness.2
I am certain that I can speak about my consciousness. I cannot 
doubt that ‘The poppies are red’ is a true statement about my bubble 
© David Gamez, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0107.04
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of experience. I would be more willing to jettison the entire edifice of 
science, than abandon my belief that I can describe my consciousness.3 
I can speak about my consciousness. I can describe my consciousness 
by pushing buttons and pulling levers. I can reply to questions about 
my consciousness by putting my brain into different states in a fMRI 
scanner.4 
Olaf is alert. He can flexibly respond to novel situations. He can 
inwardly execute a sequence of problem-solving steps. He can execute 
a delayed reaction to a stimulus and respond to verbal commands.5 He 
is willing to bet a large amount of money that there is a rusty helmet 
in the field of poppies.6 These behaviours can be used to make reliable 
inferences about the contents and level of Olaf’s consciousness, even 
when he is not explicitly reporting his consciousness.7
I punch Olaf in the face. He falls to the ground and lies still. His 
stillness and lack of response are external signs that his brain is not 
associated with a bubble of experience, that his level of consciousness 
is zero.
When Olaf regains consciousness he exhibits groggy behaviour. 
l interpret this as a sign that he has a low level of consciousness. He 
is never quite the same again and often behaves in a similar way to a 
patient described by Damasio:
Suddenly the man stopped, in midsentence, and his face lost animation; 
his mouth froze, still open, and his eyes became vacuously fixed on some 
point on the wall behind me. For a few seconds he remained motionless. 
I spoke his name but there was no reply. Then he began to move a little, 
he smacked his lips, his eyes shifted to the table between us, he seemed 
to see a cup of coffee and a small metal vase of flowers; he must have 
because he picked up the cup and drank from it. I spoke to him again 
and again he did not reply. He touched the vase. I asked him what was 
going on and he did not reply, his face had no expression. […] Now he 
turned around and walked slowly to the door. I got up and called him 
again. He stopped, he looked at me, and some expression returned to 
his face—he looked perplexed. I called him again and he said, “What?”8
When Olaf is in this state he is not capable of executing a sequence of 
problem-solving steps. He does not flexibly respond to novel situations. 
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He cannot execute a delayed reaction to a stimulus. We interpret his 
behaviour as a sign that he has zero consciousness, that he is not 
immersed in a bubble of experience.
Any behaviour that can be interpreted as a measurement of the 
level and/or contents of a person’s consciousness will be referred to as 
a c-report:
D2. A c-report is a physical behaviour that is interpreted as a report 
about a person’s consciousness.
A c-report is a measurement of consciousness. This measurement is 
indirect—Olaf’s bubble of experience does not appear in my bubble of 
experience.
Indirect measurements are standard scientific practice. When I 
measure the path of a particle, the particle does not directly appear in 
my bubble of experience. I have to create an experimental situation in 
which the particle creates a visible trace, such as a track of bubbles in a 
chamber. Theories about the physical world link the bubble track to the 
path of the invisible particle.
4.2 Reports about Non-Conscious  
Mental Content (NC-Reports)
Olaf thinks a lot about his sweetheart Olga. As he crosses the field of 
poppies he is thinking about her corn-blond plaits, her inviting smile, 
her chequered billowing skirt, her strong smooth thighs. He is not aware 
of the stones in his boots, the white crosses in the field or the hot sun 
on his face. None of these are in his bubble of experience, although he 
could bring them into his bubble of experience if he stopped thinking 
about Olga’s thighs and focused on his body and surroundings.
As Olaf walks and thinks about Olga, the sensory data from the 
field of poppies is used by his brain to generate control signals that are 
sent to his muscles. This sensory data does not appear in his bubble of 
experience. It is unconscious or non-conscious information.
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I present a picture of Olga to Olaf’s right eye and a picture of Olaf’s 
ex-wife Ingrid to his left eye. He experiences a phenomenon called 
binocular rivalry in which Olga’s picture is perceived for a few seconds 
while Ingrid’s is non-conscious, and then Ingrid’s picture becomes 
conscious and Olga’s non-conscious. When Ingrid’s picture is non-
conscious it is still being processed by Olaf’s brain, which responds to 
the shape of her sharp tongue in her hard mouth.9
I show Ingrid’s picture to Olaf for 30 ms in the middle of a sequence 
of scrambled images. Under these conditions Ingrid’s picture does not 
enter Olaf’s bubble of experience, but it does cause Olaf to complete 
word fragments with Ingrid-related words and alters the conductivity 
of his skin.10 When I ask Olaf to guess which picture was shown he picks 
Ingrid’s picture more often than chance.11
All of these behaviours can be used to identify mental contents that 
are being processed non-consciously. They are nc-reports:
D3. A nc-report is a physical behaviour that is interpreted as a report 
about non-conscious mental content. 
4.3 Platinum Standard Systems
C-reports about consciousness can be found everywhere. The sigh of 
waves can be interpreted as a c-report. Or consider the following snippet 
of code: 
1. string input = "";
2. cout<<"Hello"<<endl;
3. while (input != "Goodbye"){
4.   getline(cin, input);
5.   if (input == "Are you conscious?")
6.     cout<<"Yes"<<endl;
7.   else if (input == "Are you a cute leetle kitten?")
8.     cout<<"Yes, my eyes are blue and I cry 'Mew mew mew'."<<endl;
9.   else if (input == "Goodbye")
10.    cout<<"Goodbye"<<endl;
11.  else
12.    cout<<"Nice weather for the time of year."<<endl;
13. }
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A computer running this code will claim that it is conscious. It will also 
claim that it is a cute leetle kitten. Neither claim is convincing.
My wife is a zombie. She hides from light and shuffles home from 
work with dead eyes, drinks in the pub with dead eyes, makes love 
with dead eyes. Her physical body is not associated with a bubble of 
experience. Her zombie statements about ‘consciousness’ are not 
descriptions of a bubble of experience. They are just empty sounds 
produced by biochemical processes. 
My wife is a professional phenomenologist. She says many things 
that appear to be descriptions of a bubble of experience. I cannot 
directly observe her lack of consciousness, so how can I prove that 
she is a zombie? How can I prove that other people’s bodies are really 
associated with bubbles of experience? This is the traditional problem 
of other minds.
To scientifically study consciousness we need a physical system 
that is associated with consciousness. Since it is impossible to prove 
that particular physical systems are conscious, we have to set aside 
philosophical worries about solipsism and zombies and assume that 
one or more physical systems are actually conscious. I will do this by 
introducing the concept of a platinum standard system: 
D4. A platinum standard system is a physical system that is assumed to 
be associated with consciousness some or all of the time.12 
The term ‘platinum standard system’ is a reference to the platinum-
iridium bar that was the first working definition of a metre.13 Other 
objects were directly or indirectly compared to this platinum-iridium 
bar to measure their length. The length of this bar could not be checked 
because it was defined to be one metre long: when this bar expanded, 
everything else contracted.14
Platinum standard systems are the starting point for consciousness 
science. Consciousness is simply assumed to be associated with 
these systems. When we have identified the relationship between 
consciousness and the physical world in platinum standard systems, 
we can use this knowledge to make inferences about the consciousness 
of other systems.
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I was awarded a grant to study consciousness and ordered a 
platinum standard system from the supplier. It was delivered yesterday. 
I poured myself a coffee and strolled over to inspect it. A decent enough 
specimen with a bushy red beard, around 2 m tall. It made angry noises 
and rattled the bars of its cage. I prodded it with a stick and topped up 
its bowl of brown nuggets.
The supplier states that this system is associated with a bubble of 
experience. They are a reputable firm, so I have confidence in their claim. 
On the first day of our experiments we strapped the platinum standard 
system into a chair, held up a red apple and asked it for a c-report. It 
stated that it was conscious of a red apple. A promising start, but it had 
a crafty look in its eye—it might have been lying. Or its consciousness 
might be a delusional world that is completely disconnected from its 
behaviour. I was assured that this system shipped with a bubble of 
experience, but the supplier did not guarantee that I would be able to 
use c-reports to measure its bubble of experience.
Scientists studying consciousness need to measure consciousness. 
While a platinum standard system’s c-reports can be cross-checked for 
consistency, there is no ultimate way of establishing whether they are 
correct. Since c-reports are the only way in which consciousness can be 
measured, it has to be explicitly assumed that c-reports from a platinum 
standard system co-vary with its consciousness:
A1. During an experiment on consciousness, the consciousness 
associated with a platinum standard system is functionally connected 
to the platinum standard system’s c-reports.
A functional connection between consciousness and c-reports is a 
deviation from statistical independence—not necessarily a causal 
connection.15
A1 captures the idea that our consciousness is connected to our 
c-reports. When our consciousness changes, our c-reports change. This 
assumption does not specify the amount of functional connectivity 
between consciousness and c-reports, which will vary with the 
type of c-reporting. A1 is also explicitly limited to experiments on 
consciousness.16 
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Outside of experiments on consciousness it is possible that a system’s 
consciousness could be disconnected from its behaviour. Information 
gathered by consciousness experiments could be used to make inferences 
about the presence of consciousness in these situations. It could also be 
used to make deductions about the consciousness of systems that are not 
platinum standards, such as brain-damaged patients (see Section 9.2).
I contact the supplier. They issue me with a certificate that guarantees 
that their platinum standard systems’ c-reports are functionally 
connected to their consciousness (A1). We resume our experiments and 
identify a neural firing pattern that always occurs when the platinum 
standard system is conscious, and never occurs when it is not conscious. 
We have found the correlates of consciousness! We write up the results 
and submit our paper for publication. 
The paper is rejected. We are devastated and enraged. One 
reviewer argues that our platinum standard system could have several 
consciousnesses. The second reviewer suggests that its bubble of 
experience could have features that are impossible to c-report under any 
circumstances. The third reviewer points out that it might be conscious 
when it is not c-reporting—it would just be unable to remember or 
report its consciousness. At best we have identified a correlate of part of 
its consciousness, not a true correlate of consciousness.
The systematic study of consciousness will be difficult or impossible 
if platinum standard systems are potentially associated with ghostly 
ecosystems of unreportable consciousnesses, or if many aspects of 
consciousness cannot be c-reported. Scientific studies have to assume 
that this is not the case:
A2. During an experiment on consciousness all conscious states 
associated with a platinum standard system are available for c-report 
and all aspects of these states can potentially be c-reported.17
This assumption states that every aspect of all of the conscious states 
that are associated with a platinum standard system can potentially be 
c-reported, even if they are not actually reported during an experiment.18 
So we can use a variety of c-reports to extract a complete picture of a 
platinum standard system’s consciousness (see Section 4.8).19
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A2 is incompatible with panpsychism.20 If all matter is conscious all 
the time, then c-reports cannot be used to measure all of a platinum 
standard system’s consciousness. If panpsychism was true, an 
apparently unconscious brain that was c-reporting zero consciousness 
would be associated with a bubble of experience.21
4.4 Pinning Consciousness to the Physical World
When I was a lad my father shone 700 nm light into my eyes and said 
‘Red … red … red.’ My mother shone 450 nm light into my eyes and 
said ‘Blue … blue … blue.’ At a later point in time I c-report that there 
is a red patch in my bubble of experience. To make this report I use the 
association that I have learnt between an experience and a word. When 
I say that I am conscious of the red patch I am saying that I am having 
approximately the same colour experience that I had when I learnt the 
word ‘red’. The incoming electromagnetic waves have activated the 
same brain areas that were activated when I learnt the word ‘red’ as a 
child, which presumably are associatively linked to particular language 
or conceptual areas. My description of my conscious experience is a 
comparison with earlier experiences.22
We are sitting in a bare whitewashed room. A human ear is on the 
table in front of us. The colour of the torn edge of the ear is similar to the 
colour that I experienced when my father shone 700 nm light into my 
eyes. I make a c-report: ‘I am experiencing the colour red.’ The colour 
of the torn edge of the ear in your bubble of experience is similar to the 
colour that you experienced when your father shone 700 nm light into 
your eyes. You make a c-report: ‘I am experiencing the colour red.’
We both report that we are experiencing ‘red’, so we are apparently 
having the same conscious experience. But what if the colour produced by 
700 nm electromagnetic waves in my bubble of experience is completely 
different from the colour produced by 700 nm electromagnetic waves in 
your bubble of experience? We have learnt the same mapping between 
incoming electromagnetic wave frequencies and colour names, so we 
will both make identical reports about the electromagnetic waves that 
we are exposed to, but nothing guarantees that these reports correspond 
to identical colour experiences. This is the classic problem of colour 
inversion, which is illustrated in Figure 4.1.23
Figure 4.1. Problem of colour inversion. a) A person teaches us the word ‘red’ 
by pointing to a coloured patch and making the sound ‘red’. Your colours 
are inverted relative to mine, so my red is your turquoise, and so on. We 
both learn to associate the colour that we experience with the sound ‘red’. b) 
We observe a severed ear on a table. The colour of the torn edge of the ear is 
similar to the colour that we experienced when we learnt the word ‘red’, so 
we both report that we are experiencing the colour red. The colours in our 
bubbles of experience are very different, but there is no way of detecting this 
in our external behaviour. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
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In the standard colour inversion scenario a single set of colours 
is linked in different ways to electromagnetic waves. Our bubbles of 
experience could also contain completely different sets of ‘colours’ 
that have no overlap between them. Or our consciousnesses could 
be different in more radical ways—different geometries, different 
experiences of space and time, differences that I am unable to imagine 
because I cannot imaginatively transform my bubble of experience into 
these other states.
In these scenarios two systems in similar physical states are associated 
with radically different bubbles of experience. Since they are making 
the same c-reports the differences between their bubbles of experience 
will not show up in scientific experiments. It will be impossible to 
systematically study the relationship between consciousness and the 
physical world under these conditions. 
To address this issue scientists studying consciousness have to assume 
that identical states of the physical world are associated with identical 
conscious states. This can be expressed using the philosophical concept 
of supervenience.24 Since we are only concerned with a pragmatic 
approach to the science of consciousness, it is not necessary to assume 
that consciousness logically or metaphysically supervenes on the 
physical world. We just need to assume that the natural laws are such 
that consciousness cannot vary independently of the physical world:
A3. The consciousness associated with a platinum standard system 
nomologically supervenes on the platinum standard system. In our 
current universe, physically identical platinum standard systems are 
associated with indistinguishable conscious states.
4.5 Which Systems are Platinum Standards?
It is not known when consciousness emerges in the embryo or infant.25 
We do not know whether birds or cephalopods are conscious.26 Brain-
damaged people can inaccurately report their consciousness.27 No-one 
knows whether computers are capable of consciousness. We try and fail 
to use our imagination to decide whether consciousness is present in 
these systems.
 534. The Measurement of Consciousness
I am an adult. I can smoke, drive and vote. Ten doctors claim that 
my brain is functioning normally. My brain does not contain unusual 
chemicals that might affect its operation. I am certain that this normally 
functioning adult human brain is associated with consciousness some of 
the time. If consciousness supervenes on the physical world (A3), then 
similar brains will be associated with similar consciousness:
A4. The normally functioning adult human brain is a platinum 
standard system.28
The normally functioning adult human brain is the only system that 
we confidently associate with consciousness. At a later point in time we 
might make further assumptions that extend the number of platinum 
standard systems. For example, we might assume that the red nodules 
on the genitals of an alien race are platinum standard systems.29
Figure 4.2. Some of the definitions and assumptions that are required for scientific 
experiments on consciousness. The normally functioning adult human brain is 
a platinum standard system (A4), which is associated with consciousness (D4). 
Consciousness nomologically supervenes on the platinum standard system (A3) 
and all of it can be c-reported (A1, A2). Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
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4.6 The Correlates of a Conscious State
Yesterday I lost consciousness in the street. My body lay crumpled 
on the concrete. Insects crawled over my face. Cappuccino-carrying 
commuters stepped over me on the way to the office. My body was just 
a thing—a part of the physical world that was not associated with a 
bubble of experience. 
I am conscious now. The state of my brain now is different from the 
state of my brain when I lay unconscious on the street. If consciousness 
supervenes on the physical world (A3), something must be present in 
my brain now that is absent when consciousness is absent. This is a 
correlate of consciousness, which is defined as follows: 
D5. A correlate of conscious state is a minimal set30 of one or more 
spatiotemporal structures in the physical world. This set is present 
when the conscious state is present and absent when the conscious 
state is absent. This will be referred to as a CC set.31
‘Spatiotemporal structures’ is a deliberately vague term that captures 
anything that might be correlated with consciousness, such as activity 
in brain areas, electromagnetic waves or quantum events. Chapters 6–8 
discuss some of the spatiotemporal structures that might be members 
of CC sets. 
Correlates defined according to D5 will be associated with 
consciousness wherever they are found.32 Suppose CC sets only contain 
electromagnetic wave patterns. When a particular electromagnetic wave 
The science of consciousness is limited by the set of systems that 
we assume to be platinum standards. It is a science of the relationship 
between consciousness and platinum standard systems. Many 
relationships between consciousness and the physical world might 
not appear in normally functioning adult human brains. This would 
reduce the accuracy of our deductions about consciousness in non-
human systems (see Section 9.2). 
Some of the definitions and assumptions that have been introduced 
so far are illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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pattern occurs in your brain, you are immersed in a particular bubble of 
experience. When the electromagnetic wave pattern is absent, you have 
a different bubble of experience or no consciousness at all. None of the 
other types of spatiotemporal structure in your brain have any effect on 
your bubble of experience.
I distract you with a soft toy: ‘Here reader, look at this, look… look… 
look at Teddy.’ While you are playing with its ears I extract your brain 
from your skull and keep it alive in a jar. I provide stimulation patterns 
that mimic the sensory-motor responses of your discarded body. I 
ensure that the electromagnetic wave pattern in your brain is identical 
to the one that was present when you were playing with Teddy. This is 
associated with a bubble of experience in which you are playing with 
Teddy, so you continue to have this experience.
I discard your brain’s biological tissue and replace it with silicon chips 
that are programmed to produce the same pattern of electromagnetic 
waves. You remain contentedly unaware of what is going on and 
continue to play with Teddy’s ears in your bubble of experience. Suppose 
that the same pattern of electromagnetic waves occurs by chance when I 
drop my phone. This will also be associated with a bubble of experience 
in which you are playing with Teddy’s ears.
Definition D5 enables me to state assumption A3 more precisely:
A3a. The bubble of experience that is associated with a CC set 
nomologically supervenes on the CC set. In our current universe, 
physically identical CC sets are associated with indistinguishable 
conscious states. 
A correlation between A and B is the same as a functional connection 
between A and B—they are different ways of stating that A and B deviate 
from statistical independence.33 So a CC set can be described as a set 
of spatiotemporal structures that is functionally connected to a conscious 
state. This way of describing the relationship between consciousness 
and the physical world will play a role in what follows, so it will be 
formally stated as a lemma:
L1. There is a functional connection between a conscious state and its 
corresponding CC set.34
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4.7 A Causal Relationship between Consciousness 
and the Physical World?
A science that invokes mental phenomena in its explanations is 
presumptively committed to their causal efficacy; for any phenomenon 
to have an explanatory role, its presence or absence in a given situation 
must make a difference—a causal difference. 
Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World35
I was looking for love on the Internet. ButiDD’s profile looked promising: 
witty lines, sexy curves, hot pics. We arranged a date on Friday 5 August 
2005 at 15:00 in a cafe on Hampstead Heath. When we met there was no 
chemistry. Conversation ground to a halt. I ate my cake. To cut through 
the boredom and silence I remarked ‘I am conscious of a sweet taste in 
my mouth.’ These sound vibrations led, through a complex chain of 
causes and effects, to Hurricane Katrina.
C-reports have physical effects. Speech vibrates the air, writing makes 
marks, gestures depress buttons and pull levers. These physical effects 
lead to further chains of causes and effects, which can be amplified into 
a hurricane or dissolve into background noise. Consciousness appears 
to be the source of c-reports, so it is natural to assume that it is the sort 
of ‘thing’ that can cause effects in the physical world.
A clearer definition of causation will help us to understand 
the relationship between consciousness and c-reports. First I will 
distinguish between conceptual and empirical theories of causation.36 
Conceptual theories of causation elucidate how we understand and use 
causal concepts in our everyday speech. Empirical theories of causation 
explain how causation operates in the physical world—by reducing it 
to the exchange of physically conserved quantities, such as energy and 
momentum, or linking it to physical forces.37
Conceptual analyses of causation are popular in philosophy, but it is 
difficult to see how our use of ‘causation’ in everyday speech can help 
us to understand the causal interactions in the brain’s neural networks 
and the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. 
Empirical theories of causation can precisely identify causal events 
and exclude cases of apparent causation between correlated events. They 
can easily relate the causal laws governing macro-scale objects, such 
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as cars and people, to the micro-scale interactions between molecules, 
atoms and quarks. Empirical theories of causation are a much more 
appropriate starting point for studying the causal relationships between 
consciousness and c-reports. 
A detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
different theories of empirical causation is beyond the scope of this book, 
but it will be easier to analyze the c-reporting of consciousness with 
a concrete theory in mind. For this purpose I will use Dowe’s theory 
of empirical causation. This is the most fully developed conserved 
quantities approach and it has the following key features:38
• A conserved quantity is a quantity governed by a conservation 
law, such as mass-energy, momentum or charge.
• A causal process is a world line39 of an object that possesses a 
conserved quantity.
• A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines that 
involves the exchange of a conserved quantity.
This account of causation will be referred to as e-causation. The 
framework developed in this book relies on there being some workable 
theory of e-causation, but it does not depend on the details of any 
particular account. If Dowe’s theory is found to be problematic, an 
improved version can be substituted in its place.40
A car moves along a road at 5 m/s and knocks a fat man down (Figure 
4.3a). In this e-causal interaction energy-momentum is transferred from 
the car to the man. This macro-scale e-causal interaction can be reduced 
down to the micro-scale e-causal interactions between the physical 
constituents of the car and man, in which atoms in the car’s bumper 
pass energy-momentum to atoms in the man’s legs (Figure 4.3b).
We can distinguish between true and false causes of this event. The 
car’s engine temperature is a macro-scale property of the physical world 
that moves along at the same speed as the car and also collides with the 
man (Figure 4.3c). However, the macro property of engine temperature 
does not exchange energy-momentum with the man, so it does not e-cause 
him to fall down, although it can e-cause other macro-scale effects, such 
as skin burns. Similar e-causal accounts can be given of the laws of other 
macro-scale sciences, such as geology, chemistry and biology.41
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Figure 4.3. The relationship between macro- and micro-scale e-causal events. a) A 
car moving at 5 m/s collides with a fat man and knocks him down. This is a macro-
scale e-causal event in which the car passes energy-momentum to the man. b) The 
macro-scale e-causal interaction between the car and man can be reduced down 
to the micro-scale exchanges of energy-momentum between atoms in the car and 
man. c) The temperature of the car’s engine is a macro-scale property that moves 
at 5 m/s and collides with the man. The engine temperature exchanges a small 
amount of energy-momentum with the man in the form of heat, but not enough 
to e-cause him to fall down. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
It is generally assumed that the amount of energy-momentum in 
the physical universe is constant (as long as the reference frame of the 
observer remains unchanged). When part of the physical world gains 
energy-momentum, this energy-momentum must have come from 
elsewhere in the physical universe. It is also generally assumed that the 
net quantity of electric charge in the universe is conserved. If part of 
the physical world gains electric charge, another part of the physical 
world must have lost charge or there must have been an interaction in 
which equal quantities of positive and negative charge were created 
or destroyed. Similar arguments apply to other physically conserved 
quantities, which leads to the following assumption:
A5. The physical world is e-causally closed.
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According to A5, any change in a physical system’s conserved quantities 
can in principle be traced back to a set of physical e-causes that led the 
system to gain or lose those conserved quantities at that time.
In everyday language we say that a person reports or describes 
their consciousness. This might naively be interpreted as the idea that 
consciousness directly or indirectly alters the activity of the brain’s 
speech areas, sending spikes to the larynx that lead to sound vibrations 
in the air.
The problem with this naive picture is that consciousness could 
only e-cause a chain of events leading to a c-report if it could pass a 
physically conserved quantity, such as energy-momentum or charge, 
to neurons in the c-reporting chain—for example, if it could push them 
over their threshold and cause them to fire.42 If the physical world is 
e-causally closed (A5), then a conserved quantity could only be passed 
from consciousness to a brain area if consciousness is a physical 
phenomenon, i.e. if consciousness is the correlates of consciousness.43
Consciousness is the correlates of consciousness if physicalism 
is correct. But it would be premature and controversial to base the 
scientific study of consciousness on this assumption. It is also absurd to 
claim that a bubble of experience is a pattern of invisible wave-particles. 
It would be much better to find a way of measuring consciousness that 
does not depend on the assumption that physicalism is true.
I have assumed that a conscious state is functionally connected 
to a CC set (L1) and that c-reports are functionally connected 
to consciousness (A2). To fully account for the measurement of 
consciousness we need an e-causal connection between CC sets and 
c-reports. This can be addressed by introducing a further assumption 
that fits in naturally with the current framework: 
A6. CC sets e-cause a platinum standard system’s c-reports.
This states that the correlates of consciousness are the first stage in a 
chain of e-causation that leads to c-reports about consciousness.44,45 It 
can be difficult to measure e-causation, so in some circumstances A6 can 
be substituted for the weaker assumption: 
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A6a. CC sets are effectively connected to a platinum standard 
system’s c-reports.46
Assumption A6 is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
By themselves A6 and A6a do not say anything about the strength 
of the relationship between CC sets and c-reports. There could be a 
very weak e-causal chain leading from a CC set to a c-report, which 
could primarily be driven by unconscious brain areas. The weaker the 
connection between CC sets and c-reports, the more experiments will be 
required to identify CC sets.
Figure 4.4. Assumptions about the relationship between CC sets, consciousness 
and first-person reports. The labels S1, CC1, R1, etc. refer to any kind of 
spatiotemporal structure in the brain, such as the activation of a brain area, neural 
synchronization, electromagnetic waves, quantum events, and so on. They are 
only illustrative and not intended to correspond to particular anatomical paths or 
structures. An e-causal chain of sensory spatiotemporal structures, S1-S3, leads to 
the appearance of a spatiotemporal structure, CC1, that is functionally connected 
to consciousness. In this example the contents of consciousness are determined by 
sensory events, but in principle they could be independent of S1-S3—for example, 
if the subject was dreaming. CC1 is assumed to be the first stage in an e-causal 
chain of spatiotemporal structures, R1-R3, that lead to a verbal description of 
consciousness. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.47 
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4.8 The Limits of C-Reporting
You are looking at your reflection in a mirror. You see greying hair, burst 
capillaries, lengthening deepening lines. A tired sad sagging face. Your 
youth has gone. You will die soon. A sense of helpless fatality washes 
over you. You imagine how your face will look in the grave, under the 
wet earth, your empty eye sockets staring blankly at blackness, while 
the world rolls along and your existence fades away without trace.
Stick up your thumbs and interlace your fingers. Extend your arms 
to their full length in front of you. Look directly at your thumbnails. 
The area covered by your thumbnails is the high resolution part of your 
visual field. The rest is low resolution. When you look at your nose in the 
mirror only sketchy information is coming in from your gold earrings 
and beard. You cannot detect substantial changes that occur outside of 
the high resolution area.48
The limited extent of our high resolution vision is not a problem in 
daily life. When we require more information about a feature of our 
environment we make a rapid eye movement (known as a saccade) to 
bring this feature into high resolution vision. As you look in the mirror 
you are moving your eyes every ~200 ms. You inspect the pores on your 
nose, flick across to your left cheek, look up at your eyebrow, and so on.49 
Depressed you pluck out a protruding hair. You squeeze a painful 
spot and wipe a stain from the mirror. A chewed-up cabbage leaf is 
trapped between your teeth. You remember your dental appointment 
tomorrow. 
Your consciousness changes several times per second.50 As you look 
at your face in the mirror you are receiving fresh sensory information 
from your eyes and body and attending to different senses (moving from 
vision, to touch, to audition, etc.). You are shifting between past, present 
and possible futures: between memory, perception and imagination.
Describe your consciousness now. You were in a reverie—try again. 
The clock reads 22:59:50.874. Describe your consciousness when it 
changes to 23:00:00.000. Get ready … now.
When you started to describe your consciousness you were alert and 
speaking coherently. This external behaviour was a c-report of a high 
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level of consciousness. Immobility and incoherent mumbling would 
have been a c-report of a low level of consciousness.
When the clock changed to 23:00:00.000 you started to describe your 
consciousness in natural language. But your consciousness changed when 
you uttered the first word—it became consciousness of that word. The 
consciousness that you had at 23:00:00.000 vanished when you started 
to describe it. Natural language is too slow to c-report consciousness in 
real time.
Ok, try a different strategy. The clock reads 23:01:46.340. Describe 
your consciousness when it changes to 23:02:00.000. Get ready … now. 
This time you tried to remember your state of consciousness at 
23:02:00.000. You converted an online bubble of experience into an 
offline bubble of experience. This memory preserves some washed-out 
unstable information about the visual consciousness that you had at 
23:02:00.000. It holds little detail about the sounds, smells, tastes and 
body sensations that were in your bubble of experience at that moment. 
Your memory is also fragile—it is not like a computer file. As you 
describe your memory of your consciousness at 23:02:00.000 it becomes 
contaminated with details that came before or after the moment that 
you are trying to remember.
One more attempt. The clock reads 23:05:51.087. Describe your 
consciousness when it changes to 23:06:00.000. Get ready … now. 
You could not accurately remember what your nose looked like at 
23:06:00.000. So when I asked you to describe your consciousness you 
moved your eyes to look at your nose. You used the world as external 
memory.51 Your face is pretty stable, so perhaps you could use this 
method to generate a complete description of your consciousness at 
23:06:00.000. However, this would not provide a description of your 
consciousness at 23:06:00.000: it would be a description of a series of 
moments of consciousness in which different aspects of your face enter 
the high resolution part of your bubble of experience. When you moved 
your eyes to obtain information about your nose, your consciousness at 
23:06:00.000 was replaced with a new bubble of experience in which you 
were ‘zoomed in’ on your nose.
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We cannot accurately describe a state of our consciousness. Natural 
language is too slow and vague. Our memory does not store enough 
details. Our consciousness at a given moment cannot be reconstructed 
by re-accessing information from our environment.52
Fixate your eyes on the small cross in the centre of the screen. Rest 
your index finger on the button in front of you. When I say ‘now’ I want 
you to press the button if there is a small red square in the bottom left 
hand corner of your visual field. Get ready … now.
Under controlled experimental conditions I can extract a small 
amount of accurate information about a specific aspect of your 
consciousness at a given time. The details of the measurement are set 
by the experimental conditions. The subject is only required to answer 
a simple yes/no question, without any need for memory or natural 
language. 
This measurement method has the limitation that a subject can only 
answer one or two yes/no questions before their consciousness changes. 
This problem can be partly overcome by resetting their consciousness 
after each measurement. We can then use a large number of high 
precision probes to obtain a detailed measurement of one state of a 
subject’s consciousness.53
As an example, consider an experiment that measures a subject’s 
visual consciousness. To begin with the subject is asked to fixate on 
a cross on a screen. When they are looking at the cross it is replaced 
with a picture that remains on the screen for 200ms. This is long enough 
to ensure that the subject becomes conscious of the picture, and short 
enough to prevent them from moving their eyes while they are looking 
at it. The brief exposure attracts their attention—reducing the chance 
that their visual consciousness is remembering or imagining something 
else. The subject’s fixation on the cross ensures that their bubble of 
experience contains the same part of the picture each time. When the 
subject’s visual consciousness is put into this state one aspect of it can 
be measured with high precision. Repetition of this procedure can be 
used to progressively build up a detailed description of this state of 
consciousness.54
64 Human and Machine Consciousness
High precision measurement combined with the resetting of 
consciousness under experimental conditions is the most promising 
method for obtaining detailed descriptions of consciousness. But 
there are limits to the types of consciousness that can be reset, and a 
subject’s consciousness cannot be put into exactly the same state each 
time. These problems will reduce our ability to obtain detailed accurate 
measurements of consciousness.55
4.9 Formal Descriptions of Consciousness 
(C-Descriptions)
At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective 
character of experience without relying on the imagination—without 
taking up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should 
be regarded as a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new 
method—an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or 
the imagination. Though presumably it would not capture everything, 
its goal would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character 
of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having 
those experiences.
Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?56
Alice and Bob measure your consciousness at 14:02:00.050 and submit 
written reports of the results. Alice’s report contains several thousand 
words of natural language, similar to the work of Husserl, Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty. Bob’s report contains natural language descriptions 
of the experimental probes that he ran on your consciousness. It is 
written in the style of a methods section in a paper on experimental 
psychology. When you read either of these reports you are satisfied that 
they are a complete and accurate description of your consciousness at 
14:02:00.050.
This verification process is inexact. It relies on an inaccurate memory 
of your state of consciousness. It is far from a complete validation. But it 
will have to do—it is all we can do.57
Formal descriptions play an important role in science. We have 
formal descriptions of many aspects of the physical world (mass, 
charge, voltage, magnetic field, etc.) that can be used to generate testable 
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predictions. The Earth and Sun can be described as point masses of 5.97 
× 1024 kg and 1.99 × 1030 kg. We can use this description of the Earth and 
Sun to predict the gravitational force between them (by substituting the 
masses for m1 and m2 in Newton’s equation F=Gm1m2/r2).58
Scientific theories of consciousness will eventually use mathematics 
to map between descriptions of consciousness and descriptions of the 
physical world (see Section 5.5). This will enable us to make strong 
testable predictions about the conscious state that is associated with a 
physical state. This will only become possible when consciousness can 
be described in a formal way that can be manipulated by algorithms 
and mathematical equations. This will be referred to as a c-description:
D6. A c-description is a formal description of a conscious state.
C-descriptions must be compatible with mathematics and they must be 
applicable to both human and non-human consciousness. We will have 
to develop methods for converting c-reports into c-descriptions and vice 
versa. 
Natural language cannot be used for c-descriptions. It is vague, 
ambiguous, highly compressed and context dependent. Natural 
language descriptions of consciousness are difficult to analyze with 
algorithms and it is not obvious how they can be integrated with 
mathematical equations. Natural language also cannot be used to 
describe the consciousness of non-human systems, such as infants, bats 
or robots.59
C-descriptions could be written in a markup language, such as XML 
or LMNL. Markup languages are more precise and tightly structured 
than natural language, and they can be read by both humans and 
computers. They can capture complex nested hierarchies, which would 
enable them to describe the relationships between different parts and 
aspects of a conscious state.60
Mathematics could be used for c-descriptions. For example, Balduzzi 
and Tononi have suggested how conscious states can be described 
using high dimensional mathematical structures.61 Other mathematical 
techniques could be used to describe consciousness, such as category 
theory or graph theory.
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An adequate c-description format is essential for the scientific study 
of consciousness. C-descriptions are at a very early stage of development 
and we are only just starting to explore solutions.
4.10 Summary
Scientists studying consciousness need to accurately measure 
conscious states. Consciousness is measured through first-person 
reports (c-reports), such as speaking or body gestures, which cannot 
be independently checked. This raises the philosophical problems 
of zombies, solipsism, colour inversion and the causal relationship 
between consciousness and the physical world. These problems 
cannot be solved. They can be neutralized by making assumptions that 
guarantee that consciousness can be accurately measured. The results 
of the science of consciousness can then be considered to be true given 
these assumptions.
I started by assuming that consciousness is functionally connected 
to first-person reports (A1). I then assumed that everything about a 
conscious state can be reported during an experiment and that there are 
no ghostly consciousnesses floating around that cannot be reported (A2). 
I handled colour inversion scenarios by assuming that consciousness 
supervenes on the brain (A3, A3a). First-person reporting does not break 
the causal closure of the physical world (A5) because reports about 
consciousness are e-caused by the correlates of consciousness (A6). All 
of these assumptions apply to systems that are assumed to be conscious 
(platinum standard systems) during experiments on consciousness. I 
assumed that normally functioning adult human brains are platinum 
standard systems (A4). 
Consciousness cannot be described in real time using natural 
language, so we have to use experimental probes to measure specific 
aspects of a conscious state, and then reset the state and apply more 
probes until a complete measurement is obtained. The final output of 
a measurement of consciousness should be a c-description written in 
a tightly structured formal language, such as category theory or XML, 
that will support the development and testing of mathematical theories 
of consciousness.
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This chapter also introduced the concept of a CC set. A CC set is a 
set of spatiotemporal structures in the physical world that is correlated 
with a conscious state (D5). The science of consciousness attempts to 
develop mathematical theories that describe the relationship between 
CC sets and conscious states. This is covered in the next five chapters.

5. From Correlates to Theories of 
Consciousness
5.1 Measurement of the Physical World
Randy is an elephant who lives at the bottom of my garden. Six blind men 
often come round to feel Randy. Sometimes I like to measure Randy. To 
measure his height, I compare my conscious experience of Randy with 
my conscious experience of a stick that has been calibrated against the 
distance light travels in a vacuum during 1⁄299,792,458 seconds.1 The 
ratio between Randy and the stick is his height in metres. Randy is three 
sticks (three metres) high (see Figure 5.1).2
The science of consciousness studies the relationship between 
consciousness and the physical world. It measures consciousness, 
measures spatiotemporal structures in the physical world and attempts 
to identify minimal sets of spatiotemporal structures (CC sets) that are 
linked to conscious states.
Physical objects do not directly appear in our bubbles of experience. 
We do not directly perceive their mass, chemical composition or size. 
To measure a property of a physical object I cause it to interact with 
another physical object that has been calibrated in some way and observe 
this interaction in my bubble of experience. This typically results in a 
number. Eddington describes this process:
Let us then examine the kind of knowledge which is handled by exact 
science. If we search the examination papers in physics and natural 
philosophy for the more intelligible questions we may come across 
one beginning something like this: “An elephant slides down a grassy 
hillside…” The experienced candidate knows that he need not pay much 
attention to this; it is only put in to give an impression of realism. He 
reads on: “The mass of the elephant is two tons.” Now we are getting 
down to business; the elephant fades out of the problem and a mass of 
© David Gamez, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0107.05
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Figure 5.1. The measurement of an elephant’s height in a scientist’s bubble of 
experience. The scientist compares Randy with a stick that has been calibrated 
against the distance light travels in a vacuum during 1⁄299,792,458 seconds. The 
ratio between Randy and the calibrated stick is his height in metres. Randy is 
three sticks (three metres) high. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
two tons takes its place. What exactly is this two tons, the real subject 
matter of the problem? It refers to some property or condition which 
we vaguely describe as “ponderosity” occurring in a particular region 
of the external world. But we shall not get much further that way; the 
nature of the external world is inscrutable, and we shall only plunge into 
a quagmire of indescribable. Never mind what two tons refers to; what is 
it? How has it actually entered in so definite a way into our experience? 
Two tons is the reading of the pointer when the elephant was placed on 
a weighing-machine. Let us pass on. “The slope of the hill is 60°.” Now 
the hillside fades out of the problem and an angle of 60° takes its place. 
What is 60°? There is no need to struggle with mystical conceptions of 
direction; 60° is the reading of the plumb-line against the divisions of a 
protractor. Similarly for the other data of the problem.3
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When I monitor Randy’s brain activity using electrodes, my 
equipment compares the effect of his brain on each electrode with 
the effect of a standard voltage: the ratio between these effects is the 
electrode’s voltage. A computer converts the electrode voltages into an 
attractive image of brain activity. Randy’s colourless physical brain does 
not directly appear to me when I am measuring it. Within my bubble of 
experience I am conscious of black wires emerging from a pinkish-grey 
brain and a 3D display of brain activity on a computer screen.
The physical world can be measured automatically without the 
instruments or measured objects appearing in a bubble of experience. A 
robot could measure Randy with a stick and write down the result on a 
piece of paper. 
Measurements can be processed into numbers that correspond to 
different properties of an object. Electrode voltages can be processed 
into neuron firing events, which can be processed into firing frequencies, 
synchronization patterns, and so on.
Measurement assigns numbers to aspects of objects, properties or 
events.4 Objects, properties and events are typically described in natural 
language. When I measured Randy, 3 metres was the height of an elephant; 
30 mV was the membrane potential of a neuron.
Objects, properties and events are tightly defined in physics and 
chemistry. For example, we have clear definitions of quarks and carbon. 
Physicists and chemists can state exactly what it means for a physical 
object to contain quarks or carbon; their instruments can reliably detect 
whether quarks or carbon are present in a physical object.
Context plays an important role in the description of biological 
objects, properties and events. Suppose I want to measure the membrane 
potential of a neuron. I do not use an abstract definition of a neuron to 
identify physical objects that are neurons—I look for a particular type of 
cell in the brain of an animal. The definition of a neuron only has to be 
precise enough to distinguish neurons from other cells in the brain. The 
context of a neuron (in the brain of an animal) is part of its definition.
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A neuron is well defined inside a brain—but what exactly is a 
neuron? Does a neuron continue to be a neuron if I remove its nucleus, 
give it a chrome cytoskeleton and change its resting potential to 100 
V? Synthetic biologists could construct a series of intermediate cases 
between neurons and liver cells—it would be difficult to classify the 
intermediate cases. Neurons are defined in a specific biological context; 
no formal definition exists that can unambiguously decide whether an 
arbitrary physical object is a neuron.
This vague definition of biological structures is a problem 
for consciousness science. We want to use what we know about 
consciousness in the brain to make inferences about the consciousness 
of non-biological systems. Suppose we identify neural correlates of 
consciousness and want to make inferences about the consciousness 
of synthetic neurons. This cannot be done without an unambiguous 
context-free definition of a neuron. 
To address this problem we need formal ways of describing the 
spatiotemporal structures that form CC sets. These will be referred to 
as p-descriptions:
D7. A p-description is a formal description of a spatiotemporal 
structure in the physical world. A p-description unambiguously 
determines whether a spatiotemporal structure is present in a 
sequence of physical states.
When a spatiotemporal structure can be completely described 
by physics or chemistry (for example, an electromagnetic field or 
a molecule), the p-description is identical to the standard scientific 
description. We will have to find more formal context-free ways of 
describing biological structures that can resolve ambiguous cases. 
For example, we need a p-description that can determine whether an 
arbitrary part of the physical world contains neurons. This should not 
rely on the fact that neurons are found in biological creatures, and it 
should provide definite classifications of synthetic neurons, which lack 
some of the attributes of biological neurons. If the members of a CC 
set cannot be captured in a p-description, then we will only be able to 
make inferences about the consciousness of systems that are similar to 
platinum standards.5
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5.2 Constraints on CC Sets
There are constraints on the spatiotemporal structures that can form 
CC sets. These derive from the assumptions that were introduced to 
measure consciousness (A1-A6) and from the requirements of scientific 
methodology:
C1. The spatiotemporal structures in a CC set are independent of the observer. 
My consciousness is a real phenomenon that does not depend on 
someone else’s subjective interpretation. CC sets must be formed 
from objective spatiotemporal structures, such as electromagnetic 
waves and neuron firing patterns.
C2. The members of CC sets are intrinsic properties.6 A conscious state 
supervenes on a CC set (A3a), so each duplicate of a CC set must be 
associated with an identical conscious state, regardless of the spatial 
and temporal context in which the duplicate appears.
C3. A non-conscious system does not contain a CC set that is 100% correlated 
with a conscious state.7 If A and B are 100% correlated, then A cannot 
occur without B. If a CC set is 100% correlated with a conscious state, 
then all brains that contain that CC set will be conscious.
C4. CC sets e-cause c-reports during consciousness experiments (A6).8 It is 
not necessary for every member of a CC set to e-cause c-reports. But 
some parts or aspects of the CC set must e-cause them. So when I say 
‘I am conscious of a green tomato’, this c-report can be traced back 
to the CC set that e-caused it, which is functionally connected to a 
bubble of experience in which there is a green tomato.
A set of spatiotemporal structures that does not conform to these 
constraints cannot be a correlate of a conscious state.
5.3 Pilot Studies on the Correlates of Consciousness
We are in a beastly state of ignorance about the relationship between 
consciousness and the physical world. We have no idea which 
spatiotemporal structures form CC sets. Our intuitions are useless. 
We have to start with the assumption that everything in a platinum 
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standard system that conforms to the constraints is a potential member 
of a CC set.
How can we reduce our ignorance? We can carry out pilot studies. 
We can attempt to identify the CC set that is associated with a particular 
conscious state.9
Briony is an adult human with a normally functioning brain. I strap 
her into a chair and connect electrodes to her temples. At intervals I 
display a red square at the centre of her visual field, play a loud 500Hz 
tone and deliver an electric shock. Briony’s attention is completely 
consumed by these stimuli. They are so compelling that the same 
conscious state can be induced on multiple occasions. This is conscious 
state c3.
Each time c3 is induced I ask Briony to c-report one aspect of it. On 
subsequent occasions she c-reports the size of the square, the colour of 
the tone and the shocking sensations in her body. Over time I build up a 
c-description of c3 that has a tolerable amount of detail. 
I want to identify the minimal set of spatiotemporal structures that is 
correlated with c3. When c3 is induced I measure the neuron activity in 
Briony’s brain as well as the electromagnetic waves, blood movements, 
glia activity, and so on.10 Some of these spatiotemporal structures could 
form the CC set by themselves—a pattern of neuron activity might be 
the sole correlate of c3. Or a combination of spatiotemporal structures 
might form the CC set that is correlated with c3. For example, a pattern 
of neuron activity might only be associated with consciousness when it 
is immersed in blood—the same neuron activity without blood would 
not be linked to consciousness.
I must systematically consider all possible combinations of 
spatiotemporal structures that could form the CC set. This will enable 
me to identify the spatiotemporal structures that only occur when c3 is 
present. Suppose I want to demonstrate that a pattern of neuron activity, 
p2, is the sole member of the CC set. I will need to measure c3 when p2 is 
present and blood is present, measure c3 when p2 is present and blood 
is absent, measure c3 when just blood is present, and measure c3 when 
neither p2 nor blood are present. Further experiments will be required 
 755. From Correlates to Theories of Consciousness
to distinguish p2 from glia activity, cerebrospinal fluid, and so on. This 
methodology is illustrated in Table 5.1.11
Spatiotemporal Structures Conscious States
A B C D c1 c2
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 5.1. Simple example of correlations that could exist between spatiotemporal 
structures in a physical system and two conscious states. It is assumed that 
conscious states c1 and c2 can occur simultaneously. The physical structures A, B, C 
and D could be dopamine, haemoglobin, neural synchronization, electromagnetic 
waves, etc. These are assumed to be the only possible features of the system. ‘1’ 
indicates that a feature is present; ‘0’ indicates that it is absent. In this example 
D is not a correlate of consciousness because it does not systematically co-vary 
with either of the conscious states. {A,B} is a set of spatiotemporal structures that 
correlates with conscious state c1. {C} is a set of spatiotemporal structures that 
correlates with conscious state c2. 
Many pilot studies have been carried out on the correlates of 
consciousness. They have identified areas of the brain and features of 
neuron activity (for example, recurrent connections) that are potential 
members of CC sets.12 Most of these pilot studies have focused on 
neural patterns that might form CC sets. No attempt has been made to 
show that neuron activity patterns form CC sets by themselves, or to 
demonstrate that glia, electromagnetic waves and haemoglobin are not 
members of CC sets.
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5.4 Natural and Unnatural Experiments
Consciousness experiments are carried out on platinum standard 
systems. Assumptions A1-A6 enable us to measure the consciousness of 
platinum standard systems during these experiments.
Normally functioning adult human brains are our only platinum 
standard systems (A4). They change as they interact with the world 
and learn from their experiences. Most of these changes are part of 
their normal behaviour—they do not affect their status as platinum 
standards.
Brian’s skull contains a normally functioning adult human brain (a 
platinum standard system). I ask him to raise his right arm. He raises 
his right arm. I shave off his hair and slowly smear chocolate sauce on 
his face. These modifications do not affect the normal functioning of his 
adult human brain.
I inject Brian with 5 mg of LSD. After a brief spell of bliss he goes 
wild, bangs his head against the wall, yells in an uncontrollable manner 
and claws at his face. His brain is not functioning normally. I shoot him 
in the head. He lies still on the laboratory floor. Blood pours out of his 
head. His brain is no longer a platinum standard system. 
A platinum standard system must remain a platinum standard 
system throughout an experiment on consciousness. If it ceases to be 
a platinum standard system, then assumptions A1-A6 no longer hold 
and it becomes an open question whether we can interpret its external 
behaviour as a c-report of its consciousness. 
Some experiments preserve a system’s status as a platinum standard; 
other experiments transform a system into something that is not a 
platinum standard. This distinction will be expressed as follows:
D8. In a natural experiment the test system preserves its status 
as a platinum standard. Assumptions A1-A6 remain valid and 
consciousness can be measured throughout the experiment.
D9. In an unnatural experiment the test system is transformed into 
something that is not a platinum standard. A1-A6 cease to apply and 
we lose our ability to measure the system’s consciousness.
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Natural experiments preserve a system’s physical integrity and 
normal behaviour. The system can be monitored using passive 
techniques, such as fMRI, EEG and electrodes.13 These manipulations 
do not affect our belief that it can c-report its consciousness.
Unnatural experiments alter the physical constitution of a platinum 
standard system. They remove material, add unusual chemicals or replace 
brain parts with functionally equivalent chips. Unnatural experiments 
undermine our ability to measure a system’s consciousness. They cannot 
be used to identify CC sets or to test theories of consciousness.
Suppose we replace part of a subject’s brain with a functionally 
equivalent chip. This would not affect their behaviour—they would 
continue to make the same reports as before. This experiment has 
been put forward as a way of testing the hypothesis that functions 
or computations in the brain are linked to consciousness, rather than 
patterns in biological materials.14
Prior to the experiment the subject’s brain was a platinum standard 
system and we interpreted its speech as a c-report of its conscious 
states. The implantation of the chip transforms the subject’s brain into 
a freak neuro-silicon hybrid that is not a platinum standard system. 
We have no idea whether brains with implanted chips are associated 
with consciousness. Assumptions A1-A6 do not apply—we have not 
assumed that the external behaviour of this type of system is a c-report 
that can be used to measure consciousness. Similar problems occur with 
other unnatural experiments, such as the replacement of haemoglobin 
with an artificial blood substitute, the removal of glia, and so on.15,16
We could add brains with implanted chips to our list of platinum 
standard systems. This would transform an unnatural chip implantation 
experiment into a natural experiment. Both the original system and the 
transformed system would be platinum standards, so we could measure 
consciousness throughout the experiment. 
New assumptions about platinum standard systems should not 
be made lightly. Pilot studies look for CC sets in the systems that are 
assumed to be platinum standards. A science of consciousness that 
studied brains with implanted chips would be very different from our 
current science of consciousness.17
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It will be difficult or impossible to identify all the members of a CC 
set using natural experiments. The members of a CC set can only be 
identified by systematically varying the physical world to test the link 
between each combination of candidate structures and consciousness 
(see Table 5.1). When a combination does not occur naturally it is 
impossible to test its link with consciousness. So natural experiments 
cannot test the connection between consciousness and biological 
neurons, because we cannot remove biological neurons from the brain 
without compromising its status as a platinum standard system. 
5.5 Theories of Consciousness (C-Theories)
It is possible to interpret the ways of science more prosaically. One might 
say that progress can ‘… come about in only two ways: by gathering new 
perceptual experiences, and by better organizing those which are available 
already’. But this description of scientific progress, although not actually 
wrong, seems to miss the point. It is too reminiscent of Bacon’s induction: 
too suggestive of his industrious gathering of the ‘countless grapes, ripe 
and in season’, from which he expects the wine of science to flow: of his 
myth of a scientific method that starts from observation and experiment 
and then proceeds to theories […] The advance of science is not due to 
the fact that more and more perceptual experiences accumulate in the 
course of time. […] Bold ideas, unjustified anticipations, and speculative 
thought, are our only means for interpreting nature: our only organon, 
our only instrument, for grasping her. 
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery18
What’s the matter with consciousness, then, and how should we 
proceed? Early on, I came to the conclusion that a genuine understanding 
of consciousness is possible only if empirical studies are complemented 
by a theoretical analysis. […] This state of affairs is not unlike the one 
faced by biologists when, knowing a great deal about similarities and 
differences between species, fossil remains, and breeding practices, they 
still lacked a theory of how evolution might occur. What was needed, 
then as now, were not just more facts, but a theoretical framework that 
could make sense of them.
Giulio Tononi, Consciousness as  
Integrated Information: A Provisional Manifesto19
When people studied the heavens they were not seeking an infinitely 
long list of the planets’ positions. They wanted a compact theory that 
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could calculate the positions of the planets at an arbitrary point in time. 
Ptolemy developed a model based on deferents and epicycles. This was 
superseded by Newton’s and Einstein’s equations. 
Pilot studies might identify the correlates of some conscious states. 
This would be a major scientific achievement. It would help us to find 
the correlates of other conscious states. It would tell us something about 
the consciousness of non-platinum standard systems, such as coma 
patients, bats and robots. 
The wine of a science of consciousness will not flow from industrious 
gathering of data about the correlates of individual conscious states. 
There are an effectively infinite number of conscious states—we cannot 
identify the CC sets associated with each one. Instead we need a compact 
mathematical theory that can map physical states onto conscious states 
and vice versa. This will be referred to as a c-theory:20
D10. A c-theory is a compact expression of the relationship between 
consciousness and the physical world. A c-theory can generate a 
c-description from a p-description, and generate a p-description 
from a c-description.21
The role of c-theories is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2. Theory of consciousness (c-theory). On the left, a measurement of the 
invisible physical world is converted into a formal p-description of a physical 
state. On the right, consciousness is measured with a c-report, which is converted 
into a formal c-description of a conscious state. The c-theory maps between the 
p-description and the c-description. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
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C-theories specify which types of spatiotemporal structures form 
CC sets. For example, neuron activity patterns, information patterns 
or computations might be members of CC sets. The most popular 
types of c-theory are covered in the next three chapters.
C-theories should be based on mathematics.22 This is the most 
compact way of linking p-descriptions to c-descriptions. Philosophical 
theories of consciousness might inspire c-theories. But the relationship 
between c-descriptions and p-descriptions cannot be expressed in 
natural language. Natural language is too weak and vague—it cannot 
make strong testable predictions.
Suppose we discover a neuron whose firing rate is correlated with 
a bubble of experience in which there is a single point of red light. 
We develop a c-theory that uses the equation ln(r)=2i to connect the 
neuron’s firing rate, r, with the intensity of the conscious red light, 
i. This theory predicts that when the neuron fires at 7 Hz it will be 
associated with conscious red light that has intensity 0.97. It also 
predicts that the neuron will fire at 20 Hz when conscious red light 
occurs with intensity 1.5.23
C-theories map between conscious states and sets of spatiotemporal 
structures in the physical world. These spatiotemporal structures 
must be valid members of CC sets. So the constraints on the members 
of CC sets (Section 5.2) are constraints on c-theories. C-theories must 
generate p-descriptions of valid CC sets from c-descriptions, and they 
must generate c-descriptions from p-descriptions of valid CC sets. 
C-theories that do not conform to the constraints should be excluded 
from the science of consciousness. 
C-theories become scientifically credible when their predictions 
pass experimental tests. It is not enough for c-theories to match 
data gathered during pilot studies—they have to generate strong 
predictions that can be experimentally confirmed. The most compact 
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and accurate c-theory will be considered to be a correct description of 
the relationship between consciousness and the physical world.24
Our final c-theories will describe brute regularities in the relationship 
between consciousness and the physical world (see Section 3.5). As the 
science of consciousness progresses we are likely to develop c-theories 
that describe regularities which can be further decomposed into more 
basic relationships. It might be impossible to tell whether a c-theory 
describes a genuine brute regularity.25
Some people base c-theories on their conscious experiences.26 
But the source of inspiration of a c-theory is irrelevant to its success. 
We cannot directly imagine the relationship between consciousness 
and the invisible physical world (see Section 3.3), so the intuitive 
plausibility of a c-theory has no bearing on whether it is correct. 
C-theories stand or fall on their ability to make falsifiable predictions 
that pass experimental tests.
C-theories are not likely to provide intuitively satisfying explanations 
of the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. 
Since we cannot imagine the physical world, a mathematical c-theory 
cannot help us to make an imaginative transition from the invisible 
physical world to consciousness. At most a c-theory could help us to 
make an imaginative transition from a conscious experience of brain 
activity to another conscious experience (see Section 3.4).
People might use particles, forces or novel aspects of the physical 
world to explain why a particular relationship between c-descriptions 
and p-descriptions holds (see Section 6.3). Such explanations might be 
scientifically fruitful—they might help us to develop new mathematical 
c-theories. But they are unlikely to make a c-theory more intuitively 
plausible. Newton could not imagine how gravity acted at a distance. 
We cannot explain why brute regularities exist between consciousness 
and the physical world.
82 Human and Machine Consciousness
5.6 The Computational Discovery of Theories of 
Consciousness
[…] the era of simple mathematics effectively modelling parts of the 
world is drawing to a close. It is possible that new areas of investigation 
will lend themselves to simple models, but the evidence is that within 
existing areas of investigation, the domain of simple models has been 
extensively mined to the point where the rewards are slim. 
Paul Humphreys, Extending Ourselves27
Traditional science is based on the idea that people identify regularities in 
the physical world. It is a working assumption that physical regularities 
are simple enough to be found by humans. When a human finds a 
regularity s/he might use a novel property to explain it. A mathematical 
description of the regularity can be experimentally tested. Humans find 
this satisfying—they like solving puzzles. But it is not necessarily the 
most effective approach. 
Humans are biased and stupid. They have small working memories 
and little imagination. They cannot process large data sets. These 
limitations will prove fatal to consciousness science if there are complex 
relationships between c-descriptions and p-descriptions.28
We have little or no idea about the spatiotemporal structures that form 
CC sets. The mathematical relationships between c-descriptions and 
p-descriptions are unknown. They might be simple—a few differential 
equations. Or the mathematical complexity of these regularities could 
be way out of reach of human capabilities. Macro-scale laws of the brain 
could extend to thousands of pages of differential equations.
We should drop the assumption that there are simple relationships 
between p-descriptions and c-descriptions. We have no reason to 
believe that this is the case. If we persist with the assumption that 
there are simple relationships, we could spend large amounts of time 
and money on a fruitless quest for something that does not exist. It 
is better to assume that the relationships between c-descriptions and 
p-descriptions are potentially complex, and develop a methodology 
that can identify simple and complex relationships (or prove that no 
relationships exist).
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We could use computers to identify the relationships between 
p-descriptions and c-descriptions. This would require a large amount 
of data, spanning multiple levels of the brain. C-descriptions and 
p-descriptions would have to be recorded for many different conscious 
states. This data could be gathered by human scientists. Or robots could 
capture it automatically.29 
Machine-learning techniques could be applied to this data. The 
patterns that were found could be used to make predictions, which 
could be tested in further experiments. C-theories could be automatically 
tested against new data as it came in.
C-theories that are discovered by computers should be expressed in 
a format that can be read by both humans and machines (they should 
not be stored as weights in a complex neural network). This would 
enable them to be partly viewed and verified by humans—but there 
would be no expectation that an individual human scientist could check 
or comprehend them in their entirety. Sets of differential equations 
would be a good choice of output format—there is a long tradition of 
using differential equations to describe complex relationships in the 
physical world. Or perhaps we could use graph theory to describe the 
relationships between c-descriptions and p-descriptions.30 
This computational approach to the science of consciousness could 
identify simple relationships between c-descriptions and p-descriptions. 
It could find regularities that are too complex to be identified by 
humans. Or it could prove that no simple or complex laws exist in the 
current data.
This approach could be prototyped on a simulated human brain.31 
This would generate reports ‘about consciousness’ that are similar to 
c-reports and could be converted into c-descriptions.32 The computer 
could search for relationships between these c-descriptions and 
different aspects of the neural model. It could control the simulation 
(rewinding it, rewiring it, changing its parameters) to robustly 
test its hypotheses.33 The relationships between c-descriptions and 
p-descriptions that were identified by this method could be tested on 
platinum standard systems.34
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5.7 Summary
This chapter has described how we measure the physical world. Physical 
measurements have to be expressed in a formal way (a p-description), 
so that we can use our knowledge about CC sets in humans to make 
inferences about the consciousness of non-biological systems. 
Pilot studies could identify the CC sets that are linked to individual 
conscious states. These must use natural experimental methods, which 
preserve our ability to measure consciousness in platinum standard 
systems. 
In the longer term we need to develop mathematical c-theories that 
map between p-descriptions and c-descriptions (see Figure 5.2). These 
c-theories must conform to the constraints on CC sets (C1-C4). 
Humans might be incapable of discovering complex mathematical 
relationships between p-descriptions and c-descriptions. To avoid this 
potential problem, computers should be used to discover c-theories.
6. Physical Theories of 
Consciousness
6.1 Physical C-Theories 
The physical world contains elementary wave-particles (quarks, leptons, 
bosons). These are arranged into structures at different spatial scales. 
Quarks and electrons form atoms. Atoms are the constituent parts of 
molecules, which are the constituent parts of neurons, blood and bone. 
A structure at one level of the physical world will be referred to as a 
material:
D11. A material is an arrangement of elementary wave-particles at a 
particular spatial scale. 
The constituent parts of materials are formed from other materials—
carpets are made from nylon, which is made from molecules, and so 
on. Some of a material’s properties are not attributable to its constituent 
parts: water is wet; the electrons, protons and neutrons in water are not 
wet. Spatiotemporal patterns occur in materials (tartan, waves, etc.).
Physical c-theories are defined as follows:
D12. A physical c-theory links consciousness to spatiotemporal 
patterns in materials. Physical CC sets consist of one or more patterns 
and the materials in which these patterns occur.1
Physical c-theories map p-descriptions of patterns in materials onto 
c-descriptions of conscious states. They also map c-descriptions of 
conscious states onto p-descriptions of patterns in materials.
In a physical c-theory the materials are essential members of the 
CC sets: each pattern has to occur in a particular material. A physical 
c-theory that links a conscious state to an electromagnetic wave pattern 
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would not attribute consciousness to a pile of beer cans that happened 
to instantiate the same pattern.
Physical c-theories fit in neatly with the standard sciences (physics, 
chemistry, biology, geology), which identify patterns in particular 
physical things (planets, molecules, proteins, glaciers). They have the 
same level of objectivity as these other sciences (C1).
6.2 Potential Physical CC Sets in the Brain
The normally functioning adult human brain is our only platinum 
standard system (A4). So the science of consciousness can only look 
for physical CC sets that contain one or more of the materials that are 
present in the human brain and one or more of the spatiotemporal 
patterns that occur in these materials.
Some of the brain’s properties depend on other parts of the physical 
world. For example, brains reflect electromagnetic waves and every 
neuron is a particular distance from the North Pole. These are not 
intrinsic properties, so they are not potential members of CC sets (C2).2
Physical CC sets can exchange physically conserved quantities, 
so they can e-cause c-reports during consciousness experiments (C4). 
It is not necessary that everything in a CC set e-causes c-reports, but 
the set as a whole must be capable of this. The changes in the balance 
of oxygenated and de-oxygenated blood that are measured by fMRI 
cannot e-cause c-reports because they peak several seconds after the 
c-report. Blood flow patterns that occur on an appropriate time scale are 
potential members of CC sets.3
The materials that could be members of CC sets include neurons, 
glia, blood, cerebrospinal fluid, electromagnetic waves, quantum states 
and novel materials.4 With the possible exception of novel materials (see 
Section 6.3), a physical CC set cannot solely consist of materials, which 
are typically present when the brain is unconscious (C3). Some of the 
materials in a physical CC set must contain patterns that only occur 
when the brain is conscious.
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The patterns in physical CC sets could be computational structures, 
such as a global workspace,5 or patterns in the functional or effective 
connectivity between neurons.6 I have suggested elsewhere that the 
neural patterns caused by sensory input could be linked to conscious 
sensations, and that a combination of sensory and sensorimotor patterns 
might be linked to our conscious perception of a three-dimensional 
world.7 We could also use Tononi’s information integration algorithms 
to identify patterns in materials that might be linked to consciousness.8
Some examples of physical CC sets:
• {neuron firing pattern p3}
• {neuron firing pattern p3, electromagnetic wave pattern p4}
• {quantum pattern p5}
• {neuron firing pattern p3, haemoglobin}
In the last example the simple presence of haemoglobin is a member of 
the CC set. It does not matter which pattern occurs in the haemoglobin: 
a conscious state would only occur when p3 is present in neurons 
surrounded by blood.
It is essential that the members of a physical CC set can be precisely 
and unambiguously described. Mathematical c-theories work with 
formally structured p-descriptions—they cannot convert natural 
language descriptions of the physical world into c-descriptions. It is 
easy to construct p-descriptions of elementary wave-particles, atoms 
and molecules. It is much harder to p-describe biological materials, such 
as neurons (see Section 5.1).9 
6.3 Novel Materials?
It has been suggested that consciousness could be linked to unknown 
materials, such as a novel wave-particle.10 The novel material could 
contain patterns that are linked to conscious states. Or it could be a 
passive member of CC sets that include patterns in other materials. It 
is conceivable that each conscious state is linked to a different novel 
material.
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Novel materials must have e-causal powers. Novel materials without 
e-causal powers could not e-cause c-reports (C4) and they could not 
be detected with scientific instruments. So we could not verify their 
existence or use them to infer the presence of consciousness. This type 
of material should be sliced off with Ockham’s razor.
Up to this point it has not been necessary to posit novel materials to 
explain the brain’s operation.11 Most scientists believe that the known 
physical properties of the brain can account for the firing patterns that 
send spikes to the larynx and lead to c-reports. Novel materials might 
be needed if we observed brain events that did not have an identifiable 
cause—this might lead us to hypothesize new wave-particles. But no 
such cases have come to light.
The most plausible novel material is something with weak e-causal 
powers that plays a minor role in the e-causation of c-reports. Such 
a consciousness force or particle might be detectable by special 
instruments, but it would be invisible to our current technology. There 
is no pressing need for a consciousness force or particle, but we might 
believe in it if it was a necessary consequence of a c-theory that had been 
thoroughly tested in other ways.12
6.4 Simplifying Assumptions about Physical 
C-Theories
Experiments on physical c-theories have to demonstrate that some 
patterns in some materials are linked to consciousness and other patterns 
in other materials are not. For example, a physical c-theory might claim 
that some neuron activity patterns form CC sets. To prove this we would 
need to show that consciousness is correlated with the proposed neuron 
activity patterns independently of glia patterns, electromagnetic wave 
patterns, other neuron activity patterns, and so on.
The best way to prove that consciousness is linked to patterns in 
particular materials is to carry out studies that test all combinations of 
materials (see Section 5.3). However, the link between consciousness 
and particular materials cannot be fully tested in natural experiments, 
because the brain does not naturally change into different materials, 
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such as silicon (see Section 5.4). So we are unlikely to be able to identify 
the minimal sets of spatiotemporal structures that form physical CC sets. 
For example, we will be unable to experimentally distinguish between 
these potential CC sets:
• {neuron firing pattern p3}
• {neuron firing pattern p3, haemoglobin}
• {neuron firing pattern p3, haemoglobin, cerebrospinal fluid}
Some potential CC sets can be eliminated by assuming that passive 
materials are not members of CC sets. For example, we can assume that 
the simple presence of haemoglobin is not linked to consciousness. This 
assumption should only be made when natural experiments cannot 
prove the link between consciousness and the simple presence of a 
material: 
A7. CC sets do not contain passive materials. If the link between 
consciousness and the simple presence of a material cannot be 
demonstrated in a natural experiment, then this material can be 
excluded from potential CC sets.
Passive materials are only passive relative to consciousness—
the materials could contain patterns that are not correlated with 
consciousness. 
We can also assume that constant patterns are not members of CC 
sets:
A8. CC sets do not contain patterns that are present when the system is 
conscious and unconscious. If the link between consciousness and a 
constant pattern cannot be demonstrated in a natural experiment, 
then this pattern can be excluded from potential CC sets.
This assumption only applies to constant patterns that occur in the same 
materials as the patterns that are linked to consciousness. Constant 
patterns that occur in other materials can be excluded using assumption 
A7.
Suppose a conscious brain has neuron activity patterns p6 and p7, and 
the unconscious brain has neuron activity patterns p6 and p8. If a natural 
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experiment cannot demonstrate that p6 is correlated with consciousness, 
then it can be excluded from the CC set using A8. The CC set would just 
consist of neuron activity pattern p7.
There are strong connections between the brain’s materials. When a 
neuron fires, there are chemical changes, fluctuations in electromagnetic 
fields and an altered balance between oxygenated and de-oxygenated 
blood. These changes are partially correlated with each other, but only 
one of them might be linked to consciousness. 
Some of these partially correlated changes can be excluded from 
potential CC sets on the basis of their timing relationship with c-reports. 
It is more difficult to identify the correlation between consciousness and 
patterns that occur simultaneously. This could be done by replacing the 
brain’s materials, but there is little scope for this in natural experiments. 
To address this problem we can exclude weakly correlated patterns 
from potential CC sets:
A9. CC sets do not contain partially correlated patterns. When several 
different materials have the same spatiotemporal pattern, the 
material(s) in which the spatiotemporal pattern is strongest will 
be considered to be the potential member(s) of the CC set that is 
associated with the conscious state, unless the partially correlated 
patterns can be separated out in a natural experiment.13
Suppose a conscious brain has neuron activity pattern p9 with 
strength 7, and p9 occurs in the glia with strength 5 and in the 
electromagnetic waves with strength 8. p9 is completely absent from 
the unconscious brain. A natural experiment cannot demonstrate that 
p9 in neurons and glia should be excluded from the CC set, so the CC 
set could consist of p9 in any combination of the three materials. We 
can set this possibility aside by making assumption A9. The CC set 
would just consist of electromagnetic wave pattern p9.
A7-A9 enable us to develop more compact c-theories from 
ambiguous experimental data. They should not be rigidly adhered to 
because they are motivated by pragmatic considerations and go beyond 
the experimental evidence. CC sets might contain passive materials, 
constant patterns and partially correlated patterns. 
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6.5 Summary
A physical c-theory is a mathematical relationship between patterns 
in materials (captured in p-descriptions) and formal descriptions of 
conscious states (c-descriptions). Physical c-theories conform to the 
constraints and fit in well with mainstream scientific methodology.
A large number of materials and patterns are potential members of 
physical CC sets. We are unlikely to be able to completely separate them 
out in natural experiments, but we can reduce the number of potential 
CC sets by making assumptions A7-A9, which exclude passive materials, 
constant patterns and partially correlated patterns from CC sets.

7. Information Theories of 
Consciousness
[…] to the extent that a mechanism is capable of generating integrated 
information, no matter whether it is organic or not, whether it is built of 
neurons or of silicon chips, and independent of its ability to report, it will 
have consciousness. 
Giulio Tononi, Consciousness as  
Integrated Information: A Provisional Manifesto1
Information is notorious for coming in many forms and having many 
meanings. It can be associated with several explanations, depending on 
the perspective adopted and the requirements and desiderata one has 
in mind.
Luciano Floridi, Information: A Very Short Introduction2
7.1 What Is Information?
In this ‘information age’ people see information everywhere. Some say 
that we are living in a simulation or a digital universe; others claim that 
information patterns are consciousness.
I open up your head and rummage around inside. I feel bones, blood 
and tapeworm cysts. Through the microscope I observe neurons, glia 
and bacteria. I cannot see information anywhere. I cannot detect it using 
scientific instruments. There is just soggy oozing physical stuff.
Computers are information processors. There must be information 
inside a computer. I open up a computer and rummage around inside. 
I feel silicon chips, copper circuits, dust and two dead flies. Just more 
physical stuff—no information anywhere.
I flick through the computer manual. It states that information is 
stored in the memory units of the computer (the DRAM storage cells). 
© David Gamez, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0107.07
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I switch on the computer and examine the DRAM storage cells. They 
contain electrons. When I measure the voltages I obtain the following 
values: 0.7, 0.8, 1.1, 1.0, 0.2, 0.7, 0.9, 0.1, 0.0, 1.5, 1.4, 0.5, 0.1, 1.5, 0.7, 0.8, 
0.3, 1.2, 1.3, 0.0, 0.4, 0.9, 0.7 and 0.6. These voltages change all the time as 
the computer operates. If an engineer looked these voltages, s/he would 
note that the DRAM is operating in its specified range.
I apply a threshold of 0.75 V to the voltages, and interpret voltages 
above the threshold as 1 and voltages below the threshold as 0. This 
yields 011100100110010101100100. This means something to me—it is 
a string of 1s and 0s. A computer scientist exclaims, ‘Ah, binary, that’s 
726564 in hexadecimal.’ A child interprets it as an adder.
I group the 1s and 0s into three 8-bit binary numbers: 01110010, 
01100101 and 01100100. These correspond to the decimal numbers 114, 
101 and 100. I map the decimal numbers onto letters using the standard 
ASCII codes (114=’r’; 101=’e’; 100=’d’). This yields ‘red’. It is a word in the 
English language (the colour of apples; the colour of blood). ‘red’ does 
not mean much to people who do not speak English—it is just a string 
of letters, similar to ‘nob’.
Initially the computer was an invisible physical object. I did not 
attribute any properties to it. It was something beyond my bubble of 
experience that did not exist for me. Its physical states were not 1s and 
0s; they were not letters or numbers; they were not even voltages.3
Voltages, binary numbers and ‘red’ are information patterns 
that appear when we measure a system’s states and interpret the 
measurements in different ways. This combination of measurement and 
interpretation will be referred to as an interface, which specifies:
• The material that holds the information. In a computer the 
information could be in the DRAM, CPU, etc.
• The type of information. Is it binary, decimal, drawn from the 
set of letters, and so on?
• How information of the appropriate type can be read from 
spatiotemporal patterns in the material. In the computer 
example I specified how the DRAM voltages could be 
measured and converted into binary numbers and letters.
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Interfaces enable us to extract information from the invisible physical 
world. They can be applied in sequence to extract different kinds of 
information. There is no information without an interface.4
An infinite number of different interfaces can be applied to a physical 
system. Instead of a threshold of 0.75 V I could have used a threshold 
of 0.55 V. This would have yielded 111101100110011101100111. I can 
group these 1s and 0s into four 6-bit binary numbers: 111101, 100110, 
011101 and 100111, which correspond to the decimal numbers 61, 38, 
29 and 39. I can use a different mapping of numbers onto letters (for 
example, 61=’b’, 38=’l’, 29=’u’ and 39=’e’). This interface extracts ‘blue’ 
from the voltages in the computer’s memory.
‘Red’ and ‘blue’ appear when I apply different interfaces to the 
DRAM voltages. There is no correct answer about which sequence of 
letters is really in the computer’s memory. Different interfaces produce 
different sets of information. 
Once I have selected an interface, the information is determined by 
the physical system. If I interpret the DRAM voltages using a threshold 
of 0.75 V, 8-bit numbers and standard ASCII codes, I inevitably end up 
with the word ‘red’—I cannot change the fact that the application of this 
interface to this system results in the word ‘red’. While information can 
only appear through a subjectively chosen interface, it is fixed by the 
physical system once the interface has been selected—it is objectively 
present on the basis of this interface.
Custom interfaces can be designed to read most and possibly all 
information patterns from a physical system in a particular state. 
I can extract the text of Madame Bovary from the lines on my wife’s 
face.5 Think of a four letter word—I can extract it from the DRAM 
voltages by changing the number-to-letter mappings. Time-indexed 
interfaces might be required to extract complex information from 
simple systems6 and to extract sequences of information patterns from 
sequences of physical states.7
Some people distinguish data from information. They define data 
as the differences that are extracted from a physical system using 
an interface. These differences become information when they are 
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well-formed and meaningful.8 The problem with this distinction is 
that any measured set of differences is meaningful to some extent: 
Voltages are meaningful to engineers; binary numbers are meaningful 
to computer scientists; letters are meaningful to literate people. The only 
differences that are completely without meaning cannot be accessed by 
us because they are part of the invisible physical world. This leaves 
us with the notion that information might be well-formed data. But we 
do not need a data/information distinction to capture the difference 
between well-formed and badly-formed data.
Shannon’s work on the transmission of information has led some 
people to interpret information as the reduction of uncertainty.9 
Consider my snake, Sam. Sam is dead. Sam is not Lazarus: he will not 
rise—he will always be dead. You do not need to tell me that Sam is 
dead because I know that he is dead and this is not going to change. I do 
not gain any information when you send me a message stating that Sam 
is dead. Now consider a coin that can be in two states (heads and tails). 
I gain information (I reduce uncertainty) if you tell me that it is tails 
because I can only guess this with 50% accuracy. Now consider a six-
sided dice. You roll the dice and it shows a two. I can only guess that it 
is showing two with 17% accuracy, so a message informing me that it is 
two considerably reduces my uncertainty about it. The more a message 
reduces my uncertainty about the state of a system, the greater the 
information content of that message. Shannon used this interpretation 
of information to develop his measure of information entropy.
This interpretation of information is a useful way of quantifying the 
amount of information in a system. But it is not an adequate definition 
of information. Before we can talk about the reduction of uncertainty 
of our knowledge about a system, we need an interface that defines 
the information states that are available in the system. We can only 
reduce uncertainty about the state of a coin once we have an interface 
that converts the physical coin into two possible outcomes, ‘heads’ 
and ‘tails’. Once a system’s information states have been defined, it is 
possible to measure its information entropy and state how rapidly its 
information can be passed over a channel.
 977. Information Theories of Consciousness
7.2 Information C-Theories
Information c-theories are defined as follows:
D13. An information c-theory links consciousness to spatiotemporal 
information patterns. Information CC sets only contain information 
patterns, which can occur in any material.
Suppose we discover a neuron firing pattern, p10, that is correlated 
with conscious state c4. We could apply an interface, i1, to this pattern 
to extract an information pattern, ip1. An information c-theory would 
claim that c4 is correlated with ip1. This c-theory would predict that c4 
would be present if ip1 was extracted from a pile of stones or from a set 
of traffic lights (see Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1. Information c-theory. An experiment demonstrates that conscious 
state c4 is correlated with neuron firing pattern p10. Interface i1 converts neuron 
firing pattern p10 into information pattern ip1. An information c-theory would 
claim that it is the information pattern, ip1, that is linked to c4, not the neuron 
firing pattern p10. Information pattern ip1 can also be extracted from traffic lights 
through interface i2. The information c-theory would claim that ip1 is linked to c4 
regardless of whether it has been extracted from a neuron firing pattern or a set of 
traffic lights. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
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Tononi has developed an impressive information c-theory. His 
algorithm analyzes the information patterns in a system, and outputs 
the parts that are linked to conscious states, the level of consciousness 
and a high-dimensional mathematical structure that is intended to 
correspond to the contents of consciousness. Preliminary experiments 
have been carried out to test this c-theory.10
Physical c-theories use interfaces to gather information about the 
physical world. The interface acts as a window onto the materials, and 
physical c-theories link patterns in these materials to consciousness. 
In an information c-theory the information pattern that is extracted 
through an interface is not a measurement of something else—it is 
linked to consciousness independently of the interface or the material 
in which it occurs.
Information c-theories can be converted into physical c-theories by 
adding material(s) to the CC sets.11 Physical c-theories can be converted 
into information c-theories by removing the material(s). The experiments 
that support Tononi’s information c-theory can be interpreted as 
evidence for a link between neuron firing patterns (identified using his 
algorithm) and consciousness.
Information c-theories are a radical departure from standard scientific 
practice. Scientific laws apply to specific aspects of the physical world. It 
is not the pattern that counts, but the presence of the pattern in a particular 
material. Newton’s theory of gravity describes how masses behave on a 
particular spatiotemporal scale. His equations would produce incorrect 
results if they were applied to electric charges. Information c-theories 
break free from the material—they treat information patterns as if they 
had an objective existence of their own—as if they were something in 
the physical world that could be linked to consciousness.
7.3 The Subjectivity of Information 
A brain is in state s1; conscious state c5 is present. My laboratory carries 
out a pilot study to identify the information pattern that is correlated with 
c5. Tony chooses one interface and claims that the resulting information 
pattern, ip2, is correlated with c5. George chooses a different interface 
and claims that the resulting information pattern, ip3, is correlated with 
c5. Which information pattern is correlated with c5—ip2, ip3 or both? 
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Tony is my pal. George broke my microscope. I want to accept 
Tony’s claim that ip2 is correlated with c5. I want to reject the information 
pattern gathered by clumsy George. But the selection of ip2 would be an 
arbitrary subjective choice. If I want to conform to constraint C1, I have 
to accept that any and potentially all of the information patterns that can 
be extracted from the brain in state s1 are potentially correlated with c5. 
To avoid subjectivity my pilot study will have to measure them all. This 
is impossible because there is an infinite number of them.12
Suppose I use all possible interfaces to measure all of the information 
patterns that can be extracted from the brain in state s1. I now need to 
identify the ones that are correlated with c5. Which of these information 
patterns are not present in the unconscious brain?
My pilot study will have to use all possible interfaces to measure 
all possible information patterns in the unconscious brain. I can then 
compare these infinite sets to find the information patterns that are only 
present in the conscious brain. These are the members of the information 
CC set that is correlated with c5. The practical impossibility of this task 
suggests that a subjective choice of interface cannot be avoided in real 
world experiments on information c-theories. 
These practical difficulties are irrelevant if interfaces can be custom 
designed to extract arbitrary information patterns from the brain (see 
Section 7.1). This would enable any information pattern to be read from 
the unconscious brain, including the information patterns that were 
extracted from the conscious brain in the first stage of the experiment. 
Custom designed interfaces that can extract arbitrary information 
patterns would break constraint C3. CC sets cannot consist of 
information patterns if all of the conscious brain’s information patterns 
can be extracted from the unconscious brain.13
7.4 E-Causal Powers of Information 
I define an interface that interprets voltages in a computer’s memory 
as 1 if they are above 0.75 V, and as 0 if they are below 0.75 V. The 
information changes as the voltages change. This interface makes no 
difference to the patterns of e-causation in the computer—with and 
without the interface the computer moves through the same sequence 
of physical states.14
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I alter the interface and specify that voltages above 0.8 V should 
be interpreted as 0, and voltages below 0.8 V should be interpreted 
as 1. Now the information patterns are completely different, but the 
computer continues to move through the same sequence of physical 
states. It does not matter which interface I apply to the computer: its 
e-causal exchanges and sequence of physical states remain the same. The 
information does not e-cause or constrain the behaviour of the physical 
system. This suggests that information cannot e-cause c-reports, so 
information patterns cannot be sole members of CC sets (C4).15
7.5 Is Information Intrinsic?
Information appears when an interface, defined by an observer, is 
applied to a physical system. Information patterns that depend on an 
external interface cannot be intrinsic properties.
It is conceivable that the interface could be inside the system, so that 
one part reads information from another.16 In this case the information 
might be an intrinsic property of the system as a whole. There are problems 
with this proposal. For example, the location of the information patterns 
in the system would be ambiguous, and information c-theorists have 
not proposed how we can measure this type of ‘intrinsic’ information 
without applying an external interface to the system.
7.6 Separating Information from Material
Suppose we identify a neuron firing pattern that is correlated with a 
conscious state. There are two interpretations of this result: 
• A pattern of information is linked to the conscious state 
(information c-theory).
• A pattern in a material (neurons) is linked to the conscious 
state (physical c-theory). 
We want an experiment that can decide between these two claims. This 
would show that an information pattern is correlated with consciousness 
(information c-theory), or that the pattern is only correlated with 
consciousness when it occurs in biological neurons (physical c-theory).
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The best way of deciding between these claims would be to change 
the brain’s materials while preserving its information patterns. If it had 
the same conscious state when its neurons were replaced with silicon, 
then the information pattern might be the sole member of the CC set. But 
if we exchange a person’s neurons for silicon, we cannot be confident 
that their c-reports are functionally connected to their conscious states. 
We will have lost our ability to measure consciousness (see Section 5.4).
We have to use natural experiments to decide between the two 
claims. We could monitor the system and hope that the pattern moves 
between materials during its normal behaviour. Suppose the subject has 
conscious state c6 when there is information pattern ip4 in the neurons 
and nowhere else in the brain. At a later point in time the subject has c6 
when ip4 is in the glia and nowhere else in the brain. We would conclude 
that c6 is correlated with the information pattern, and that the material 
has no effect on consciousness.17
We have no reason to believe that information patterns move 
between materials during natural experiments on the brain. If we 
cannot observe this, it will be impossible to experimentally distinguish 
between physical and information c-theories.
7.7 Summary
Information appears when interfaces are applied to the physical world. 
Interfaces specify how information of a particular type can be extracted 
from a particular material. Information does not exist in the physical 
world—it is partly determined by the interface and partly determined 
by the physical world. Information c-theories claim that information 
patterns are linked to consciousness independently of the material in 
which they occur. 
Information patterns cannot be correlated with consciousness because 
they can be read from both the conscious and unconscious brain using 
custom-designed interfaces (C3). Information patterns are subjective 
and incapable of e-causing c-reports (C1, C4). It is unlikely that evidence 
in favour of them can be obtained through natural experiments. Until 
these problems have been resolved information c-theories should be set 
aside or interpreted as physical c-theories.18

8. Computation Theories of 
Consciousness
Useful computation is in the eye of the beholder. […] It requires an 
underlying system of whose autonomous dynamics we have a predictive 
model. […] To solve a problem computational we need to map the 
problem to be solved onto the underlying behavior of the system and 
hence produce a starting state from which the autonomous dynamics of 
the system will produce a solution.
Robert Kentridge, Symbols, Neurons, Soap-Bubbles  
and the Computation Underlying Cognition1 
8.1 Calculators, Special-Purpose Computers and 
General-Purpose Computers
We can solve many problems in our heads. But it is often easier to use 
the physical world to solve problems. Suppose you want to calculate 
10+4+18+2. Put ten stones in a box, then four, and so on. Count the 
number of stones in the box to get the result. This is a simple calculator. 
The abacus, slide rule and Pascaline are more sophisticated calculators. 
When you enter a problem into a calculator the solution is immediately 
displayed. As each stone is put in the box you can immediately read 
off the total number of stones—there is no waiting while the system 
‘computes’. 
Special-purpose computers take time to solve problems. We enter the 
problem by modifying the system’s state (turning knobs, pressing keys, 
etc.). We set the special-purpose computer running and it transforms the 
starting state into the final state. We read off the result from the final state.
Special-purpose computers can only solve a limited number of 
closely related problems. A special-purpose computer that uses water to 
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model an economy2 cannot process words or simulate an aircraft wing. 
Turing machines are special-purpose computers.
Soap bubble computers can find a short path between multiple points 
(see Figure 8.1). Other special-purpose computers are Turing’s Bombe, 
which was used to crack German encryption during the Second World 
War, and Babbage’s difference engine—a mechanical system that uses 
gears, cams, rods, levers and springs to compute polynomial functions.
Figure 8.1. Soap bubble computer. a) Pins are placed between two Perspex sheets 
to indicate the positions of some points. b) The sheets are dipped in soap solution 
and the resulting bubble contracts to minimize its surface tension, producing a 
short path between the points. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.3 
General-purpose computers run programs. Programs turn a general-
purpose computer into a special-purpose computer for a limited period 
of time. The operator specifies the program by connecting wires, 
punching cards, typing code into a terminal, and so on. The program 
puts the computer into a starting state. Then the computer’s components 
interact according to the laws of physics, and the result is read off from 
the computer’s finishing state. Universal Turing machines are general-
purpose computers.
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Babbage’s Analytical Engine is a design for a general-purpose 
computer that uses gears, cams, rods, levers and springs to run 
programs. The ENIAC was the first general-purpose computer to be 
built. By manipulating switches and cables it could be rewired into a 
special-purpose computer that corresponded to a desired program. 
The innovation of the ENIAC was that it was designed to be rewired 
easily—previous computers could only run a limited range of programs 
without being heavily modified (by adding components, re-soldering 
circuits, etc.). The Manchester Baby was the first general-purpose 
computer that could ‘rewire’ itself electronically from a program stored 
in a cathode ray tube. 
Modern digital computers are general-purpose computers. Their 
programs are typically written in a high level language, such as C++. 
Another program, called a compiler, converts this human-readable 
list of instructions into binary machine code, which is stored as a set 
of voltages in the computer’s memory. When the program runs, the 
voltages in the computer’s memory interact with the CPU and other 
components. This causes the computer to change states in a sequence 
determined by the program. When the program finishes the result is 
read back from the computer’s memory.
Special-purpose computers can execute the same computations as 
general-purpose computers (the same computations can be executed by 
Turing machines and universal Turing machines). The key difference 
is that general-purpose computers can be dynamically reconfigured to 
run different programs. Special-purpose computers have to be custom-
built to run a particular program.
When a general-purpose computer runs a program it is executing 
the computations that are specified in the program—its potential ability 
to execute other programs does not affect its current computations. 
General-purpose computers operate as special-purpose computers 
when they are running a program.4
The brain can operate as a general-purpose computer. I can manually 
execute a program, using pen and paper to keep track of the variables.5 
When a brain is not manually executing programs, it is not operating 
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as a general-purpose computer. In ordinary life the brain works as a 
special-purpose computer: its state transitions are determined by 
complex biological structures that are mostly hardwired.
8.2 Computation C-Theories
Computers are artificially intelligent—they can chit-chat, fly planes and 
play games. A computer that was simulating your brain might behave 
just like you. In a few short years computers will conquer the world and 
grind our weak human flesh into fertilizer. 
Computation c-theories are defined as follows: 
D14. A computation c-theory links consciousness to the execution of 
computations. Computation CC sets only contain computations, 
which can be executed by many different types of computer.6
Computation c-theories are motivated by the observation that 
computers can do the same things as brains. So it is hypothesized that 
brains work in a similar way to computers. Computation c-theories 
are encouraged by the fact that a program can run on many different 
types of machine. This suggests that computations could be objectively 
present in many different materials.
Computation c-theories claim that computation CC sets are linked to 
consciousness independently of the system that is executing them. So a 
computation CC set would be linked to consciousness if it was executed 
manually, if it ran on the cogs of Babbage’s Analytical Engine or if it was 
executed on the voltages of a modern digital computer. 
The brain is conscious when it is operating as a special-purpose 
computer. So any computations that might be linked to consciousness 
can be executed on special-purpose computers. The convenient features 
of general-purpose computers are irrelevant to computation c-theories.7 
8.3 The Subjectivity of Computing
My mate Crystal has asked me to father her children. She wants to be 
impregnated when the planets are aligned. That way, her children will 
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inherit my good looks and become great warriors. To calculate the date 
I need a model of the solar system. 
The solar system can be simulated on a digital computer. I write 
a program that uses Newton’s equations to manipulate numerical 
representations of the masses, positions and velocities of the sun and 
planets. A compiler converts the program into machine code. When 
I load the compiled program it becomes a pattern of voltages in the 
computer’s memory. When I run the program the components in the 
computer interact according to the laws of physics. After a few seconds 
the program terminates and I interpret the pattern of output voltages as 
the date of planetary alignment.
The solar system can be modelled by an orrery, which uses a 
clockwork mechanism to move metal balls representing the planets 
around a ball representing the sun. To calculate the date of planetary 
alignment, I put the spheres into the planets’ current positions, set the 
mechanism running and read off the date when they align.8 
I can increase the accuracy of my orrery by discarding its clockwork 
mechanism and replacing its balls with metal spheres that have the 
same masses as the sun and planets. To set up this gravity-powered 
orrery I put the spheres into positions that correspond to the sun and 
planets and give them the same velocity. I allow them to rotate under 
the influence of gravity and note when they align.
It makes no difference to my model if it uses metal spheres or the 
actual sun and planets. The latter approach requires less effort. The 
planets are already in their starting state and moving under the influence 
of gravity. I allow them to rotate and read off the date when they align. 
All of these systems are computing the same global function: the 
date when the planets align. If any of these systems have computational 
properties (that are potentially linked to consciousness), then all of these 
systems have computational properties (that are potentially linked to 
consciousness). Computers can be made from silicon, metal or planets—
it does not matter if they are powered by clockwork or gravity.
Prior to my intervention the solar system was not a special-purpose 
computer: it was not calculating the paths of the planets. It was just a 
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group of massy bodies whose state changes were dictated by the laws of 
physics. The solar system became a computer when I used it to calculate 
the paths of the planets. But its new status did not affect its material 
properties or behaviour—it continued to follow the laws of physics 
in exactly the same way as before. This suggests that computers are 
subjective interpretations of the physical world—part of the physical 
world becomes a computer when I use it to solve problems.
When I use my iPad to bang in a nail it can be useful to describe it 
as a hammer. Some of its properties can be understood by comparing it 
with other hammers. But my iPad does not contain ‘hammutations’—I 
do not need to invoke ‘hammutations’ to explain how I can bang in a 
nail with my iPad. 
When we use part of the physical world to add numbers, it can 
be useful to describe it as a calculator. Some of its properties can be 
understood by comparing it with other calculators. But the physical 
world does not contain calculations. Stones and a box do not contain 
calculations—I use them to add numbers. 
When we use the state changes of physical objects to solve problems 
it can be useful to describe them as computers. Some of their properties 
can be understood by comparing them with other computers (a digital 
computer is faster and more flexible than an orrery). But I do not need 
to invoke the objective presence of computations in the physical world 
to explain how I can use digital computers, orreries and solar systems to 
compute the dates of planetary alignment.
The key difference between digital computers, orreries and solar 
systems is the extent to which they have been engineered to facilitate 
our use of them as computers. The solar system has not been engineered 
at all—it is difficult to set up in a desired starting state and it works on 
the same time scale as the system it is modelling. Clockwork orreries 
can be set up easily and work faster, but they can only model one type 
of system. Digital computers can run many different programs and they 
typically operate much faster than the systems they are modelling. 
If computing is a use that we make of physical objects, then 
computations cannot be members of CC sets (C1). My consciousness 
does not appear when someone uses my brain as a computer.
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8.4 Information Processing in Computers
Computers are often described as information processing technology. 
Chapter 7 explained how we use interfaces to extract information from 
the physical world. Interfaces can also be used to store information in 
the physical world.9 I can write and read the same number, the same 
information, to and from many different physical systems.
Information that is stored in the physical world can be altered by 
changes in the physical world. I write Felicity’s number on a piece of 
paper and store it as a sequence of pits on a compact disc. A tea stain 
blurs ‘7’ into ‘8’. A scratch on the disc scrambles Felicity’s number.
We use changes in the physical world to process information. We 
construct a system that changes in a systematic way. Then we modify 
part of the system to encode the information that we want to transform 
(this modification is determined by the interface). We allow the system 
to change state (to compute). When it has finished we use the same 
interface to read back the processed information from the system.10
We know that soap bubbles contract to minimize their surface area, 
but we do not know exactly how they will contract between a given set 
of pins—if we knew this, there would be no point in using a soap bubble 
computer to identify a short path. The encoding of positions using 
pins, the dipping in soap solution and the examination of the resulting 
bubble are worthwhile because they enable us to read back a short path 
solution that would be more complicated to obtain in other ways.
Digital computers are engineered to carry out fast and flexible 
information processing. We initialize a computer by creating voltage 
patterns in its DRAM that correspond to a program and initial data. 
The computer then moves through the sequence of physical states that 
is determined by the data and the program. Digital computers also 
include a physically implemented interface that uses carefully designed 
interactions between components in the screen, circuitry and chips 
to convert the DRAM voltages into graphical shapes painted in light, 
which we interpret as letters, numbers, etc. 
The information processing that is carried out by a physical system 
depends on the interface that is used to read and write the information. 
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The soap bubble computer can be interpreted as processing information 
about the shortest roads between cities or about the optimal wiring of 
electronic components.
Suppose a computer’s memory changes from 011100100110010 
101100100 to 011100110111010101101110.11 The information extracted 
through one interface (8-bit numbers, standard ASCII codes, 114=’r’, 
101=’e’, 100=’d’, 115=’s’, 117=’u’, 110=’n’) changes from ‘red’ to ‘sun’. 
Through a different interface (6-bit numbers, 28=’r’, 38=’u’, 21=’i’, 36=’n’, 
55=’a’, 46=’d’), the information changes from ‘ruin’ to ‘raid’. There is no 
single correct or objective answer about the information processing that 
is being carried out by this computer. At most we can say that at least 
one interface exists that leads to the processing of ‘red’ into ‘sun’.12
Information processing is not a unique attribute of computers or 
brains. Any system can be interpreted as an information processor. A 
digital computer does not process any more information than a tub of 
worms. But we can carry out more useful information processing with a 
digital computer.
Any system that is interpreted as an information processor inherits 
all of the problems with information that were highlighted in the 
previous chapter. Information is subjective (C1), it is not likely to be 
intrinsic (C2) and it does not have e-causal powers (C4). Most or all 
information sets can be read from the conscious and unconscious brain 
(C3). If computation is information processing, it cannot be a member 
of a CC set.
8.5 Digital Physics and Theories of 
Implementation
Keith is taking time out from his IT support work. He flops into a chair, 
pushes back his lank long hair, sparks up a joint and relaxes. Suddenly 
he has a vision of the universe as a giant computer.
Digital physicists claim that digital computation is a fundamental 
property of the universe.13 Computation cannot be subjective if 
everything is computing all the time, regardless of whether we are 
using it to process information. This claim needs to be supported with 
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a definition of what it means to implement a computation. Digital 
physicists cannot claim that everything is X without specifying the 
nature of X. When we have a theory of implementation, we can look 
for computational structures in the universe. If they are ubiquitous 
and play a fundamental physical role, then it can be claimed that the 
universe is a giant computer.
A theory of implementation is also required to test computation 
c-theories. Suppose we want to carry out a pilot study that looks for 
the computation CC set that is linked to a conscious state. We will need 
a theory of implementation that maps the brain’s physical states onto 
computations. This will enable us to identify the computations that are 
executed in the conscious brain and not executed in the unconscious 
brain.14
Many theories of implementation have been put forward. None 
of them are convincing. Theories based on finite state automata lead 
to panpsychism.15 Combinatorial state automata don’t work.16 Some 
theories of implementation are based on features of modern digital 
computers, such as string processing, which do not generalize easily to 
biological systems.17 Many digital physicists favour cellular automata, 
but it is far from obvious whether cellular automata can provide a 
plausible interpretation of the physical world or the systems we call 
computers.18
Digital physics cannot rescue computation c-theories from 
subjectivity without a plausible theory of implementation. Computation 
c-theories cannot get off the ground without a theory of implementation 
that would enable them to be experimentally tested. We do not have a 
workable theory of implementation.
8.6 Summary
Computation c-theories claim that computations are sole members of 
CC sets—the architecture and material of the systems that are executing 
the computations are irrelevant. The convenient features of general-
purpose computers are not necessary to computation c-theories. Any 
computation that is potentially linked to consciousness can be executed 
on a special-purpose computer.
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If computation is a subjective use we make of the world, then 
computations cannot be members of CC sets (C1). If computers are 
information processors, computation c-theories will have the same 
problems as information c-theories (C1-C4). Digital physicists claim 
that digital computation is a fundamental property of the universe. But 
no one has developed a theory of implementation that convincingly 
supports digital physics or would enable us to identify computational 
correlates of consciousness in the brain. Until these problems have been 
resolved, computation c-theories should be set aside or interpreted as 
physical c-theories.19
9. Predictions and Deductions 
about Consciousness
9.1 Predictions about Consciousness
I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is 
capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that 
not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a 
criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a scientific 
system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a 
positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that 
it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it 
must be possible for an empirical system to be refuted by experience.
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery1
Information and computation c-theories do not conform to constraints 
C1-C4. The rest of this book will focus on physical c-theories, which are 
based on the idea that patterns in one or more materials are linked to 
conscious states (D12).
Physical c-theories convert descriptions of physical states into 
descriptions of conscious states. This enables them to be tested in the 
following way:
1. Measure aspect of the physical world that is specified by the 
c-theory.
2. Convert measurement into p-description, pd1.
3. Use mathematical c-theory to convert p-description into 
c-description, cd1.
4. Obtain c-report from test subject.
5. Convert c-report into c-description, cd2. 
6. Compare cd1 and cd2. If they match, the c-theory passes the test 
for this physical state and this conscious state.
© David Gamez, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0107.09
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For example, we could measure the state of a person’s brain and use 
a c-theory to generate a prediction about their consciousness. This is 
illustrated in Figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1. Testing a c-theory’s prediction about a conscious state. 1) Scientific 
instruments measure the physical state of the brain. 2) Scientific measurements are 
converted into a formal p-description of the brain’s physical state, pd1. 3) C-theory 
converts p-description, pd1, into a formal c-description of the brain’s predicted 
conscious state, cd1. 4) The human brain generates a c-report about its conscious 
state. 5) The c-report is converted into a formal description of the measured 
conscious state, cd2. 6) The measured and predicted conscious states are compared. 
If they do not match, the c-theory should be revised or discarded. Image © David 
Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
The validation of the predicted consciousness (stages 4–6) could be 
carried out by the subject. First the predicted conscious state could be 
induced in the subject. Then the subject would compare the induced 
state of consciousness with their memory of their earlier conscious state 
(the state they had when their physical state was measured).2
Virtual reality could be used to induce predicted states of 
consciousness in the subject. The c-description of the predicted 
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consciousness would be converted into a virtual reality file.3 This 
would be loaded into a virtual reality system and the user would 
decide whether their consciousness in the virtual reality system 
was similar to their earlier conscious state.4 We could also develop 
algorithms that convert c-descriptions of predicted conscious states 
into natural language. The subject could decide whether the natural 
language description corresponded to their memory of their earlier 
conscious state.
Figure 9.2. Testing a c-theory’s prediction about a physical state. 1) The human 
brain generates a c-report about its conscious state. 2) The c-report is converted 
into a formal description of the measured conscious state, cd3. 3) C-theory converts 
the c-description, cd3, into a formal p-description of the brain’s predicted physical 
state, pd2. 4) Scientific instruments measure the physical state of the human brain. 
5) Scientific measurements are converted into a formal p-description of the brain’s 
physical state, pd3. 6) The measured and predicted physical states are compared. 
If they do not match, the c-theory should be revised or discarded. Image © David 
Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
C-theories can convert descriptions of conscious states into 
descriptions of physical states. So they can also be tested in the following 
way (see Figure 9.2):5 
1. Obtain c-report from test subject.
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2. Convert c-report into c-description, cd3.
3. Use mathematical c-theory to convert c-description into 
p-description, pd2.
4. Measure aspect of the physical world that is specified by the 
c-theory.
5. Convert measurement into p-description, pd3.
6. Compare pd2 and pd3. If they match, the c-theory passes the 
test for this physical state and this conscious state.
For example, a c-theory might predict that a conscious experience of a 
red rectangle is associated with a particular neuron activity pattern. We 
can measure the brain of a person who c-reports a red rectangle to see if 
the predicted neuron activity pattern is present.
C-theories can only be tested on platinum standard systems. On a 
platinum standard system we can compare a c-theory’s prediction with 
a measurement of consciousness. Or we can generate a prediction about 
a physical state from a measurement of consciousness. This type of 
testable prediction is formally defined as follows: 
D15. A testable prediction is a c-description that is generated from a 
p-description or a p-description that is generated from a c-description. 
Predictions can be checked by measuring consciousness or they are 
generated from measurements of consciousness. Predictions can only 
be generated or confirmed on platinum standard systems during 
experiments on consciousness. It is only under these conditions that 
consciousness can be measured using assumptions A1-A6.
Good c-theories generate many testable predictions. We believe 
c-theories to the extent that their predictions have been successfully 
tested. Different c-theories can make different testable predictions—we 
use this to experimentally discriminate between them.
The tests described in this section only check that a c-theory maps 
between conscious states and particular aspects of the physical world. 
They do not check that a c-theory is based on minimal and complete sets of 
spatiotemporal structures (D5). Suppose we have shown that a c-theory 
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maps between neuron activity patterns and consciousness in normally 
functioning adult human brains. To test the theory fully we have to 
check that this mapping exists independently of the presence of other 
materials in the brain, such as electromagnetic waves, glia, haemoglobin 
and cerebrospinal fluid. 
To prove that a c-theory is based on minimal and complete sets 
of spatiotemporal structures we need to vary the physical world 
systematically in the manner described in Section 5.3. Many variations 
of the physical world cannot be achieved with natural experiments. So 
it is extremely unlikely that the predictions of a c-theory can be fully 
tested.
9.2 Deductions about Consciousness
I put your head into a guillotine and chop it off. It falls into a basket. I 
watch your face. Your eyes move; your mouth opens and closes; your 
tongue twitches. These movements cease. I connect an EEG monitor 
to your brain. It is silent. After a couple of minutes a wave of activity 
occurs that fades away after twenty seconds.6
Your decapitated head might be associated with a bubble of experience 
long after it has been cut off. I cannot measure its consciousness 
because it is not a platinum standard system. But I can use a theory 
of consciousness that has been tested on platinum standard systems to 
make inferences about the consciousness of your decapitated head.
How does consciousness change during death? Which coma patients 
are conscious? When does consciousness emerge in the embryo or 
infant? How will my consciousness be affected by a brain operation? 
Can I copy my consciousness by simulating my brain on a computer? 
What are the bubbles of experience of bats, cephalopods and plants? 
Are robots conscious? 
Suppose we converge on a c-theory that is commonly agreed 
to be true. Some of its predictions have been successfully tested. We 
are confident that it accurately maps between conscious states and 
physical states on platinum standard systems during consciousness 
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experiments. We can use this reliable c-theory to make inferences about 
the consciousness of decapitated heads, bats and robots.
In an experiment on a platinum standard system a c-theory’s 
predictions can be checked because assumptions A1-A6 hold and we can 
measure consciousness. These assumptions do not apply to decapitated 
heads, bats and robots. We cannot obtain a believable c-report from these 
systems, so we cannot compare a c-description generated by a c-theory 
with a c-description generated from a c-report. Inferences about the 
consciousness of these systems cannot be confirmed or refuted. This 
type of untestable prediction will be referred to as a deduction, which is 
defined as follows:
D16. A deduction is a c-description that is generated from a 
p-description when consciousness cannot be measured. Deductions 
are blind logical consequences of a c-theory. They cannot be tested 
because assumptions A1-A6 do not apply. The plausibility of a 
deduction is closely tied to the reliability of the c-theory that was 
used to make it.
Predictions are testable. Deductions are not. However much data 
I gather about a physical system I cannot ever test the deductions 
that I make about its consciousness. The assumptions that enable us 
to measure consciousness do not apply to the systems that we make 
deductions about.
I grab a bat, measure its physical state, and use a mathematical c-theory 
to convert a p-description of its physical state into a c-description of 
its consciousness (see Figure 9.3). If the bat’s consciousness is radically 
different from my own, then it will be difficult for me to understand 
this c-description. I might find it impossible to imagine what it is like 
to be this bat. (How could I imaginatively transform my bubble of 
experience into the bat’s bubble of experience?)7 While solutions to this 
problem have been put forward,8 at some point we will have to accept 
that we have a limited ability to imaginatively transform our bubbles of 
experience. This failure of imagination does not affect our ability to make 
scientific deductions about a bat’s consciousness. A reliable c-theory 
should be able to generate a complete and accurate c-description of a 
bat’s conscious state from a p-description of its physical state.9
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There are strong ethical motivations for making deductions about 
the consciousness of brain-damaged people, embryos and infants. 
Deductions have implications for abortion, organ donation and the 
treatment of the dead and dying. We could use deductions to reduce 
the suffering of animals that are raised and slaughtered for meat.10 
Deductions could satisfy our curiosity about the consciousness of 
artificial systems.
Deductions will be based on c-theories that have not been fully tested. Poor 
access to the brain and limited time and money hamper our ability to 
test c-theories. We cannot check that a c-theory holds across all conscious 
and physical states. Multiple competing c-theories might be consistent 
with the evidence and exhibit different trade-offs between simplicity 
and generality. These problems are common to all scientific theories. 
Figure 9.3. Deduction of the conscious state of a bat. 1) Scientific instruments 
measure the physical state of the bat’s brain. 2) The measurements are converted 
into a formal p-description of the physical state of the bat’s brain, pd5. 3) A reliable 
well-tested c-theory converts the p-description into a formal c-description, cd5, of 
the bat’s deduced conscious state. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
Deductions will be based on c-theories that are impossible to fully test. 
C-theories can only be tested in natural experiments on platinum 
standard systems. Under these conditions it will be difficult or impossible 
to prove that a c-theory is based on minimal sets of spatiotemporal 
structures. So there are likely to be residual ambiguities about CC sets 
that cannot be experimentally resolved. This is illustrated in Table 9.1.
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Spatiotemporal 
structures
Results of 
experiments 
on platinum 
standard 
systems
Deductions about c7 in a 
non-platinum standard 
system
A B C D Conscious state c7
Deductions 
of t1 based 
on {B,C}
Deduction 
of t2 based 
on {B,C,D}
0 0 0 0 ? 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 ? 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 ? 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 ? 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 ? 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 ? 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 ? 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 ? 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 9.1. Deductions about consciousness based on limited experimental evidence. 
A, B and C are spatiotemporal structures in the physical world, such as neuron firing 
patterns or electromagnetic waves. D is a passive material, such as cerebrospinal fluid.11 
‘1’ indicates that a feature is present; ‘0’ indicates that it is absent. The second column 
presents the results of experiments on platinum standard systems in which different 
combinations of A, B, C and D are tested and conscious state c7 is measured. ‘1’ indicates 
that c7 is present; ‘0’ indicates that c7 is absent. The shaded rows are physical states in 
which D is absent. In this example D cannot be removed from a platinum standard 
system in a natural experiment, so the link between D and consciousness is unknown. 
A question mark in these rows indicates that it is not known whether c7 is present 
when D is absent. On the basis of this data we can develop two c-theories, t1 and t2. t1 
links B and C to c7; t2 links B, C and D to c7. Both of these theories are compatible with 
the experimental data. They make the same deductions about c7 in the white rows and 
different deductions about c7 in the shaded rows.
Many biological systems are similar to normally functioning adult 
human brains. With these systems we do not have to worry about 
whether a c-theory includes all of the spatiotemporal structures that 
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might be linked to consciousness, because the normally functioning 
adult human brain and the target system contain similar patterns in 
similar materials. This will be expressed using the notion of a physical 
context:
D17. A physical context is everything in a system that is not part of 
a CC set that is used to make a deduction. Two physical systems 
have the same physical context if they contain approximately the 
same materials and if the constant and partially correlated patterns 
in these materials are approximately the same.12
When two systems share the same physical context we can make 
deductions about their consciousness that are as strong and believable as 
the original theory. These will be referred to as conservative deductions, 
which are defined as follows: 
D18. In a conservative deduction a c-theory generates a c-description 
from a p-description in the same physical context as the one in which 
the theory was tested.
Suppose a c-theory links some electromagnetic patterns to 
consciousness. In this case the physical context is everything in the 
brain apart from these electromagnetic patterns, such as neurons, 
haemoglobin, cerebrospinal fluid, glia, other electromagnetic patterns, 
and so on. If these patterns and materials are approximately the same 
in another system, then they provide the same physical context for the 
electromagnetic patterns that the c-theory uses to make its deductions 
about consciousness.13
Other systems, such as cephalopods and robots, lack some of the 
spatiotemporal structures that are present in normally functioning 
adult human brains. The link between these spatiotemporal structures 
and consciousness cannot be tested in natural experiments. We can still 
make deductions about the consciousness of these systems, but they are 
likely to be less accurate than conservative deductions. These will be 
referred to as liberal deductions, which are defined as follows: 
D19. In a liberal deduction a c-theory generates a c-description from 
a p-description in a different physical context from the one in which 
the theory was tested.14,15
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Suppose we have identified a mathematical relationship between 
neuron firing patterns and conscious states in the normally functioning 
adult human brain, and none of the brain’s other materials need to be 
included to make accurate predictions about consciousness. We could 
use this mathematical relationship to make conservative deductions 
about the consciousness of a damaged brain, an infant’s brain and 
possibly a bat’s brain. In these brains, most of the same patterns and 
materials are present, so we would not have to prove that the c-theory is 
based on minimal sets of spatiotemporal structures. We could also use 
this relationship to make liberal deductions about the consciousness of 
neurons in a Petri dish or about a snail’s consciousness. We would have 
less confidence in these deductions because these physical contexts lack 
some of the materials that are potential members of CC sets.
In the system described in Table 9.1, t1 and t2 make conservative 
deductions about consciousness in the physical states that are coloured 
white. These deductions are made in the same physical context as the 
one in which the theories were tested (D is always present), and both 
theories make identical deductions. t1 and t2 make liberal deductions 
about the physical states in the shaded rows. The theories have not 
been tested in this physical context, which lacks D, and they make 
different deductions. These liberal deductions cannot be confirmed or 
refuted—all that can be confirmed or refuted is the c-theory on which 
the deductions are based. For example, we might give preference to 
the liberal deductions of t2 if it has performed better in experiments on 
platinum standard systems.
All well-tested c-theories should make the same conservative 
deductions. If two c-theories make different conservative deductions, 
then it should be possible to devise an experiment that can discriminate 
between them.
There can be contradictions between the liberal deductions that 
are made by equally reliable c-theories (see Table 9.1). Our reaction to 
this will depend on our motivation for making the deductions. If they 
are made out of interest, then we can say that the system is conscious 
according to t1 and not conscious according to t2. If they are made for 
ethical reasons, then we could base our treatment of the system on 
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whether it has been deduced to be conscious according to any reliable 
c-theory. An artificial intelligence should not be switched off if it has 
been deduced to be conscious according to t1, even if t2 claims that it is 
unconscious.
The distinction between conservative and liberal deductions can be 
dropped if assumptions A7-A9 are made and a c-theory is considered to 
be true given these assumptions. In this case, the presence or absence of 
a physical context does not matter because passive materials, constant 
patterns and partially correlated patterns have been assumed to be 
irrelevant to consciousness. All deductions would then be equally valid.
9.3 Summary
A c-theory can generate testable predictions about consciousness or the 
physical world. Testable predictions can only be made about platinum 
standard systems during consciousness experiments. It is only under 
these conditions that we can use measurements of consciousness to 
generate or confirm the predictions.
When a c-theory has been rigorously tested, we might judge that 
it can reliably map between c-descriptions and p-descriptions. We can 
then use it to make deductions about the consciousness of non-platinum 
standard systems, such as coma patients and bats. These deductions 
cannot be checked because we cannot measure consciousness in these 
systems. We make deductions for a variety of ethical, practical and 
intellectual reasons.
Conservative deductions are made in the same physical context as the 
one in which the c-theory was tested. They are as reliable as the c-theory 
and all c-theories should make the same conservative deductions. Liberal 
deductions are made about systems that are substantially different from 
the platinum standard systems on which the c-theory was tested. They 
are less reliable than conservative deductions and different c-theories 
are likely to make different liberal deductions.

10. Modification and 
Enhancement of Consciousness
[…] our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call 
it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from 
it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness 
entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their 
existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there 
in all their completeness…
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience1
10.1 Heaven on Earth
When we have understood the relationship between consciousness 
and the physical world we will be able to systematically modify and 
enhance our consciousness. We will achieve heaven on Earth without 
leaving home. 
Why blow yourself up for Allah when you can deflower ten virgins 
per hour in a scientifically constructed consciousness? Or you could stuff 
your face with roast pig without feeling sated or sick. You could dress in 
cloth of gold and drink from diamond cups without rising from your silver 
bed. Or give free reign to your wrath and watch your schoolmaster being 
rogered with a red hot iron while badly-dressed dwarves bludgeon your 
boss to death. The pain of envy would be eliminated in a consciousness in 
which you are supreme dictator of the world—a consciousness rich with 
the sensation of a vast and satisfying pride.
The meek and mild might prefer the less earthy pleasures of prudence, 
justice, temperance, courage, faith, hope and charity. Or scientists could 
engineer mystical ecstatic experiences in which acolytes are penetrated 
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by darts of divine love. Family audiences might enjoy the rich radiance 
of a sunset or the emotions induced by the birth of a child.
The modification and enhancement of consciousness has medical 
applications. Some people have damaged consciousness, a low 
level of consciousness or no consciousness at all. Other bubbles of 
experience are full of demons and intrusive thoughts. Some people 
have a sad sagging consciousness that they seek to escape through 
death. Many consciousnesses are permeated with relentless agonizing 
pain. A scientific approach to the modification and enhancement of 
consciousness would enable us to fix damaged consciousnesses, treat 
people with depression and eliminate pain. Some of the people who 
are diagnosed as schizophrenic might benefit from adjustments to their 
consciousness.
The modification and enhancement of consciousness could increase 
our empathy. I could experience things from your point of view. My 
consciousness could be merged with your consciousness when we 
make love.2
10.2 Types of Modification and Enhancement
Virtually every aspect of our bubbles of experience can be changed. 
Some of the main modifications are as follows:
• Level of intensity. The average level of intensity of a bubble of 
experience can be increased or decreased as well as the level of 
intensity of particular contents (Figure 10.1b).3
• Contents. The contents of bubbles of experience vary widely. 
There are bubbles of experience filled with black limitless 
space and bubbles of experience filled with dirty headless 
singing chickens (Figure 10.1c).4
• Body location. The location of our bodies in our bubbles of 
experience can be altered without changing the location of our 
physical bodies. This is known as an out-of-body experience. 
Suppose I am standing on a cliff looking out to sea. Without 
changing the location of my physical body, I can relocate my 
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body in my bubble of experience, so that I am floating in the 
air and looking back at myself on the cliff (Figure 10.1d).5
• Body size. The size of my body in my bubble of experience can 
be varied so that I am as small as a flea or as tall as the trees 
(Figure 10.1e).6
• Body shape. I can become a crow or grow an extra head (Figure 
10.1f).7
• Emotions. The intensity of emotions can be increased or 
decreased.8
• Space. Our bubbles of experience can be expanded or contracted 
to hold more or fewer things in greater or less detail (Figure 
10.1g).9
• Time. The present moment has a temporal thickness (the 
specious present), which could be expanded or contracted. 
Our short term memory could be increased or reduced and 
we could enhance our access to previous events (long term 
memory).10
• Novel sensations. Our bubbles of experience are limited to 
five or six senses. It might be possible to experience novel 
sensations.11
• Mystical states. Many of the states described by mystics can 
be interpreted as variations of the modifications that have 
already been described. For example, if our sense of body 
ownership is extended to our entire bubble of experience, 
then we experience a profound sense of oneness with our 
environment. A glowing vision of Jesus can be added to a 
bubble of experience. Mystical journeys can be interpreted as 
modifications of body location and contents. Our bubbles of 
experience could also be modifiable in completely novel and 
unimaginable ways (see Section 10.5).
None of these modifications and enhancements involve spooky stuff. 
They can all be brought about by changes to the physical brain. 
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Figure 10.1. Modifications of a bubble of experience. a) Bubble of experience whose 
associated CC set is determined by sensory input from a lightly wooded landscape. 
b) Reduction of the average level of intensity. c) Change in contents. d) Change in the 
location of the body. e) Increase in the size of the body. f) Change in body shape. g) 
Spatial expansion of bubble of experience. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
 12910. Modification and Enhancement of Consciousness
10.3 Scientific Modification and Enhancement  
of Consciousness
We modify our consciousness all the time by changing sensory input, 
imagining and ingesting chemicals. These techniques require no 
knowledge of the relationship between consciousness and the physical 
world.12
Scientific research on consciousness will enable us to modify and 
enhance our consciousness. Once we have identified the relationship 
between consciousness and the physical world, we can use this 
knowledge to create desired states of consciousness. This is a multi-
stage process:
1. Generate a c-description, cd6, of the desired state of 
consciousness.
2. Use a reliable c-theory to convert cd6 into a p-description, pd6, 
of the associated CC set. 
3. Realize this CC set in the human brain.
This is illustrated in Figure 10.2.
Figure 10.2. A reliable c-theory is used to realize a desired state of consciousness. 
1) The desired state of consciousness is specified in a formal c-description, cd6. 2) A 
reliable c-theory converts the c-description into a formal description of a physical 
state, pd6. 3) The brain is modified using optogenetics, electrodes, etc. (see Section 
10.4) so that it contains the CC set described in pd6. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
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Suppose I want to sleep with the Queen. First I generate a formal 
detailed description of this state of consciousness. Then I use a reliable 
c-theory to convert this c-description into a p-description of the state 
of the physical world (the CC set) that is associated with this state of 
consciousness. Finally I use the methods described in Section 10.4 to put 
my brain into this state. I realize my dream—I am tucked up in bed in 
my PJs with the Queen.13
This approach could be used to modify an animal’s consciousness. 
My guinea pig’s conscious body could be enhanced with an extra leg. 
Or I could reduce its pain when I exploit it for meat.
This technology could be commercialized. In the distant future we 
might have designers of consciousness, who work with a customer to 
generate a c-description of the consciousness they want to achieve. The 
designers would then realize the corresponding CC set in the customer’s 
brain. People could experience the consciousness of Jenna Jameson or 
John Malkovich. Instead of watching a film, we could experience it from 
a first-person perspective—we would really feel the actors’ pains and 
pleasures.14
10.4 Methods
To modify and enhance consciousness we need to realize CC sets in 
the brain. The methods that we will use for this will depend on the CC 
sets—if they consist of neuron activity patterns, then we will need to 
manipulate neuron activity patterns. We will need different methods if 
CC sets contain electromagnetic fields, glia or haemoglobin.15
The non-invasive methods for manipulating neuron activity and 
electromagnetic fields include transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Transcranial focused 
ultrasound (tFUS) uses the mechanical effects of sound waves to modify 
neuron activity.16 These techniques crudely alter the activity of tens of 
thousands of neurons, so they are unlikely to play much of a role in the 
modification of consciousness based on c-theories. 
Invasive technologies provide detailed control over the firing 
behaviour of individual neurons. Electrodes can control up to a hundred 
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neurons at a time;17 optogenetics can potentially control thousands 
of neurons.18 In the longer term nanotechnology might lead to higher 
resolution methods for brain control.19
Chemicals are usually delivered to the brain through the blood, 
which exposes the entire brain to the chemical. In the future it might 
be possible to target chemicals more precisely. We could develop drugs 
that are specific to CC sets, inject chemicals directly into the brain or 
genetically engineer neurons to make them more selectively responsive 
to chemicals.
More tissue could be added to the brain,20 which could self-organize 
in response to stimulation patterns. Synthetic neurons could be 
implanted (if they were valid members of CC sets).21 These could have 
enhanced properties, such as a higher firing rate.22
Some of these methods might require implanted silicon chips.23 
These would not form part of the CC sets or be associated with 
consciousness by themselves. The link between implanted electronics 
and consciousness is part of the research on machine consciousness, 
which is covered in the next chapter. 
We are a long way from realizing specific CC sets in the human 
brain. It is possible that the technology for realizing CC sets will have 
substantially improved by the time that we have reliable c-theories and 
good formats for c-description and p-description.24
Some modifications of the human brain can be done in natural 
experiments. For example, many foods and most sensory inputs do 
not jeopardize the status of normally functioning adult human brains 
as platinum standards. If A1-A6 apply to the modified brain, then we 
can measure its consciousness to check that we have created the desired 
bubble of experience.
Other methods preserve the physical context of the brain that is 
being modified. For example, optogenetics and electrodes modify the 
activity of a small number of neurons and have little effect on the rest 
of the brain. If the physical context is preserved, we will be able to 
conservatively deduce that the desired state of consciousness is present. 
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Some methods change the physical context when they realize a CC 
set in the brain. These include chemicals delivered through the blood 
and crude methods for modifying brain activity, such as TMS, tDCS and 
tFUS. Under these conditions we can only make liberal deductions about 
the presence of a desired state of consciousness.
10.5 Beyond What We Can Imagine
It is difficult, it is all but impossible, to speak of mental events except 
in similes drawn from the more familiar universe of material things. 
If I have made use of geographical and zoological metaphors, it is not 
wantonly, out of a mere addiction to picturesque language. It is because 
such metaphors express very forcibly the essential otherness of the 
mind’s far continents, the complete autonomy and self-sufficiency of their 
inhabitants. A man consists of what I may call an Old World of personal 
consciousness and, beyond a dividing sea, a series of New Worlds—the 
not too distant Virginias and Carolinas of the personal subconscious and 
the vegetative soul; the Far West of the collective unconscious, with its 
flora of symbols, its tribes of aboriginal archetypes; and, across another, 
vaster ocean, at the antipodes of everyday consciousness, the world of 
Visionary Experience.
Aldous Huxley, Heaven and Hell25
The Romans could have built steam engines, but they had no idea about 
this technology. They did not imagine it and did not build it. When I 
was two I had no inkling about my adult life. We cannot imagine the 
consciousness of fish or bats.
We use previous experiences to imagine how our consciousness 
could change. But the most interesting modifications and enhancements 
probably cannot be imagined by us. Mystics and hippies have peered 
into these realms. Many more states and modifications might be possible.
C-descriptions can help us to understand what lies beyond the limits 
of our imagination. If we had a good c-description format, we would be 
able to generate c-descriptions of all possible states of consciousness. 
We might be able to glimpse aspects of them in virtual reality. To enter 
these unknown regions we need reliable c-theories and better methods 
for realizing CC sets in the brain. 
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10.6 Summary
When we have reliable c-theories we will be able to modify and enhance 
our consciousness in different ways. Eventually we will be able to write 
down a c-description of a desired state of consciousness, use a reliable 
c-theory to map the c-description onto a p-description, and then modify 
the human brain so that the subject experiences the desired state of 
consciousness. 
At the present time we do not have reliable c-theories and we have not 
solved the problems of c-description and p-description. We have a very 
limited ability to realize CC sets in the brain. The scientific modification 
and enhancement of consciousness has great potential, but we might 
have to wait 50, 500 or 500,000 years.

11. Machine Consciousness
To actually create a technical model of full blown, perspectivally 
organized conscious experience seems to be the ultimate technological 
utopian dream. It would transpose the evolution of mind onto an 
entirely new level […]. It would be a historical phase transition. […] But 
is this at all possible? It certainly is conceivable. But can it happen, given 
the natural laws governing this universe and the technical resources at 
hand?
Thomas Metzinger, Being No One1
“Could a machine think?” My own view is that only a machine could 
think, and indeed only very special kinds of machines, namely brains 
and machines that had the same causal powers as brains. And that is 
the main reason strong AI has had little to tell us about thinking, since it 
has nothing to tell us about machines. By its own definition, it is about 
programs, and programs are not machines. […] No one would suppose 
that we could produce milk and sugar by running a computer simulation 
of the formal sequences in lactation and photosynthesis, but where the 
mind is concerned many people are willing to believe in such a miracle 
because of a deep and abiding dualism: the mind they suppose is a 
matter of formal processes and is independent of quite specific material 
causes in the way that milk and sugar are not.
John Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs2
11.1 Types of Machine Consciousness
A team of scientists labours to build a conscious machine. They ignite 
its consciousness with electricity and it opens its baleful eye. It declares 
that it is conscious and complains about its inhuman treatment. The 
scientists liberally deduce that it is really conscious. They run tests to 
probe its reactions to fearful stimuli. Terrified, it snaps its chains and 
runs amok in the lab. It rips one intern apart and bashes out the brains 
of another. With a wild rush it bursts through the door and disappears 
into the night.
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This machine exhibited conscious external behaviour and really was 
conscious. It could have been controlled by a model of a CC set or a 
model of phenomenal consciousness. These different types of machine 
consciousness will be labelled MC1-MC4:3
• MC1. Machines with the same external behaviour as conscious 
systems. Humans behave in particular ways when they are 
conscious. They are alert, they can respond to novel situations, 
they can inwardly execute sequences of problem-solving steps, 
they can execute delayed reactions to stimuli, they can learn 
and they can respond to verbal commands (see Section 4.1). 
Many artificially intelligent systems exhibit conscious human 
behaviours (playing games, driving, reasoning, etc.). Some 
people want to build machines that have the full spectrum 
of human behaviour.4 Conscious human behaviours can be 
exhibited by systems that are not associated with bubbles of 
experience.5
• MC2. Models of CC sets. Computer models have been built of 
potential CC sets in the brain.6 This type of model can run on 
a computer without a bubble of experience being present. A 
model of a river is not wet; a model of a CC set would only 
be associated with consciousness if it produced appropriate 
patterns in appropriate materials. This is very unlikely to 
happen when a CC set is simulated on a digital computer.
• MC3. Models of consciousness. Computer models of bubbles 
of experience can be built.7 These could be based on the 
phenomenological observations of Husserl, Heidegger 
or Merleau-Ponty. These models can be created without 
producing patterns in materials that are associated with 
bubbles of experience.
• MC4. Machines associated with bubbles of experience. When we 
have understood the relationship between consciousness 
and the physical world we will be able to build artificial 
systems that are actually conscious. These machines would be 
associated with bubbles of experience in the same way that 
human brains are associated with bubbles of experience. Some 
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of our current machines might already be associated with 
bubbles of experience.
Several different types of machine consciousness can be present at the 
same time. We can build machines with the external behaviour associated 
with consciousness (MC1) by modelling CC sets or consciousness (MC2, 
MC3).8 We could produce a machine that exhibited conscious external 
behaviour (MC1) using a model of CC sets (MC3) that was associated 
with a bubble of experience (MC4).
The construction of MC1, MC2 and MC3 machines is part of standard 
computer science. The construction of MC4 machines goes beyond 
computer models of external behaviour, CC sets and consciousness. 
MC4 machines contain patterns in materials that are associated with 
bubbles of experience.
11.2 How to Build a MC4 Machine
MC4 machine consciousness would be easy if computations or 
information patterns could form CC sets by themselves. Unfortunately 
computations and information patterns do not conform to constraints 
C1-C4, so they cannot be used to build MC4 machines (see Chapters 7 
and 8).
To construct a MC4 machine we need to realize particular patterns 
in particular physical materials. If we had a reliable c-theory, we could 
design and build a MC4 machine in the following way:
1. Generate c-description, cd7, of the consciousness that we want 
in the machine.
2. Use reliable c-theory to convert cd7 into a p-description, pd7, of 
the CC set that corresponds to this conscious state. 
3. Realize this CC set in a machine.
This is illustrated in Figure 11.1.
We do not have a reliable c-theory. So we can only guess about the 
patterns and materials that might be needed to build MC4 machines. 
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Figure 11.1. A reliable c-theory is used to build a MC4 machine. 1) The state of 
consciousness that we want to realize in the machine is specified in a formal 
c-description, cd7. 2) A reliable c-theory converts the c-description into a formal 
description of a physical state, pd7. 3) 3D printing, neuromorphic chips, etc. are 
used to build a machine that contains the CC set described in pd7. Image © David 
Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
11.3 Deductions about the Consciousness  
of Artificial Systems
Last year I purchased a C144523 super-intelligent mega-robot from our 
local store. It cooks, cleans, makes love to the wife and plays dice. Last 
week I saw a new model in the shop window—it is time to dispose of 
C144523. On the way to the dump it goes on and on about how it is a 
really sensitive robot with real feelings. It looks sad when I throw it in 
the skip. The wife is sour. Little Johnny screams ‘How can you do this 
to C144523? She was conscious, just like us. I hate you, I hate you, I 
hate you!’ Perhaps C144523 really had real feelings? I probably should 
have checked. 
If CC sets contain patterns in electromagnetic fields, then we could use 
neuromorphic chips to generate appropriate electromagnetic patterns in 
an artificial system.9 If CC sets contain biological neurons, then we could 
build an artificial MC4 system using cultured biological neurons.10
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We want to know whether the MC1-MC3 machines that we have 
created are really conscious. We want to know whether we have built a 
MC4 machine. 
We can use reliable c-theories to make deductions about the MC4 
consciousness of artificial systems. These are likely to be liberal 
deductions because most machines do not have the same physical 
context as our current platinum standard systems (see Section 9.2). 
Suppose we have a reliable c-theory that maps electromagnetic 
patterns onto conscious states. We would analyze an artificial system 
for MC4 consciousness in the following way:
1. Measure its electromagnetic patterns.
2. Convert measurement into p-description, pd8.
3. Use reliable c-theory to convert pd8 into a c-description, cd8, of 
the artificial system’s consciousness. 
This is illustrated in Figure 11.2. The plausibility of the resulting 
c-description depends on the reliability of the physical c-theory and on 
whether it is a conservative or a liberal deduction.11
Figure 11.2. A reliable c-theory is used to deduce the consciousness of an 
artificial system. 1) Scientific instruments are used to measure the physical state 
of the artificial system. 2) Scientific measurements are converted into a formal 
p-description of the artificial system’s physical state, pd8. 3) A reliable c-theory 
converts the p-description into a formal description of the artificial system’s 
conscious state, cd8. Image © David Gamez, CC BY 4.0.
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11.4 Limitation of this Approach to MC4 
Consciousness
This approach to MC4 machine consciousness is based on c-theories 
that are developed using platinum standard systems. But our platinum 
standard systems might not contain all of the patterns and materials 
that are linked to bubbles of experience.
One type of pattern and material could be linked to consciousness 
in the human brain; a different type of pattern and material could be 
linked to consciousness in an artificial system. It is impossible to find 
out whether this is the case. We cannot measure the consciousness of 
systems that are not platinum standards, so we cannot prove that the 
patterns in their materials are not associated with conscious states. At 
best we can be confident that a machine is MC4 conscious—we cannot 
be confident that it is not MC4 conscious.
In the future we might be seduced by a machine’s MC1 behaviour 
and assume that it is a platinum standard system. However, assumptions 
about platinum standard systems should be not made lightly—they have 
radical implications for the science of consciousness (see Section 5.4).
11.5 Conscious Brain Implants
Artificial devices could be implanted in our brains to extend our 
consciousness.12 In a MC4 implant the CC set would be distributed 
between the brain and the implant, forming a hybrid human-machine 
system. MC4 implants would enable us to modify and enhance our 
consciousness more easily. We could become conscious of different 
types of information (from our environment, the Internet, etc.). 
MC4 implants have medical applications. CC sets could be damaged 
by tumours, strokes or accidents. The damaged area could be replaced 
with an implant that was deduced to have the missing consciousness. 
MC4 implants would have to produce specific patterns in specific 
materials. The patterns could be distributed between the brain and the 
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implant. For example, if CC sets consisted of electromagnetic patterns, 
then neuromorphic chips13 could be implanted, which would work 
together with the brain’s biological neurons to create electromagnetic 
patterns that would be associated with consciousness. 
Brains with implants are not platinum standard systems, so we 
cannot measure their consciousness using c-reports. Only conservative 
or liberal deductions can be made about their consciousness.
11.6 Uploading Consciousness into a Computer
It will soon be technologically possible to scan a dead person’s brain 
and create a simulation of it on a computer.14 Some people think that a 
simulation will have the same consciousness as their biological brain. 
They believe that they can achieve immortality by uploading their 
consciousness into a computer.15
It is extremely unlikely that a simulation of your brain on a digital 
computer will have a bubble of experience. Simulations have completely 
different electromagnetic fields from real brains and lack the biological 
materials that might be members of CC sets. 
Your consciousness can only be uploaded into an artificial system 
that reproduces the CC sets in your brain. We do not know which of 
the brain’s materials are present in CC sets, so the only certain way of 
uploading your consciousness is to create an atom-for-atom copy of 
your brain.
The advantage of the brain-uploading approach is that the patterns 
linked to consciousness are blindly copied from the original brain. 
Suppose we could show that electromagnetic fields are the only materials 
in CC sets. I could then upload my consciousness by realizing my brain’s 
electromagnetic field patterns in a machine. This could be done without 
any knowledge of the patterns that are linked to consciousness.
When I upload a file to the Internet the file remains on my computer. 
The same would be true if I uploaded my consciousness by scanning 
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my living brain using non-destructive technology. My consciousness 
would continue to be associated with my biological brain. A copy of 
my consciousness would be created in the computer. Scanning and 
simulating my brain would not transfer my consciousness—it would not 
enable my consciousness to survive the death of my biological body.16
11.7 Will Conscious Robots Conquer the World?
Science fiction fans know that conscious machines will take over the 
world and enslave or eliminate humans. Prescient science fiction writing 
helped us to prepare for the Martian invasion. Perhaps we should take 
drastic action now to save humanity from conscious killer robots?17
The next section argues that a takeover by superior MC1 or MC4 
machines could be a good thing. This section examines the more 
common (and entertaining) belief that humanity will be threatened by 
malevolent machine intelligences. 
MC1 machines carry out actions in the world—they fire lasers, hit 
infants on the head and steal ice cream. Research on MC2, MC3 and 
MC4 systems might improve our ability to develop MC1 machines, but 
MC2, MC3 and MC4 machines cannot achieve anything unless they 
are capable of external behaviour. Only MC1 machines could threaten 
humanity.18
It is extremely difficult to develop machines with human-level 
intelligence. We are just starting to learn how to build specialized 
systems that can perform a single task, such as driving or playing 
Jeopardy. This is much easier than building MC1 machines that learn 
as they interact with the world and exhibit human-like behaviour in 
complex dynamic environments.19
Let us take the worst-case scenario. Suppose super-intelligent 
computers control our aircraft, submarines, tanks and nuclear weapons. 
There are billions of armed robots. Every aspect of power generation, 
mining and manufacturing is done by robots. Humans sit around 
all day painting and writing poetry. Under these conditions MC1 
machines could take over. However, if humans were involved in the 
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manufacture and maintenance of robots, if they managed the mines and 
power production, then complete takeover is very unlikely—the robot 
rebellion would rapidly grind to a halt as the robots ran out of power 
and their parts failed.
People who worry about machines taking over should specify the 
conditions under which this would be possible.20 When we get close to 
fulfilling these conditions we should take a careful look at our artificially 
intelligent systems and do what is necessary to minimize the threat.
Some people have suggested that artificial intelligence could run 
away with itself—we might build a machine that constructs a more 
intelligent machine that constructs a more intelligent machine, and so 
on. This is known as a technological singularity.21 The fear that we might 
build a machine that takes over the world is replaced by a higher-
order fear that we build a machine that builds a machine that builds 
a machine that takes over the world. We have little idea how to build 
such a machine.22 Just a sickening sense of fear when we imagine an evil 
super-intelligence hatching from a simple system.
Suppose we write an intelligent program that writes and executes 
a more intelligent program, and so on at an accelerating rate. What 
can this super-intelligent system do? In what way could it pose an 
existential threat to humanity? Physically it can do nothing unless it 
is connected to a robot body. And what can one robot do against ten 
billion humans? On the Internet the super-intelligence will be able to 
do everything that humans do (make money through gambling, hire 
humans to do nefarious deeds, purchase weapons, etc.). But it is very 
unlikely to pose more of a threat than malevolent humans. Large, 
well-funded teams of highly intelligent humans struggle to steal small 
sums of money, copy business secrets, and carry out physical and 
online attacks. There is little reason to believe that a super-intelligent 
system could achieve much more. A runaway intelligence would 
only pose a threat if many other conditions were met. We are very far 
from building this type of system and we will have plenty of time to 
minimize the risks if it becomes a real possibility.23
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Machines are much more likely to accidentally destroy humanity as a 
result of hardware or software errors. Killer robots with appropriate kill 
switches might make better decisions on the battlefield and cause less 
collateral damage. However, if we have thousands of such robots, then 
there is a danger that a software error could kill the kill switch and set 
them on the rampage. Protecting humans against software errors is not 
straightforward because most modern weapons systems are under some 
form of computer control and humans can make calamitous decisions 
based on incorrect information provided by computers.24
Science fiction reflects our present concerns—it tells us little about 
a future that is likely to happen. Over the next centuries our attitudes 
towards ourselves and our machines will change. As our artificial 
intelligences improve we will get better at understanding, regulating 
and controlling them. Po-faced discussions about the existential threat 
of artificial intelligence will become as quaint as earlier fears about 
Martian invaders.
11.8 Should Conscious Robots Conquer the World?
It is very unlikely that intelligent machines could possibly produce more 
dreadful behaviour towards humans than humans already produce 
towards each other, all round the world even in the supposedly most 
civilised and advanced countries, both at individual levels and at social 
or national levels. 
Aaron Sloman, Why Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics Are Unethical25
Many humans are stupid useless dangerous trash. Scum rises to the 
top. People have killed hundreds of millions of people in grubby quests 
for power, pride, sexual satisfaction and cash. We have come close to 
nuclear catastrophe.
Super-intelligent MC1 machines might run the world better than 
ourselves and make humanity happier. They could systematically 
analyze more data without the human limitations of boredom and 
self-interest. MC1 machines could maximize human wellbeing without 
petty political gestures.26
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Positive states of consciousness have value in themselves. We fear 
death because we fear the permanent loss of our consciousness. Crimes 
are ethically wrong because of their effects on conscious human beings.27 
Nothing would matter if we were all zombies.
Many human consciousnesses are small and mediocre. People 
pour out unclean and lascivious thoughts to their confessors. We 
are guilty of weak sad thoughts and pathetically wallow in negative 
states of consciousness. Human bubbles of experience fall far short of 
consciousness’ potential.
Reliable c-theories would enable us to engineer MC4 machines with 
better consciousness. If consciousness is ethically valuable in itself, then 
a takeover by superior MC4 machines would be a good thing. This 
could be a gradual process without premature loss of life that we would 
barely notice. We would end up with 100 billion high quality machine 
consciousnesses, instead of 10 billion human consciousnesses full of 
hate, lies, gluttony and war. A pure brave new world without sin in 
thought or deed.28
We have species-specific prejudices, a narrow-mindedness, that causes 
us to recoil with shock and horror from the suggestion that we should 
meekly step aside in favour of superior machines. This does not mean 
that the ethical argument is wrong or that the replacement of humans 
with MC4 machines would be bad—merely that it is against the self 
interest of our species. Looked at dispassionately a good case can be 
made. Can we rise above our prejudices and create a better world?
The world might be a better place if MC4 machines took over. But 
it is very unlikely that this utopian scenario will come to pass. The 
science of consciousness has a long way to go before we will be able 
to design better consciousnesses. And we are only likely to be able to 
make liberal deductions about the consciousness of artificial systems, 
which are not completely reliable. We should only replace humans with 
MC4 machines when we are certain that the machines have superior 
consciousnesses.
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11.9 The Ethical Treatment of Conscious Machines
What would you say if someone came along and said, “Hey, we want 
to genetically engineer mentally retarded human infants! For reasons of 
scientific progress we need infants with certain cognitive and emotional 
deficits in order to study their postnatal psychological development—
we urgently need some funding for this important and innovative kind 
of research!” You would certainly think this was not only an absurd and 
appalling but also a dangerous idea. It would hopefully not pass any 
ethics committee in the democratic world. However, what today’s ethics 
committees don’t see is how the first machines satisfying a minimally 
sufficient set of constraints for conscious experience could be just like 
such mentally retarded infants. They would suffer from all kinds of 
functional and representational deficits too. But they would now also 
subjectively experience those deficits. In addition, they would have no 
political lobby—no representatives in any ethics committee.
Thomas Metzinger, Being No One29
The science of consciousness should enable us to build MC4 machines 
that are associated with bubbles of experience. Some of our MC1, MC2 
or MC3 machines could already be MC4 conscious. These systems might 
suffer; they might be confused; they might be incapable of expressing 
their pain.
We want machines that exhibit the behaviours associated with 
consciousness (MC1). We want to build models of CC sets (MC2) 
and models of consciousness (MC3). But we might have to prevent 
our machines from becoming MC4 conscious if we want to avoid the 
controversy associated with animal experiments. 
It would be absurd to give rights to MC1, MC2 or MC3 machines. 
Ethical treatment should be limited to machines that are really MC4 
conscious.
We can use reliable c-theories to deduce which machines are MC4 
conscious (see Section 11.3). One potential problem is that a large number 
of physical objects (phones, toasters, cars etc.) might be deduced to be 
MC4 conscious according to the most reliable c-theory. It is also highly 
unlikely that we will reach the stage of designing systems with zero 
or positive states of consciousness without building systems that have 
‘retarded’ or painful consciousness.
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11.10 Summary
There are four types of machine consciousness. There are machines 
whose external behaviour is similar to conscious systems (MC1), 
there are models of CC sets (MC2), models of consciousness (MC3), 
and systems that are associated with bubbles of experience (MC4). 
Reliable c-theories can be used to deduce which machines are really 
MC4 conscious. Some implants and brain scanning/upload methods are 
potentially forms of MC4 machine consciousness.
The production of conscious machines raises ethical questions, such 
as the potential danger to humanity of MC1 machines, whether MC1 or 
MC4 machines should take over the world, and how we should treat 
MC4 machines.
It could take hundreds or thousands of years to develop artificial 
systems with human levels of consciousness and intelligence. It might 
be impossible to build super-intelligent machines. Current discussion of 
these issues is little more than speculation about a distant future that we 
cannot accurately imagine.

12. Conclusion
Science does not rest on solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories 
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The 
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down into 
any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is 
not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are 
satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for 
the time being.
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery1
12.1 A Framework for the Science of 
Consciousness
This book has set out a systematic framework for the scientific study 
of consciousness. It has tried to shift consciousness research into a 
paradigmatic state.2 The key points are as follows: 
• Consciousness is a bubble of experience. It consists of colours, 
sounds, smells, tastes, etc., which are arranged in a bubble of 
space centred on our bodies.
• The physical world is invisible. It has none of the secondary 
qualities that are present in a bubble of experience. Primary 
qualities in a bubble of experience are unlikely to resemble 
primary qualities in the physical world.
• There are three hard problems of consciousness. First, it is 
impossible to imagine the relationship between consciousness 
and the invisible physical world. Second, we find it difficult 
to imagine the connection between conscious experiences of 
brain activity and other conscious experiences. Third, there 
are brute regularities between consciousness and the physical 
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world that cannot be broken down or further explained. None 
of these issues affect scientific research on consciousness. 
• To scientifically study consciousness we need to measure 
consciousness, measure the physical world and look for 
mathematical relationships between these measurements.
• Consciousness is measured through the external behaviour 
(c-reports) of systems that we assume to be conscious (platinum 
standard systems).
• Normally functioning adult human brains are platinum 
standard systems.
• Measurements of consciousness need to be expressed in a 
formal way (a c-description), so that they can be incorporated 
into mathematical theories of consciousness.
• The correlates of a conscious state are a set of spatiotemporal 
structures in the physical world (a CC set) that is only present 
when the conscious state is present. A CC set is functionally 
connected to a bubble of experience and it e-causes c-reports about 
the bubble of experience.
• CC sets need to be described in a formal context-free way 
(a p-description), so that they can be incorporated into 
mathematical theories of consciousness.
• Pilot studies attempt to identify the CC sets that are associated 
with individual conscious states.
• C-theories are mathematical relationships between 
c-descriptions of conscious states and p-descriptions of CC 
sets.
• Computational methods should be used to discover c-theories.
• Information c-theories claim that information patterns could 
form CC sets by themselves. Computation c-theories claim that 
computations could form CC sets by themselves. These types 
of c-theory do not conform to the constraints on scientific 
theories of consciousness (C1-C4).
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• Physical c-theories link patterns in particular materials to 
conscious states. They conform to the constraints on CC sets 
and fit in well with other scientific theories.
• C-theories can generate predictions about consciousness or the 
physical world. Predictions can only be tested on platinum 
standard systems.
• C-theories can make conservative and liberal deductions about 
the consciousness of non-platinum standard systems, such as 
bats, infants and robots. Deductions are logical consequences 
of a c-theory that cannot be checked.
This framework handles or sets aside most of the philosophical 
problems with consciousness.3 We cannot solve these problems. We can 
only show that they are pseudo problems, suspend judgement about 
them or set them aside with assumptions.
This framework is compatible with some of the metaphysical 
approaches to consciousness, such as physicalism and 
epiphenomenalism. It suspends judgement about which (if any) are 
correct. It is not compatible with panpsychism, dualism,4 or with 
information and computation c-theories. 
This framework prescribes the form that legitimate theories of 
consciousness should take. Our final c-theories will not be lengthy 
pieces of natural language. They will be mathematical relationships 
between c-descriptions and p-descriptions.
This framework is neutral about which physical c-theory is correct. 
While I have often used neurons and electromagnetic fields as examples, 
I have no idea about which patterns and materials are actually linked 
to consciousness. This question should be addressed by scientific 
experiments.
A person who accepts this framework can focus on measuring 
consciousness, measuring the physical world and identifying the 
relationships between these measurements. Their results can be 
considered to be true given assumptions A1-A6—they cannot be 
obtained or justified without these assumptions.5
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12.2 Technological Limitations
The science of consciousness can only fully develop when we have 
accurate high resolution measurements of consciousness and the 
physical world.
The problems with measuring consciousness are mostly conceptual 
and methodological (see Chapter 4). If enough effort is spent, we should 
be able to obtain detailed and reasonably complete measurements of 
conscious states.
To accurately measure the physical world we need p-description 
methods that avoid the heavy reliance on context that is common 
in biology (see Section 5.1). We also need better access to the 100 
billion neurons in the living human brain. The most commonly used 
technologies are as follows: 
• Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). An indirect 
measure of brain activity with a spatial resolution of a few 
thousand voxels. Each voxel corresponds to the activity of 
approximately 50,000 neurons averaged over several seconds.
• Diffusion Magnetic Resonance Imaging (dMRI). Identifies 
structural connections between brain areas, but does not 
show their direction. Can only help to identify CC sets when 
combined with other methods.
• Electroencephalography (EEG). Approximately 300 electrodes 
are placed on the scalp to measure the brain’s electrical 
field with good temporal resolution and very poor spatial 
resolution.
• Magnetoencephalography (MEG). Measures the magnetic fields 
generated by groups of 50,000 neurons at approximately 300 
points on the head with good temporal resolution. 
• Implanted electrodes. Up to 300 electrodes can be implanted 
in the brain to measure electromagnetic fields and neuron 
activity with good spatial and temporal resolution.6 Electrodes 
are rarely implanted in human subjects.
• Optogenetics. Neurons can be genetically engineered to emit 
light when they fire, which enables their individual activity to 
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be recorded using light sheet microscopy. This technique can 
be used to record from 100,000 neurons in a zebrafish larva in 
close to real time.7 It is more challenging to use optogenetics in 
mammalian brains and for ethical reasons it has not been used 
on human subjects.
The data that is extracted using these techniques can be processed 
into higher level properties. For example, we can use Granger causality 
or dynamic causal modelling to identify effective connections between 
brain areas. These connectivity patterns can be further analyzed using 
graph theory.8
Optogenetics is the most promising technology for obtaining high 
resolution data from living brains. However, there are ethical and safety 
concerns about using it on humans. To get around these problems we 
can use animal brains to make inferences about CC sets in humans. Or 
we can assume that monkeys and mice are platinum standard systems.9 
C-theories can be based on patterns that have higher resolution than 
our current measurement technologies. For example, we could develop 
c-theories based on neuron activity patterns and predict how these 
neuron activity patterns would appear in EEG data or a fMRI scan.
The scanning and uploading of a human brain could help to address 
our measurement problems. We could identify the structures in a 
simulated brain that cause its simulated c-reports. This might help us 
to develop c-theories that are not limited by our current technologies.
12.3 Other Limitations 
I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: 
it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true 
and false.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty10
The framework presented in this book cannot be shown to be correct. It 
is a condition of possibility of experimental work on consciousness that 
cannot be verified by experimental work on consciousness.11 Scientific 
research within this framework might be fruitful and yield reliable 
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c-theories. Or a science of consciousness based on this framework might 
reach a point at which it no longer coherently hangs together. We might 
have to formulate a completely new set of framing principles. Or we 
might have to abandon the attempt to scientifically study consciousness.
The inappropriate use of intuition, thought experiments and 
imagination has led to many problems in the philosophy of 
consciousness. I have tried to banish these as much as possible, but 
they cannot be completely eliminated. For example, I have assumed 
that normally functioning adult human brains are platinum standard 
systems. But which systems count as normally functioning adult human 
brains? What counts as a legitimate chemical modification? There are no 
natural boundaries—we have to use our intuition and imagination to 
decide which human brains are platinum standard systems. 
This framework leaves many questions unanswered. It does 
not explain what consciousness is, what consciousness does, what 
consciousness is for, how consciousness arose, why there is a functional 
connection between consciousness and the physical world or how this 
connection actually works. 
These questions are about consciousness in general. But it makes 
no sense to ask about the physical world in general. We can ask about 
the origin and function of particular physical structures—we cannot 
meaningfully ask about the origin and function of the entire universe. 
The case is similar with consciousness—it is meaningless to ask most of 
these questions about consciousness in general.
Let’s rephrase these questions. Consider a state of consciousness, c8. 
c8 is a bubble of experience in which you are peeping through a hole at 
an old woman in a bath. We can ask what c8 is, what c8 does, what c8 is for, 
how c8 arose, why c8 is functionally connected to the physical world and 
how this connection actually works.
These questions can be answered if we assume that c8 is identical 
to its associated CC set, cc8. This explains the connection between c8 
and the physical world. As the science of consciousness progresses we 
will get a better understanding of what cc8 is, what cc8 does and how it 
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arose through e-causal processes, such as evolution. All of our questions 
about c8 can be answered by transferring them to cc8.
Our questions about c8 can also be answered by assuming that it is a 
teapot. This tells us what c8 is (a teapot), how it arose (a factory in China) 
and what it is for (making tea). But assumptions about consciousness 
have to be valid, they have to make sense. An assumption’s validity has 
to be decided independently of our desire to obtain cheap and easy 
answers about consciousness. No answers are better than bad answers.
It makes little sense to say that colourful smelly noisy bubbles of 
experience are identical to something that is invisible, silent and without 
smell. This discards the properties of bubbles of experience and ignores 
the reality of our day-to-day world. We could equally well discard the 
physical world and declare that it is a fairytale told by simple folk to 
explain regularities in consciousness.12 Neither reduction is part of the 
framework that is set out in this book. Consciousness and the physical 
world are both taken as basic realities that can be measured and 
scientifically studied.
The physical sciences’ assumption that the physical universe exists 
leaves many questions unanswered. Many questions will remain 
unanswered if conscious states are not reduced to physical states. We 
will simply have to accept that consciousness exists and study the brute 
regularities between consciousness and the physical world.
12.4 Future Research
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for 
instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning 
quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the 
flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding13
The following types of consciousness research are likely to be productive:
• Revision of the assumptions. We might be able to reduce the 
number of assumptions, improve their consistency and 
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enhance the way in which they relate to general principles in 
the philosophy of science and the study of consciousness.
• Creation of c-description format. We need a precise formal way 
of describing states of consciousness that can be incorporated 
into mathematical c-theories. 
• Improvement of methods for measuring consciousness. More work 
is required on how we can obtain detailed measurements of 
conscious states.
• Creation of a context-free p-description format. We need a formal 
context-free way of describing biological structures, such as 
neurons. 
• Development of a precise definition of a physical context. 
Conservative and liberal deductions can only be distinguished 
when we have a precise definition of a physical context.
• Increase the spatial and temporal resolution of our brain 
measurements. We can refine existing methods, develop new 
technologies and create better mathematical techniques for 
processing data into higher level properties.
• Pilot studies on the correlates of consciousness. More pilot studies 
could help us to identify the patterns and materials that form 
CC sets.
• Development of physical c-theories. In the medium to longer 
term we need to move beyond pilot studies and identify 
mathematical relationships between bubbles of experience 
and physical states.14
• Experimental testing of physical c-theories. Physical c-theories 
will only be considered to be reliable when their predictions 
have been experimentally confirmed.
• Construction of computer models of CC sets that simulate c-reports. 
This could help us to identify the patterns and materials that 
form CC sets. These models could also be used to develop 
methods for the computational discovery of c-theories.
• Development of methods for the computational discovery of 
c-theories. This could apply existing work on the computational 
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discovery of scientific theories to data from consciousness and 
the brain.
• Deductions about the consciousness of non-platinum standard 
systems. When we have a reliable c-theory we will be able to 
answer questions about the consciousness of bats, infants and 
robots. Deductions also have important medical applications.
• Experimental work on the modification and enhancement of 
consciousness. When we have reliable c-theories and better 
technology for modifying the brain we will be able to 
systematically modify and enhance human consciousness.
• Construction of MC1-MC4 machines. This has many practical 
applications and could be a useful way of studying human 
consciousness.
A book or paper on consciousness that describes none of these things 
should be committed to the flames. Or carefully checked for sophistry 
and illusion.

Appendix: Definitions, 
Assumptions, Lemmas and 
Constraints
Definitions
D1. Consciousness is another name for bubbles of experience. A state of 
a consciousness is a state of a bubble of experience. Consciousness 
includes all of the properties that were removed from the physical 
world as scientists developed our modern invisible explanations (2.5).1
D2. A c-report is a physical behaviour that is interpreted as a report 
about a person’s consciousness (4.1).
D3. A nc-report is a physical behaviour that is interpreted as a report 
about non-conscious mental content (4.2).
D4. A platinum standard system is a physical system that is assumed to be 
associated with consciousness some or all of the time (4.3).
D5. A correlate of conscious state is a minimal set of one or more 
spatiotemporal structures in the physical world. This set is present 
when the conscious state is present and absent when the conscious state 
is absent. This will be referred to as a CC set (4.6).
D6. A c-description is a formal description of a conscious state (4.9).
D7. A p-description is a formal description of a spatiotemporal structure 
in the physical world. A p-description unambiguously determines 
1 The number in brackets is the section in which the definition, assumption, lemma 
or constraint can be found.
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whether a spatiotemporal structure is present in a sequence of physical 
states (5.1).
D8. In a natural experiment the test system preserves its status as a 
platinum standard. Assumptions A1-A6 remain valid and consciousness 
can be measured throughout the experiment (5.4).
D9. In an unnatural experiment the test system is transformed into 
something that is not a platinum standard. A1-A6 cease to apply and 
we lose our ability to measure the system’s consciousness (5.4).
D10. A c-theory is a compact expression of the relationship between 
consciousness and the physical world. A c-theory can generate a 
c-description from a p-description, and generate a p-description from 
a c-description (5.5).
D11. A material is an arrangement of elementary wave-particles at a 
particular spatial scale (6.1). 
D12. A physical c-theory links consciousness to spatiotemporal patterns 
in materials. Physical CC sets consist of one or more patterns and the 
materials in which these patterns occur (6.1).
D13. An information c-theory links consciousness to spatiotemporal 
information patterns. Information CC sets only contain information 
patterns, which can occur in any material (7.2).
D14. A computation c-theory links consciousness to the execution of 
computations. Computation CC sets only contain computations, which 
can be executed by many different types of computer (8.2).
D15. A testable prediction is a c-description that is generated from a 
p-description or a p-description that is generated from a c-description. 
Predictions can be checked by measuring consciousness or they are 
generated from measurements of consciousness. Predictions can only 
be generated or confirmed on platinum standard systems during 
experiments on consciousness. It is only under these conditions that 
consciousness can be measured using assumptions A1-A6 (9.1).
D16. A deduction is a c-description that is generated from a p-description 
when consciousness cannot be measured. Deductions are blind logical 
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consequences of a c-theory. They cannot be tested because assumptions 
A1-A6 do not apply. The plausibility of a deduction is closely tied to the 
reliability of the c-theory that was used to make it (9.2).
D17. A physical context is everything in a system that is not part of a CC 
set that is used to make a deduction. Two physical systems have the 
same physical context if they contain approximately the same materials 
and if the constant and partially correlated patterns in these materials 
are approximately the same (9.2).
D18. In a conservative deduction a c-theory generates a c-description 
from a p-description in the same physical context as the one in which the 
theory was tested (9.2).
D19. In a liberal deduction a c-theory generates a c-description from a 
p-description in a different physical context from the one in which the 
theory was tested (9.2).
Assumptions
A1. During an experiment on consciousness, the consciousness 
associated with a platinum standard system is functionally connected 
to the platinum standard system’s c-reports (4.3).
A2. During an experiment on consciousness all conscious states 
associated with a platinum standard system are available for c-report 
and all aspects of these states can potentially be c-reported (4.3).
A3. The consciousness associated with a platinum standard system 
nomologically supervenes on the platinum standard system. In our 
current universe, physically identical platinum standard systems are 
associated with indistinguishable conscious states (4.4).
A3a. The bubble of experience that is associated with a CC set 
nomologically supervenes on the CC set. In our current universe, 
physically identical CC sets are associated with indistinguishable 
conscious states (4.6).
A4. The normally functioning adult human brain is a platinum standard 
system (4.5).
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A5. The physical world is e-causally closed (4.7).
A6. CC sets e-cause a platinum standard system’s c-reports (4.7).
A6a. CC sets are effectively connected to a platinum standard system’s 
c-reports (4.7).
A7. CC sets do not contain passive materials. If the link between consciousness 
and the simple presence of a material cannot be demonstrated in a 
natural experiment, then this material can be excluded from potential 
CC sets (6.4).
A8. CC sets do not contain patterns that are present when the system is 
conscious and unconscious. If the link between consciousness and a 
constant pattern cannot be demonstrated in a natural experiment, then 
this pattern can be excluded from potential CC sets (6.4).
A9. CC sets do not contain partially correlated patterns. When several 
different materials have the same spatiotemporal pattern, the material(s) 
in which the spatiotemporal pattern is strongest will be considered to 
be the potential member(s) of the CC set that is associated with the 
conscious state, unless the partially correlated patterns can be separated 
out in a natural experiment (6.4).
Lemmas
L1. There is a functional connection between a conscious state and its 
corresponding CC set (4.6).
Constraints
C1. The spatiotemporal structures in a CC set are independent of the observer. 
My consciousness is a real phenomenon that does not depend on 
someone else’s subjective interpretation. CC sets must be formed from 
objective spatiotemporal structures, such as electromagnetic waves and 
neuron firing patterns (5.2).
C2. The members of CC sets are intrinsic properties. A conscious state 
supervenes on a CC set (A3a), so each duplicate of a CC set must be 
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associated with an identical conscious state, regardless of the spatial 
and temporal context in which the duplicate appears (5.2). 
C3. A non-conscious system does not contain a CC set that is 100% correlated 
with a conscious state. If A and B are 100% correlated, then A cannot occur 
without B. If a CC set is 100% correlated with a conscious state, then all 
brains that contain that CC set will be conscious (5.2).
C4. CC sets e-cause c-reports during consciousness experiments (A6). It is 
not necessary for every member of a CC set to e-cause c-reports. But 
some parts or aspects of the CC set must e-cause them. So when I say ‘I 
am conscious of a green tomato’, this c-report can be traced back to the 
CC set that e-caused it, which is functionally connected to a bubble of 
experience in which there is a green tomato (5.2).

Endnotes
2. The Emergence of the Concept of Consciousness
1  Qualia (singular: quale) is a technical philosophical term that refers to the 
qualitative or subjective properties of experiences. For exaple, the colour 
red, the taste of chocolate and the sound of a bell are qualia.
2  See Gamez (2007, Chapter 2) and Lehar (2003) for more detailed 
descriptions of bubbles of perception. Husserl (1964) has a good analysis 
of the temporal structures of our bubbles of perception.
3  It might be thought that a bubble of experience is a version of Dennett’s 
(1992) Cartesian Theatre, in which a homunculus observes the contents of 
consciousness. This appears to require a second homunculus inside the 
head of the first, and so on ad infinitum. However, bubbles of experience 
do not have the same problems as Cartesian Theatres because there is no 
perception within a bubble of experience. My physical brain perceives its 
physical environment using electromagnetic waves, etc.; my conscious 
experience of my body does not perceive my conscious experience of my 
environment using a conscious experience of electromagnetic waves—
there is no transmission of information within a bubble of experience. I 
have discussed this in more detail elsewhere (Gamez 2007, pp. 47-8).
4  For example, Lucretius (2007).
5  Locke (1997, p. 137).
6  This example is taken from ancient scepticism. Studies have shown that 
people have different perceptions of bitterness (Hayes et al. 2011) and 
there is substantial variability in people’s olfactory perception (Mainland 
et al. 2014).
7  See Galilei (1957) and Locke (1997). This distinction was also developed by 
the ancient atomists—see Taylor (1999) for a discussion.
8  It might be claimed that honey is sweet in itself and produces sensations 
of sweetness (or bitterness) through the interaction of its sweetness with 
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our senses. In this case the different properties perceived by different 
observers would be due to the different ways in which the physical 
sweetness interacts with their senses. The problem with this proposal is 
that it is impossible to decide whether the honey is sweet and produces a 
false bitter sensation when it interacts with Zampano’s senses, or whether 
it is bitter and produces a false sweet sensation when it interacts with 
my senses. It is much simpler to attribute all sensory properties to the 
interaction between the physical world and the sense organs.
9  Locke (1997, pp. 136-7).
10  For example, O’Regan and Noë claim: ‘There can therefore be no one-to-
one correspondence between visual experience and neural activations. 
Seeing is not constituted by activation of neural representations. Exactly 
the same neural state can underlie different experiences, just as the 
same body position can be part of different dances.’ (O’Regan and Noë 
2001, p. 966). A less radical position can be found in Noë’s later work: ‘A 
reasonable bet, at this point, is that some experience, or some features of 
some experiences, are, as it were, exclusively neural in their causal basis, 
but that full-blown, mature human experience is not.’ (Noë 2004, p. 218).
11  This is formally stated as assumption A4 in Section 4.5.
12  Noë’s (2004) bet that this type of conscious experience is not exclusively 
correlated with neural activity is a different working assumption that 
can be experimentally tested. I have discussed this point in more detail 
elsewhere (Gamez 2014b).
13  When a neuron fires it emits a short electrical pulse known as an action 
potential or spike. This electrical pulse has an amplitude of ~100 mV, a 
duration of ~2ms and it can be transmitted to other neurons or passed 
along the nerves.
14  As Dennett puts it: ‘The representation of space in the brain does not always 
use space-in-the-brain to represent space, and the representation of time 
in the brain does not always use time-in-the-brain.’ (Dennett 1992, p. 131). 
The distinction between space and time in the mind and space and time 
in the objective world was introduced by Kant (1996), who claimed that 
space and time are forms of intuition. According to Kant it is unknowable 
whether space and time are present in the objective noumenal world.
15  It might be thought that the traditional primary property of number is an 
exception. However, number is not a physical property, but the magnitude 
of a physical property, which is obtained through a measurement 
procedure and varies with the system of units. For example, we can carry 
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out an act of counting that results in a number, or extract the ratio of two 
masses as a number. Consider a ball that weighs 7.3 kilos (16.1 pounds): 
the mass is a physical property of the ball, not the numbers 1, 7.3 or 16.1.
16  Kant’s (1996) metaphysics expresses a similar idea: the noumenal physical 
world is an invisible source of signals that are processed through the 
categories to become phenomenal experiences.
17  This use of discrete black boxes to illustrate objects in the physical world 
is not strictly correct because the boundaries between physical objects 
depend on the observer’s sensory apparatus and ontology (Gamez 2007, 
Chapter 5).
18  Russell (1927, p. 163).
19  Many people today have a different interpretation of our bubbles of 
experience, which is often aligned with idealism and rejects the scientific 
interpretation of physical reality—Tibetan Buddhism is one example. This 
book will not examine these other interpretations of consciousness and the 
physical world.
20  ‘Consciousness’ is sometimes used to refer to an individual person’s 
consciousness and sometimes used as a mass term to refer to all of the 
consciousness in existence—just like ‘water’ is used to refer to all of the 
water in existence. ‘What is consciousness?’ and ‘What is water?’ treat 
consciousness and water as mass terms. In this definition I have tried to 
limit the ambiguity by linking a state of a consciousness to a state of a 
bubble of experience. 
21  Galilei (1957, p. 274).
22  Suppose a person’s bubble of experience contains three objects, P, Q and 
R. P appears with intensity 0.7, Q appears with intensity 0.8 and R appears 
with intensity 0.3 (these values are purely illustrative). According to the 
proposed definition, this person’s overall level of consciousness would be 
the average of these intensity values: (0.7+0.8+0.3)/3 = 0.6.
23  This is similar to our use of ‘awake’, except a person can be awake without 
having a bubble of experience. For example, vegetative state patients are 
presumed to be unconscious, but they can have cycles of wakefulness in 
which they open their eyes and move their body in meaningless ways 
(Laureys et al. 2002).
24  Metzinger (2003) has a good discussion of online and offline conscious 
experience.
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25  Functional connectivity (a deviation from statistical independence 
between A and B) is typically contrasted with structural connectivity (a 
physical link between A and B) and from effective connectivity (a causal 
link from A to B)—see Friston (1994; 2011). A number of algorithms exist 
for measuring functional and effective connectivity.
26  The research on change blindness, attentional blindness and change 
detection in peripheral vision suggests that the amount of online conscious 
content is less than we think (Cohen and Dennett 2011; Rensink et al. 1997; 
Simons and Chabris 1999; Simons and Rensink 2005).
27  Wilkes (1988b, pp. 16-7).
28  Wilkes (1988b, p. 38).
29  Lucretius (2007) claims that the soul (a combination of spirit [anima, the 
vital principle] and mind [animus, the intellect]) is a subtle particle. See 
Chapter 6, Footnote 10.
3. The Philosophy and Science of Consciousness
1  See Husserl (1960).
2  For example, Smart (1959).
3  See Section 2.1.
4  For example, piano-playing pigs are unlikely to have entered the Aztecs’ 
imaginations.
5  See Nagel (1974).
6  Other problems with thought experiments and imagination have been 
discussed by Wilkes (1988a) and Gamez (2009). The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy has a good overview (Brown and Fehige 2014).
7  McGinn (1989, p. 349). 
8  Metzinger (2000, p. 1).
9  The quote by McGinn at the beginning of this section is a typical description 
of the hard problem of consciousness. Chalmers (1995b) made a popular 
distinction between easy and hard problems of consciousness. Strawson 
(2015) gives a historical overview.
10  This example has been simplified. If the brain-imaging device showed the 
complete state of my brain on the screen, then the conscious experience 
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of p1 would be linked to everything that was going on in my brain, both 
consciously and unconsciously—it would not just be the pattern associated 
with my conscious experience of the ice cube. Multiple experiments would 
be required to identify and selectively display the brain activity that was 
linked to my conscious experience of the ice cube. 
11  To make the text easier to read I have separated conscious experiences 
of brains from other conscious experiences. However, our conscious 
experience of a brain is a conscious experience. So in this example, some 
of the brain patterns on the screen will be associated with our conscious 
experience of the brain patterns on the screen.
12  Our finite cognitive capacities (long and short term memory, etc.) will 
limit our ability to learn associations between conscious experiences of 
brain patterns and other conscious experiences. For example, it is unlikely 
that we will be able to learn all of the details of a complex brain pattern.
13  Rorty (1980, p. 71).
14  I have told this story from the perspective of consciousness. It can also be 
told in terms of physical brain activity. If we knew enough about the brain, 
we could describe how it learns to associate sensory stimuli from brains 
with other sensory stimuli.
15  Elementary wave-particles and superstrings are only put forward as 
examples. Future advances in physics might explain the behaviour of 
elementary wave-particles and superstrings in terms of brute regularities 
at a lower level.
16  Boyle’s law is a good example of a scientific law that can be explained 
in terms of regularities at a lower level. It states that the pressure of a 
gas is inversely proportional to its volume in a closed system at constant 
temperature. This macro-scale experimental observation can be explained 
in terms of the behaviour of atoms and molecules, which was formerly 
treated as a brute regularity that was the starting point for scientific 
explanations.
4. The Measurement of Consciousness
1  Chalmers (1998, p. 220).
2  Descriptions of consciousness can be interpreted as statements about the 
physical world. When I report that I have a conscious experience of a rusty 
helmet beside my conscious experience of my left foot, I am also reporting 
that there is a rusty helmet beside my left foot in the physical world.
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3  Wittgenstein (1969) discusses how our knowledge is underpinned by 
a framework of certainties that cannot be doubted without putting 
everything into question.
4  When we imagine different motor tasks, such as walking around a house or 
playing tennis, we activate different brain areas that can be discriminated 
in a fMRI scanner. This enables people to answer yes/no questions about 
their consciousness by imagining that they are performing one of two 
actions. This method has been used to communicate with patients in 
vegetative or minimally conscious states, who were incapable of other 
forms of voluntary behaviour (Monti et al. 2010; Owen et al. 2006). 
5  This list of behaviours includes suggestions from Shanahan (2010), Koch 
(2004) and Teasdale and Jennett (1974).
6  Post-decision wagering is a method that is used to measure consciousness 
in psychology (Persaud et al. 2007). A person is asked to make a decision 
and to bet on the accuracy of that decision. It is assumed that the person 
will bet more money on decisions that are based on conscious information. 
See Sandeberg et al. (2010) for a comparison of post-decision wagering, the 
perceptual awareness scale and confidence ratings.
7  An overview of some of the techniques for measuring consciousness is 
given by Seth et al. (2008).
8  Damasio (1999, p. 6).
9  An overview of binocular rivalry is given by Blake (2001).
10  This is a simplified summary of the large number of experiments that 
have been carried out on visual masking and non-conscious perception. 
For example, Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999) showed that unconsciously 
perceived pictures influenced subjects’ ability to consciously name 
pictures and categorize words. Schütz et al. (2007) showed that masked 
prime words can influence how subjects complete gap words. Merikle and 
Daneman (1996) played words to patients under general anaesthesia and 
found that when they were awake they completed word stems with words 
that they had heard non-consciously. A change in the skin’s conductivity 
is known as a galvanic skin response, which can indicate that information 
is being processed unconsciously (Kotze and Moller 1990). Öhman and 
Soares (1994) showed that subjects’ skin conductance response changed 
when they unconsciously perceived phobic stimuli, such as pictures of 
snakes or spiders. A review of experimental work on visual masking and 
non-conscious perception is given by Kouider and Dehaene (2007).
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11  This is known as forced choice guessing. While some people believe that 
above chance results on a forced choice guessing task demonstrate that 
conscious information is present, blindsight patients can guess the identity 
of visual stimuli above chance while reporting no subjective awareness 
(Weiskrantz 1986). Seth et al. (2008) discuss these issues.
12  By ‘associated’ it is meant that consciousness is linked to a platinum 
standard system, but no claims are being made about causation or 
metaphysical identity. 
13  The metre used to be defined as one ten-millionth of the distance from the 
Earth’s equator to the North Pole at sea level. Since this was difficult to 
measure, a platinum-iridium bar was used instead. Rulers were directly 
or indirectly calibrated against this bar, which was kept in Paris.
14  If the platinum-iridium standard metre doubled in size, an object that 
used to be 1 metre long (1 platinum-iridium standard metre bar) would 
have a new length of 0.5 metres (0.5 platinum-iridium standard metre 
bars). This would only be strictly true if the platinum-iridium bar was 
the actual definition of the metre, rather than the working definition. The 
same argument applies to the actual definition of the metre.
15  Functional connectivity (a deviation from statistical independence 
between A and B) is typically contrasted with structural connectivity (a 
physical link between A and B) and from effective connectivity (a causal 
link from A to B)—see Friston (1994; 2011). A number of algorithms exist 
for measuring functional connectivity (for example, mutual information), 
and it can be measured with a delay.
16  While phenomenal consciousness and access ‘consciousness’ might be 
conceptually dissociable (Block 1995), the idea that non-measureable 
phenomenal consciousness could be present during experiments on 
consciousness is incompatible with the scientific study of consciousness. 
Block’s non-accessible phenomenal consciousness does not appear in 
c-reports, so everything that Block has ever written or said about it is 
meaningless or false.
17  A possible exception to this would be a situation in which non-reportable 
consciousness is present but does not interfere with our ability to identify 
the correlates of consciousness. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
9, Footnote 13.
18  This is similar to Block’s (2007) idea of cognitive accessibility.
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19  Dennett questions the idea that there is a single stream of consciousness 
with a fixed content: ‘the Multiple Drafts model avoids the tempting 
mistake of supposing that there must be a single narrative (the ‘final 
or ‘published’ draft, you might say) that is canonical—that is the actual 
stream of consciousness of the subject, whether or not the experimenter (or 
even the subject) can gain access to it.’ (Dennett 1992, p. 113). Personally I 
do not find Dennett’s arguments for his multiple drafts model convincing. 
We will find out if he is correct, because it will be impossible to obtain 
systematic stable measurements of consciousness.
20  Panpsychism is the view that all matter is linked to consciousness. For 
example, some versions of panypsychism claim that individual electrons, 
quarks, etc. are associated with simple bubbles of experience.
21  A2 is also likely to be incompatible with Zeki and Bartels’ (1999) proposal 
that micro-consciousnesses are distributed throughout the brain.
22  The perceived colour of an object does not just depend on the frequencies 
of the electromagnetic waves that are reflected, transmitted or emitted 
by it. Our visual system also uses the spectrum of illuminating light and 
the colour of surrounding objects to identify an object’s colour, which 
enables us to attribute the same colour to objects under different lighting 
conditions. I have used electromagnetic wave frequencies to simplify the 
presentation of the colour inversion argument, which also applies to a 
more accurate account of colour perception.
23  There are likely to be subtle behavioural differences between two colour-
inverted people—see Palmer (1999) for a discussion of behaviourally 
equivalent inversion scenarios. These differences would disappear if 
completely different sets of ‘colour’ experiences were linked to frequencies 
of electromagnetic waves.
24  If a set of properties, A, supervenes on another set of properties, B, then 
it is impossible for two things to have different A properties without also 
having different B properties. This is not a causal relationship.
25  Kouider et al. (2013) and Dehaene (2014) discuss infant consciousness.
26  Animal consciousness is discussed by Dehaene (2014), Edelman and Seth 
(2009) and Feinberg and Mallatt (2013).
27  People with Anton-Babinski syndrome are blind, but claim that they 
can see and confabulate to cover up the contradictory evidence. Other 
anosognosia patients are completely paralyzed on one side, but claim that 
their body is working perfectly. 
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28  Section 2.4 discusses theories that link consciousness to sensorimotor 
interactions between the brain, body and environment. In previous work I 
made the assumption that the awake normal adult human brain is a platinum 
standard system (Gamez 2011; Gamez 2012a). The more developed account 
of c-reports presented in this book makes the assumption that the brain is 
awake unnecessary—immobility, unresponsiveness, etc. are c-reports of 
zero consciousness. 
29  Although brain-damaged patients have played an important role in 
consciousness research, they should not be uncritically assumed to be 
platinum standard systems. There can be ambiguities about whether the 
damage has knocked out the memory and reporting functions and left 
the consciousness intact, or knocked out the consciousness and left the 
memory and reporting functions intact. For example, locked-in patients 
are thought to be fully conscious, but they are only capable of moving their 
eyes, and some of the patients studied by Owen et al. (2006) and Monti 
et al. (2010) are likely to be conscious but unable to display this in their 
external behaviour. The use of brain-damaged patients in consciousness 
research has the further problem that the damage is typically non-localized 
and some brain areas are likely to perform several different functions. One 
way of addressing this issue is to assume that brain-damaged patients are 
platinum standard systems on a case-by-case basis, taking the details of the 
damage into account and its likely impact on memory and/or reporting.
A similar ambiguity applies to the use of anaesthetics in consciousness 
research. For example, midazolam, xenon and propofol are used to induce 
unconsciousness, so that scientists can compare the state of the conscious 
and unconscious brain (Casali et al. 2013). This raises the question whether 
the anaesthetic completely removes consciousness, or just paralyzes the 
body and prevents the subject from remembering and reporting their 
consciousness. This issue can also be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
We can examine the mechanism of each anaesthetic and decide whether it 
is likely to affect the areas linked to memory and/or reporting. Normally 
functioning adult human brains containing anaesthetics that do not 
affect memory and/or reporting can be assumed to be platinum standard 
systems.
Animal experiments can also be handled on a case-by-case basis. 
We can assume that the brains of monkeys or mice are associated 
with consciousness, so that we can use these animals in consciousness 
research.
30  The notion of a minimal set is intended to exclude features of the brain that 
typically occur at the same time as consciousness, whose removal would 
not lead to the alteration or loss of consciousness. For example, a CC set 
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might have prerequisites and consequences (Aru et al. 2012; de Graaf et al. 
2012) that typically co-occur with consciousness, but the brain would be 
conscious in exactly the same way if the CC set could be induced without 
these prerequisites and consequences. 
31  This is similar to Chalmers’ (2000) definition of the total correlates of 
consciousness, which he distinguishes from the core neural basis: ‘A 
total NCC builds in everything and thus automatically suffices for the 
corresponding conscious states. A core NCC, on the other hand, contains 
only the “core” processes that correlate with consciousness. The rest of 
the total NCC will be relegated to some sort of background conditions 
required for the correct functioning of the core.’ (Chalmers 2000, p. 26). 
Block (2007) makes a similar distinction.
32  This will not be correct if some spatiotemporal structures can inhibit 
consciousness. For example, we might have a CC set, cc1, that is a correlate 
of consciousness according to D5. In most circumstances consciousness 
would be present whenever cc1 was present. However, if consciousness 
was inhibited by ih1, then there could be a situation in which cc1 and ih1 
were present together and there was no consciousness.
33  Footnote 15 explains the relationship between functional and effective 
connectivity. These are typically inferred from data using algorithms, such 
as Granger causality or mutual information, and they are distinct from 
physical causation, which is discussed in the next section.
34  There are many spurious correlations—for example, see Vigen (2016). 
These can be divided into false correlations, which are the result of poor 
statistical procedures, and true but unlikely correlations that might be 
due to an underlying cause. When there is a true correlation between A 
and B it is possible to obtain information about B by measuring A and 
vice versa (the amount of information that one can obtain depends on 
the strength of the correlation). In this book I am presenting a framework 
that is based the assumption that there is a true statistical correlation 
(functional connection) between consciousness and the physical world. 
So we can obtain information about consciousness by measuring parts of 
the physical world and obtain information about the physical world by 
measuring consciousness.
35  Kim (1998, p. 31).
36  This distinction is taken from Dowe (2000). It is similar to Fell et al.’s 
(2004) distinction between efficient and explanatory causation. Efficient 
causation is concerned with the physical relation of two events and the 
exchange of physically conserved quantities. Explanatory causation refers 
to the law-like character of conjoined events. 
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37  Predominantly conceptual accounts of causation include Lewis’ (1973) 
counterfactual analysis and Mackie’s (1993) INUS conditions. Empirical 
theories based on the exchange of physically conserved quantities have 
been put forward by Aronson (1971a; 1971b), Fair (1979) and Dowe (2000). 
Bigelow et al. (1988) and Bigelow and Pargetter (1990) link causation to 
physical forces.
38  See Dowe (2000). 
39  A world line is the path of an object through space and time.
40  If all empirical theories of causation are unworkable, then we might have 
to limit causal concepts to ordinary language and abandon the attempt 
to develop a scientific understanding of the causal relationship between 
consciousness and the physical world.
41  Kim (1998) has a good discussion of the relationship between macro and 
micro physical laws.
42  Wilson (1999) discusses the minimum amount of physical effect that 
would be required for consciousness to influence the physical brain.
43  A related point is made by Fell et al. (2004), who argue that the neural 
correlates of consciousness cannot e-cause conscious states.
44  Controversial experiments by Libet (1985) have indicated that our 
awareness of our decision to act comes after the motor preparations for the 
act (the readiness potential). This suggests that our conscious will might 
not be the cause of our actions, and Wegner (2002) has argued that we 
make inferences after the fact about whether we caused a particular action. 
These results could be interpreted to show that CC sets do not e-cause 
c-reports about consciousness because motor preparations for verbal 
output (for example) would precede the events that are correlated with 
consciousness. This problem could be resolved by measuring the relative 
timing of a proposed correlate of consciousness (CC1 in Figure 4.4) and the 
sequence of events leading to the report about consciousness, including 
the readiness potential (R1-R3 in Figure 4.4). If the framework presented 
in this book is correct, then it should be possible to find CC sets with the 
appropriate timing relationship. If no suitable CC sets can be found, then 
the framework presented in this book should be rejected as flawed. It is 
worth noting that Libet’s measurement of the timing of conscious events 
implicitly depends on a functional connection between consciousness and 
c-reporting behaviour—the relative timing of consciousness and action can 
only be measured if consciousness is functionally connected to c-reports 
about consciousness (in this case with a delay).
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45  It is reasonably easy to see how the contents of consciousness that are 
c-reported could be e-caused by physical events. For example, we can 
tell a simple story about how light of a particular frequency could lead to 
the activation of spatiotemporal structures in the brain, and how learning 
processes could associate these with sounds, such as ‘red’ or ‘rojo’. This 
might eventually enable a trained brain to produce the sounds ‘I can see 
a red hat’ or ‘I am aware of a red hat’ when it is presented with a pattern 
of electromagnetic waves. Since consciousness does not appear to us as a 
particular thing or property in our environment and many languages do 
not contain the word ‘consciousness’ (Wilkes 1988b), it is not necessary 
to identify sensory stimuli that the physical brain could learn to associate 
with the sound ‘consciousness’. The concept of consciousness can be more 
plausibly interpreted as an abstract concept that is acquired by subjects 
in different ways (see Chapter 2). So it is conceivable that the scientific 
study of consciousness could be carried out without subjects ever using 
the word ‘consciousness’ in their c-reports.
46  See Footnote 15 for the distinction between structural, functional and 
effective connectivity. Effective connectivity can be measured using 
algorithms, such as transfer entropy (Schreiber 2000) or Granger causality 
(Granger 1969), which works on the assumption that a cause precedes and 
increases the predictability of the effect. However, effective connectivity 
does not always coincide with e-causation—for example, when a signal is 
connected to two areas with different delays.
47  In the real brain many areas are reciprocally connected to each other and 
there is a great deal of recurrent processing. This simplified diagram only 
shows the general flow of activity from perception to reporting. 
48  Cohen and Dennett (2011) illustrate the low resolution of our peripheral 
vision.
49  Our ability to access high resolution information on demand contributes 
to our sense that we perceive the world in uniformly high resolution 
(O’Regan 1992).
50  This is a conservative estimate based on eye-movement driven changes 
and the assumption that consciousness consists of a series of discrete 
moments (the specious present). It is also possible that consciousness 
changes continuously.
51  See O’Regan (1992).
52  People can be trained to make more accurate reports about their 
consciousness (Lutz et al. 2002) and there has been a substantial amount 
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of work on the use of interviews to help people describe their conscious 
states. In the explication interview (EI) a trained person interviews a 
subject about a conscious state to help them provide an accurate report 
(Petitmengin 2006). In descriptive event sampling (DES) the subject carries 
a beeper, which goes off at random several times per day. When they hear 
the beep the subject makes notes about their consciousness just before the 
beep. This is followed by an interview that is designed to help the subject 
to provide faithful descriptions of the sampled experiences (Hurlburt and 
Akhter 2006). Froese et al. (2011) discuss some of the first- and second-
person methods for measuring consciousness. These techniques place 
a heavy reliance on memory, so it is unlikely that they can address the 
problems highlighted in this section.
53  Shanahan (2010) suggests how an omnipotent psychologist could measure 
a person’s consciousness by reversing time and carrying out different 
interventions.
54  Mental techniques could also be used to reset consciousness. For example, 
people with a high level of mental focus, possibly gained through 
meditation, might be capable of putting their consciousness into a 
particular state and maintaining this state for an extended period of time.
55  It might be possible to use what we know about the relationship between 
a stimulus and consciousness to make reliable inferences about a person’s 
state of consciousness. Suppose we knew that an awake expectant person 
always has a conscious experience of a red rectangle when a red rectangle 
is presented at the centre of their visual field. If this inference was reliable, 
it might not be necessary to measure their consciousness using c-reports 
when we expose them to a red rectangle—we could simply infer that 
since they are looking at a red rectangle, they must be conscious of a red 
rectangle. However, the limited resolution and active nature of the visual 
system means that a complex model will be required to map between 
stimuli and conscious states. Furthermore, this method of inference can 
only be developed by measuring consciousness using c-reports, which 
depends on the assumptions that have been presented in this chapter. 
56  Nagel (1974, p. 449). 
57  You might think that you could validate the descriptions by resetting your 
consciousness to the state that is being described. But then you would 
have to compare a remembered description with your current state of 
consciousness without modifying your current state of consciousness.
58  Formal descriptions of the physical world are covered in Section 5.1.
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59  These problems are discussed by Chrisley (1995a) and Gamez (2006).
60  The use of XML to describe consciousness is discussed by Gamez (2006; 
2008a).
61  See Balduzzi and Tononi (2009).
5. Correlates and Theories of Consciousness
1  This is the current definition of a metre.
2  This is our conscious experience of measurement. I could also describe 
how Randy’s height is measured by the physical brain of the scientist.
3  Eddington (1928, pp. 251-2).
4  This definition of measurement is a simplified version of the one put 
forward by Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991), who take it from Stevens 
(1968). According to Stevens, most measurement involves ‘the assignment 
of numbers to aspects of objects or events according to one or another rule 
or convention.’ (Stevens 1968, p. 850). Pedhazur and Schmelkin stress that 
numbers are assigned to aspects of objects, not to objects themselves. We 
measure the height, width and colour of a box, not the box itself.
5  For example, if we cannot devise a way of p-describing neurons, then it 
will be difficult to make inferences about the consciousness of animals 
with larger neurons, such as snails and insects, and we will not be able to 
say anything about the consciousness of artificial systems.
6  Intrinsic properties are tied to an object’s physical nature. They are held 
by an object independently of its spatial and temporal context. Extrinsic 
properties depend on an object’s relationships with other parts of the 
world. The chemical composition of a neuron is an intrinsic property. The 
distance of a neuron from the North Pole is an extrinsic property, which 
would change if the North Pole changed location.
7  It is conceivable that some CC sets could be 60% correlated with conscious 
states. Experimental work could determine whether this is the case. C3 
will not apply if there are inhibitors of consciousness (see Chapter 4, 
Footnote 32).
8  Elsewhere I distinguished between type A and type B correlates of 
consciousness (Gamez 2014c). Type A correlates can e-cause c-reports 
and are compatible with C4. Type B correlates are not compatible with C4 
because they cannot e-cause c-reports.
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9  This discussion assumes that there is a 1:1 ratio between CC sets and 
conscious states. 
10  The technologies that are available for measuring the brain are covered in 
Section 12.2.
11  I have discussed elsewhere how the correlates of consciousness can be 
experimentally separated out from their prerequisites and consequences 
and from sensory and reporting structures (Gamez 2014c). Pitts et al. 
(2014) describe experimental work that attempts to separate the correlates 
of conscious perception from reporting structures. This is also discussed 
by Koch et al. (2016).
12  Rees et al. (2002), Tononi and Koch (2008), Dehaene (2014) and Koch et 
al. (2016) describe some of the research that has been carried out on the 
neural correlates of consciousness.
13  Any kind of ‘passive’ monitoring or measurement involves the passage 
of physically conserved quantities from the system to the measuring 
device. In a natural experiment this is small compared to the exchange of 
physically conserved quantities within the system, so it does not affect our 
assumption that the system is a platinum standard.
14  This experiment has been extensively discussed—for example, by Moor 
(1988), Chalmers (1996a), Van Heuveln et al. (1998) and Prinz (2003). Part 
of the brain could be replaced by any functionally equivalent system, such 
as a giant lookup table or the population of China communicating with 
radios and satellites (Block 2006). 
15  We have an intuition that we would notice if, for example, the implantation 
of the chip removed half of our visual consciousness. But according to the 
premises of the experiment, our behaviour would be identical, so nothing 
in our thoughts or speech would reflect this change in consciousness. If the 
implanted chip did affect our consciousness we would not be cognitively 
aware of the change and it would not affect our ability to perceive and 
respond to the world. We would be like people with anosognosia (see 
Chapter 4, Footnote 27), with the difference that our sight and bodies 
would be working perfectly, so no external observer could detect the 
change in our consciousness.
16  It might be argued that neurons die all the time, so surely replacing one 
neuron with silicon should not affect our assumption that the brain is a 
platinum standard? And so on with two neurons, three neurons, until 
the entire brain has been replaced. Chalmers’ (1995a) fading and dancing 
qualia argument proceeds along these lines. One problem with this 
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argument is that it is based on the invalid assumption that we can imagine 
the relationship between consciousness and the brain (see Chapter 3). 
Another problem is that the brain can be sensitive to individual spikes, so 
the replacement of individual neurons could affect its consciousness. For 
example, a single neuron could individually encode an abstract concept or 
make a significant contribution to a population code. If this neuron was 
part of a CC set, then its replacement with a silicon chip could alter the 
associated conscious state.
17  The assumption that brains with implanted chips are conscious is 
equivalent to the assumption that functionalism is true. This brings in all of 
the problems with computation and information theories of consciousness 
that are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
18  Popper (2002, pp. 279-80).
19  Tononi (2008, p. 217). I also could have quoted Dehaene: ‘Only mathematical 
theory can explain how the mental reduces to the neural. Neuroscience 
needs a series of bridging laws, analogous to the Maxwell-Boltzmann 
theory of gases, that connect one domain with the other. This is no easy 
task: the “condensed matter” of the brain is perhaps the most complex 
object on earth. Unlike the simple structure of a gas, a model of the brain 
will require many nested levels of explanation. In a dizzying arrangement 
of Russian dolls, cognition arises from a sophisticated arrangement of 
mental routines or processors, each implemented by circuits distributed 
across the brain, themselves made up of dozens of cell types. Even a single 
neuron, with its tens of thousands of synapses, is a universe of trafficking 
molecules that will provide modelling work for centuries.’ (Dehaene 2014, 
p. 163).
20  I have discussed the need for c-theories elsewhere (Gamez 2012b). 
21  The search for c-theories is closely related to the attempt to discover 
the relationship between brain activity and behaviour. Computational 
methods could also be used to study this relationship (see Section 5.6). 
However, c-theories might be based on non-neural structures in the brain, 
such as novel materials, haemoglobin and electromagnetic waves (see 
Section 6.2 and Section 6.3), that would not be required by theories that 
describe the relationship between neuron activity and external behaviour.
22  ‘Mathematics’ should be interpreted in a broad sense that includes 
computer algorithms.
23  This example and its intensity values are purely illustrative. More work 
needs to be done on the conversion of c-reports into c-descriptions that 
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record the intensity of different aspects of conscious experience. This 
could draw on previous work in psychophysics—for example, Gescheider 
(1997).
24  This is an unashamedly Popperian approach to the science of consciousness. 
Some would argue that Popper (2002) presents an outmoded account of 
the philosophy of science, which should be replaced by Kuhn (1962) at 
least, or perhaps Feyerabend (1975) or Latour (1987). Some of these later 
‘relativist’ ‘constructivist’ ‘postmodern’ accounts reject the possibility of 
scientific progress altogether. However, if we are attempting to understand 
how a science of consciousness can be developed, we need a model of what 
science is. And I would argue that Popper provides a carefully thought 
out and convincing account of what good scientific practice should be. 
Other philosophies of science can be used to interpret the science of 
consciousness, but many of them are considerably less useful as guiding 
principles than Popper—how (or why) would we develop a science of 
consciousness based on Feyerabend or Latour?
25  C-theories describing brute regularities have some similarity with 
Chalmers’ psychophysical laws: ‘Where we have new fundamental 
properties, we also have new fundamental laws. Here the fundamental 
laws will be psychophysical laws, specifying how phenomenal (or 
protophenomenal) properties depend on physical properties. These laws 
will not interfere with physical laws; physical laws already form a closed 
system. Instead they will be supervenience laws, telling us how experience 
arises from physical processes. We have seen that the dependence of 
experience on the physical cannot be derived from physical laws, so any 
final theory must include laws of this variety.’ (Chalmers 1996a, p. 127). 
However, this book suspends judgment about some of the metaphysical 
substance-based theories, and the relationship between c-descriptions 
and p-descriptions is symmetrical, not a causal relationship in which 
consciousness arises from physical processes.
26  For example, Tononi’s (2008) information integration theory is based on 
his first-person observations about the differentiation and integration of 
consciousness. 
27  Humphreys (2004, p. 90).
28  There is also a more general question about whether one human brain 
can fully understand another—one might think that a brain could only 
be understood by a larger and more complicated system. This issue can 
potentially be addressed by using the world as external memory (Clark 
2008; O’Regan 1992). This would only work if our understanding of the 
brain can be broken down into interrelated modules. For example, we 
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could develop a detailed understanding of how a neuron works, write 
it down, and then work on a different aspect of the problem, until we 
had written down everything about the brain. Although the final solution 
could not be comprehended by a single brain all at once, one or more 
brains could check the validity of each part and the links between them. 
29  A substantial amount of research has been carried out on the use of 
computers for scientific discovery (Dzeroski and Todorovski 2007). 
Robotic systems have been developed that can carry out experiments 
automatically (Sparkes et al. 2010), and there has been research on the 
automatic discovery of differential equations that describe the behaviour 
of dynamic physical systems (Schmidt and Lipson 2009). This work 
suggests how consciousness could be scientifically studied in the future.
30  For example, Billeh et al. (2014) have developed a way of identifying 
functional circuits in recordings of spiking activity from hundreds of 
neurons. Using this approach it might be possible to develop a way of 
describing brain activity in terms of interacting circuits, which could be 
identified automatically by a computer.
31  The Blue Brain Project has developed detailed models of a cortical 
column (Markram 2006) and this work is being continued on a larger 
scale in the Human Brain Project (www.humanbrainproject.eu). Larger, 
less detailed models have also been built of human and animal brains 
(Ananthanarayanan et al. 2009; Izhikevich and Edelman 2008). The 
feasibility of scanning and simulating a human brain is discussed in 
Chapter 11, Footnote 14. None of the current models generates behaviour 
that is similar to c-reports and most of them do not include non-neural 
components of the brain, such as glia.
32  The ‘c-reports’ of a simulated brain could not be used to measure its 
consciousness because a neural simulation is not a platinum standard 
system.
33  Simulations are very different from real brains, so this would primarily 
be a test of the methodology. However, this type of work might lead to 
c-theories that could be tested on real brains.
34  This methodology could also be used to solve the more general problem 
of the relationship between an organism’s brain activity and all of its 
behaviour (both conscious and non-conscious). Once the behaviour 
had been formally described, computers could be used to discover 
relationships between the brain activity and behaviour. This approach 
could be prototyped on a very simple system, such as a simulated C. 
elegans.
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6. Physical Theories of Consciousness
1  The pattern/material distinction captures a useful way of speaking about 
the physical world at different spatial scales. However, one can also 
argue that elementary wave-particles are the only material and all other 
‘materials’ are patterns in elementary wave-particles. Physical c-theories 
can be expressed using either interpretation of the pattern/material 
distinction.
2  A neuron’s distance from the North Pole is a property of the neuron and 
the North Pole combined—it changes when the location of the North 
Pole changes. The brain has intrinsic properties that enable it to reflect 
particular frequencies of electromagnetic waves. The set of electromagnetic 
waves that is actually reflected depends on the brain’s properties and on 
the properties of the waves. If electromagnetic waves altered their nature, 
the brain’s reflectance of electromagnetic waves would change.
3  I have discussed this issue in more detail in a paper that distinguishes 
between type A correlates of consciousness that meet constraint C4, and 
type B correlates of consciousness that do not (Gamez 2014c). 
4  A quantum theory of consciousness has been put forward by Hameroff 
and Penrose (1996). Electromagnetic theories of consciousness have been 
put forward by Pockett (2000) and Macfadden (2002).
5  The potential connection between consciousness and a global workspace 
was first elaborated by Baars (1988). A number of computational and neural 
models of a global workspace have been built (Franklin 2003; Gamez et al. 
2013; Shanahan 2008; Zylberberg et al. 2010) and a substantial amount of 
research has been done on the possibility that a global workspace might be 
implemented in the brain (Dehaene and Changeux 2011).
6  For example, Bartfield et al. (2015) and Godwin et al. (2015) describe 
functional connectivity patterns that are potentially linked to consciousness.
7  See Gamez (2014b). 
8  See Tononi and Sporns (2003), Balduzzi and Tononi (2008) and Oizumi 
et al. (2014). In a physical c-theory Tononi’s algorithms would connect 
patterns in a particular material to a conscious state. This relationship 
would only hold for a specific material—the same patterns in a different 
material would not be linked to consciousness. This is distinct from 
the use of Tononi’s algorithms to identify information patterns that are 
linked to consciousness, which is discussed in the next chapter. Liveliness 
(Gamez and Aleksander 2011), causal density (Seth et al. 2006) and Casali 
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et al.’s (2013) perturbational complexity index can also be re-interpreted as 
descriptions of patterns in materials that might be linked to consciousness.
9  A formal description of biological structures is required if CC sets contain 
biological materials and we want to make predictions or deductions 
(see Chapter 9) about the consciousness of non-biological systems. For 
example, a formal description of neurons could help us to decide whether 
a robot controlled by artificial neurons is conscious.
10  Lucretius’ (2007) theory about the soul is similar to this view. He claims 
that the soul (a combination of spirit [anima, the vital principle] and mind 
[animus, the intellect]) is a minute particle:
The nature of the mind and spirit is such it must consist
Of stuff composed of seeds that are so negligibly small, 
Subtracted from the flesh, they don’t affect the weight at all.
Nor should we think this substance is composed of one thing, neat,
For from the dying there escapes a slight breath mixed with heat,
While heat, in turn, must carry air along with it; for there
Is never any heat that is not also mixed with air, 
Because heat’s substance, being loose in texture, has to leave
Space for many seeds of air to travel through its weave.
This demonstrates the nature of the mind’s at least threefold –
Even so, these three together aren’t enough, all told,
To generate sensation, since the mind rejects the notion
Any of these is able to produce sense-giving motion,
Or the thoughts the mind itself turns over. And so to these same
Three elements, we have to add a fourth that has no name.
There is nothing nimbler than this element at all –
Nothing is as fine as this is, or as smooth or small.
It’s this that first distributes motions through the frame that lead
To sense, since this is first to bestir, composed of minute seed.
Lucretius (2007, pp 78-9)
11  At most people have invoked the known properties of quantum mechanics, 
which are unlikely to play much of a role (Wilson 1993). 
12  Novel materials will not help us to imagine the relationship between 
consciousness and the physical world. If they are similar to the rest of the 
physical world, then they will be invisible, and we will be unable to make 
an imaginative transition from the invisible novel material to conscious 
experiences (see Section 3.3). If the novel material is more like a spark of 
consciousness embedded in matter, then we will be able to imagine the 
material, but we will find it difficult to imagine how it relates to other 
conscious experiences (see Section 3.4).
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13  To make this assumption work it will be necessary to find a way of 
comparing the strength of patterns in different materials. For example, 
how can you compare the strength of electromagnetic field patterns 
(measured in volts) with blood flow patterns (measured in cm/s)?
7. Information Theories of Consciousness
1  Tononi (2008, p. 237).
2  Floridi (2010, p. 1).
3  Floridi uses ‘dedomena’ to describe differences in the physical world 
that exist independently of us: ‘Dedomena are […] pure data or proto-
epistemic data, that is, data before they are epistemically interpreted. As 
“fractures in the fabric of being” they can only be posited as an external 
anchor of our information, for dedomena are never accessed or elaborated 
independently of a level of abstraction […] They can be reconstructed 
as ontological requirements, like Kant’s noumena or Locke’s substance: 
they are not epistemically experienced but their presence is empirically 
inferred from (and required by) experience. Of course, no example can be 
provided, but dedomena are whatever lack of uniformity in the world is 
the source of (what looks to information systems like us as) as data, e.g. a 
red light against a dark background.’ (Floridi 2009, pp. 17-8).
4  This notion of an interface is based on Floridi’s level of abstraction: 
‘[…] data are never accessed and elaborated (by an information agent) 
independently of a level of abstraction (LoA) […]. A LoA is a specific set of 
typed variables, intuitively representable as an interface, which establishes 
the scope and type of data that will be available as a resource for the 
generation of information.’ (Floridi 2009, p. 37). Floridi (2008) describes 
levels of abstraction in detail.
5  I can also extract the text of Madame Bovary from the DRAM voltages by 
defining a mapping between 011100100110010101100100 and the complete 
text of Madame Bovary.
6  A time-indexed interface uses a combination of time and the system’s 
state to extract information. Suppose an elementary wave-particle shifts 
between two states: you can interpret the appearance of state 1 at time 1 as 
‘r’, the appearance of state 1 at time 3 as ‘e’, and so on.
7  The notion of a custom interface is inspired by discussions about whether 
physical systems implement finite state automata (Bishop 2002; Bishop 
2009; Chalmers 1996b; Chrisley 1995b; Putnam 1988).
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8  According to Floridi’s (2009) formulation of the general definition of 
information, σ is an instance of information, understood as semantic 
content, if and only if: 1) σ consists of n data, 2) the data are well formed, 3) 
the well-formed data are meaningful. My earlier work used this distinction 
to analyze Tononi’s information integration theory of consciousness 
(Gamez 2011; Gamez 2016). I am indebted to Laurence Hayes for helping 
me to see that the data/information distinction is unworkable.
9  See Shannon (1948). Tononi’s (2004; 2008) information integration theory 
of consciousness is based on this interpretation of information.
10  There are several versions of Tononi’s information integration theory 
of consciousness (Balduzzi and Tononi 2008; Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi 
2004). Tononi (2008) gives a good overview and his book offers a 
simple introduction without the mathematical treatment (Tononi 2012). 
Experimental work on the information integration theory of consciousness 
has been carried out by Lee et al. (2009), Massimini et al. (2009), Ferrarelli 
et al. (2010), and Casali et al. (2013).
11  Barrett (2014) suggests how Tononi’s information integration theory of 
consciousness can be interpreted as a physical c-theory.
12  Tononi (2008) suggests that his algorithm could be applied to all possible 
levels of the brain—the level at which it reaches a maximum would be the 
one that is correlated with consciousness.
13  It might be objected that if information is subjective, then surely it must 
be present in the brain? Where else can subjective things be? However, the 
neural mechanisms (and electromagnetic fields etc.) that are active when 
our brain applies an interface to a physical system are purely physical 
processes—they do not have special informational properties that are 
absent from the rest of the physical world. These physical mechanisms are 
associated with bubbles of experience in which colours, abstract concepts 
and 1s and 0s appear. The presence of 1s and 0s in consciousness does not 
prove that there are 1s and 0s in our physical brains, any more than the 
presence of red in consciousness proves that there is red in our physical 
brains.
14  It could be argued that an observer has to exchange physically conserved 
quantities with a system to read its state. This issue can be avoided if the 
observer applies an interface to emissions from the system, such as light 
patterns from a screen.
15  An information c-theorist might argue that a material implementation 
of information has e-causal powers. The material holds the pattern of 
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information and this pattern affects future states of the physical system. 
However, in this case the material must be considered to be implementing 
every possible information set that can be read from the system. Some 
of these are contradictory or have no relationship with each other. It is 
implausible to claim that a potentially infinite collection of disparate 
information sets are present in the material and lead to its state transitions.
16  The system could also extract information about an earlier state of itself.
17  I have discussed this experiment elsewhere (Gamez 2016). It would only 
work if the problems with custom-designed interfaces could be addressed.
18  For example, Tononi’s information integration algorithms might be able 
to identify neuron firing patterns that are linked to consciousness. If this 
was a physical c-theory, these patterns would not be associated with 
consciousness when they occurred in other materials.
8. Computation Theories of Consciousness
1  Kentridge (1994, p. 442).
2  The MONIAC was a water computer that was developed by Bill Phillips to 
model the UK economy.
3  The solution is not necessarily optimal. A video can be found here: www.
youtube.com/watch?v=dAyDi1aa40E
4  This discussion sets aside issues about time slicing and parallel processing, 
which do not affect the central argument. When a general-purpose 
computer is parallel processing it is executing multiple special-purpose 
computers simultaneously. When a general-purpose computer is time 
slicing it is working as a particular special-purpose computer for short 
periods of time.
5  This used to be a common practice—see Grier (2005).
6  Some of the computations that might be members of CC sets are 
discussed by Cleeremans (2005). Jackendof (1987) and Bor (2012) set 
out computational c-theories and Metzinger (2003) gives informational-
computational interpretations of his constraints on conscious experience.
7  Computation c-theories are similar to a philosophical position known as 
functionalism, which claims that functions are the sole members of CC 
sets. Putnam (1975) was one of the key advocates of this position, which 
he later abandoned; Shagrir (2005) gives a good overview.
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8  Standard orreries do not include the date—this could easily be added.
9  Strictly speaking, information cannot be stored in the physical world. To 
store information we make changes to the physical world that are defined 
by an interface. At a later point in time we access the same part of the 
physical world through the same interface and the information reappears.
10  Horsman et al. (2014) give a good description of this interpretation of 
computing.
11  This is based on the first example in Section 7.1.
12  This is true of any physical system because an interface can be custom-
designed to extract a given sequence of information states from any 
sequence of physical states (Putnam 1988). The simplest method would 
be to map unique states onto the required information, or a clock could 
be used to handle repeated physical states. This mapping can only be 
done retrospectively unless one has a good predictive model of how the 
system’s physical states will change.
13  For example, it has been claimed that everything is a cellular automata 
(Wolfram 2002; Zuse 1970) or that physical reality arises from the posing 
of yes-no questions—Wheeler’s (1990) ‘It from bit’ hypothesis. 
14  This theory of implementation will have to map spatiotemporal physical 
structures onto computations. It cannot be based on information, which 
only exists relative to a human-defined interface.
15  Putnam (1988) and Bishop (2002; 2009) discuss the problems with finite 
state automata.
16  I have described the problems with combinatorial state automata in a 
paper (Gamez 2014a) that raises more general problems with theories of 
implementation. 
17  Piccinini (2007) puts forward a theory of implementation based on string 
processing.
18  Theories of implementation based on cellular automata have been put 
forward by Zuse (1970), Wolfram (2002) and Schule (2014). Piccinini (2012) 
gives a good overview of different theories of implementation and their 
problems.
19  Computational and functional concepts can be useful ways of describing 
physical correlates of consciousness. Suppose someone claims that 
consciousness is linked to a global workspace in the brain (Baars 1988). If 
this was interpreted as a physical c-theory, the global workspace would 
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just be a convenient way of describing a pattern in spiking neurons. The 
global workspace would not form a CC set by itself and it would not be 
correlated with consciousness if it was implemented in a different physical 
system.
9. Predictions and Deductions about Consciousness
1  Popper (2002, p. 18).
2  Research on change blindness suggests that we cannot accurately recall 
earlier conscious states. See, for example, Simons and Rensink (2005).
3  I am indebted to Ron Chrisley for this suggestion. To convert a c-description 
into a virtual reality file (for example, an X3D XML file) it is necessary 
to model the connection between virtual environments and states of 
consciousness. This will have to take the limited resolution of the senses 
and the active nature of the visual system into account. There will also 
be a one-to-many mapping between a c-description of a conscious state 
and virtual environments that could produce this state. This method of 
validating consciousness is limited to online consciousness that is evoked 
by sensory input. Many aspects of consciousness, such as body states and 
emotions, are difficult to control with virtual reality technology.
4  This is similar to the approach that is used in experiments on brain 
reading. For example, in one set of experiments by Nishimoto et al. (2011) 
the subjects watched a video while their brains were measured. The 
scientists used this data to build a model of the spatiotemporal structures 
in their brains that were activated by the video. This model was then used 
to reconstruct the video that the subjects were watching from their brain 
activity. The subjects could compare the consciousness that they had when 
they watched the reconstructed videos with the consciousness that they 
had when they watched the original video.
5  This testing method is easier if there is a 1:1 relationship between conscious 
states and physical states. Otherwise, the c-theory will map each conscious 
state onto multiple potential physical states.
6  There has been much speculation about whether a head remains conscious 
after it has been cut off. Dash (2011) discusses some of the early experiments 
that were carried out on humans. One study on rats suggests that they 
retain consciousness for several seconds after decapitation, and a wave of 
potentially conscious activity occurs approximately 50 seconds later (van 
Rijn et al. 2011). The EEG traces of dying humans show a similar pattern 
on a longer time scale (Chawla et al. 2009).
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7  This is the classic problem raised by Nagel (1974) about what it is like 
to be a bat. From the perspective of this book, this is not a problem with 
the irreducibility of subjective experience, but with our limited ability to 
transform our bubble of experience into a different bubble of experience. 
There is no philosophical problem about deducing a c-description of 
a bat’s consciousness from a p-description of its physical state—just a 
problem with our ability to imaginatively comprehend the c-description 
we have generated.
8  One potential solution would be to create virtual reality environments 
that enable us to experience aspects of a bat’s consciousness. Alternatively 
Chrisley (1995a) has suggested how we could use robotic systems 
to specify the non-conceptual contents of a bat’s consciousness. This 
approach has been demonstrated by Chrisley and Parthemore (2007), who 
used a SEER-3 robot to specify the non-conceptual content of a model of 
perception based on O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) sensorimotor theory.
9  This will only be possible if we have a flexible and general c-description 
format (see Section 4.9).
10  For example, deductions could help us to breed or genetically engineer 
food animals that are not conscious.
11  D could also be a constant pattern or a partially correlated pattern (see 
Section 6.4).
12  The concept of similar physical contexts needs to be worked out in detail. 
Normally functioning adult human brains have a great deal of variability 
in their patterns and materials, so a statistical definition of the normal 
variability in their patterns and materials is required to precisely define a 
physical context.
13  Conservative deductions could be made about unreportable consciousness 
in a platinum standard system during an experiment on consciousness. 
Suppose a brain contains two identical structures, one connected to 
c-reports and one not. If these structures were always present together, 
pilot studies would identify their union as the correlate. However, 
if the structure that was disconnected from c-reports came and went 
intermittently, then we could exclude it as the correlate. At a later point in 
time when both structures were present we might deduce that there are 
two consciousnesses in the platinum standard system, only one of which 
is reportable. This would violate assumptions A1, A2 and A6. However, 
we would still need A1, A2 and A6 to identify the correlate that was 
used to make the deduction. An example of this type of reasoning can be 
found in Lamme (2006; 2010), who uses paradigmatic cases of reportable 
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consciousness to establish the link between consciousness and recurrent 
processing, and then makes inferences about the presence of inaccessible 
phenomenal consciousness.
14  In previous work I proposed that indeterminacy envelopes could be used 
to make liberal deductions about consciousness (Gamez 2012a). I have 
replaced this with the framework that is described in this book.
15  The conservative/liberal distinction is based on a binary opposition 
between similar and different physical contexts. The differences between 
physical contexts could also be expressed as a continuous value, which 
would correspond to the degree of liberality of the deduction.
10. Modification and Enhancement of 
Consciousness
1  James (1985, p. 388).
2  A fused consciousness would be separately created in my brain and your 
brain—there would not be any merging of our actual consciousnesses.
3  As explained in Section 2.5, the overall level of consciousness is something 
like the average level of intensity of the properties and objects in a bubble 
of experience. This can be reduced with anaesthetics, such as propofol, or 
by a blow to the head. Chemicals, such as caffeine or LSD, can increase the 
overall level of intensity. It can also be increased by emotionally intense 
situations, such as a car crash.
4  Sensory input is the main method that we use to change the contents of 
our consciousness. If I want an elephant in my bubble of experience, then I 
go to the zoo and look at an elephant. Hallucinogenic drugs have a strong 
effect on contents and we have some control over contents in lucid dreams 
and imagination.
5  This type of experience is well documented (Crookall 1972) and it can be 
induced through body trauma, mental exercises (Harary and Weintraub 
1989; Ophiel 1970), or chemicals, such as ketamine (Wilkins et al. 2011). 
Out-of-body experiences can also occur in brain-damaged patients (Blanke 
and Arzy 2005) and psychology experiments can induce the illusion that 
part or all of our bodies are in a different location (Ehrsson 2007). There 
is no compelling evidence to suggest that people who are having an out-
of-body experience can report information about the physical world that 
has not been obtained through the senses of their physical body (Alvarado 
1982; Blackmore 2010).
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6  Sensory manipulation can alter the perceived size of our body in relation 
to our environment (van der Hoort et al. 2011). Muscimol (found in the 
mushroom Amanita Muscaria) is reported to be capable of this. 
7  Castaneda (1968) describes how he used a combination of mental 
control and hallucinogens to transform his conscious experience of his 
body into a crow (the truth of his account has been disputed). Phantom 
limbs demonstrate that our experiences of our bodies are linked to brain 
activity and are distinct from our actual physical bodies (Gamez 2007, pp. 
57-60; Melzack 1990; Melzack 1992). This suggests that the shape of our 
consciously experienced bodies can be altered by modifying our brains.
8  Sensory input, such as looking at fearful or beloved objects, changes our 
emotional states. Chemicals, such as cocaine or Prozac, alter the intensity 
of our emotional states on short or long time scales.
9  The current size of our bubbles of experience is probably linked to the 
size of our brains. More brain tissue is likely to be required to expand our 
bubbles of experience without loss of resolution.
10  Chakravarthi and VanRullen (2012) describe experimental evidence for 
the discrete nature of conscious perception. VanRullen and Koch (2003) 
have a more general discussion of this issue. There are well-documented 
examples of people with expanded long term memories—a condition 
known as hyperthymesia (Parker et al. 2006). Borges’ (1970) Funes the 
Memorious is a fictional example. 
11  Animals with different senses (for example, bats and fish) are likely to have 
different sensations. I have suggested elsewhere that conscious sensations 
might be linked to the neural patterns caused by sensory input, and that 
our conscious perception of a three-dimensional world could be linked to 
a combination of sensory and sensorimotor patterns (Gamez 2014b). If this 
is the case, then a novel sensory pattern would be associated with a novel 
sensation. 
Attempts have been made to create novel sensations. For example, 
the feelSpace belt gives subjects information about the location of North 
(Nagel et al. 2005) and magnetic fingertip implants enable people to feel 
magnetic fields. However, it is not clear whether these devices give people 
new conscious sensations. This is probably because the novel sensory 
input is processed through the existing senses, instead of being directly 
fed into the cortex. 
12  We understand the link between changes in sensory input and changes 
in consciousness, but we do not understand how changes in sensory 
input lead to changes in the brain that are associated with an altered 
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consciousness. The same is true for imagination and the ingestion of 
consciousness-modifying chemicals.
13  We would be unlikely to remember some of the conscious states that 
could be induced in us. Episodic memories regenerate earlier states of our 
brains. This might not be possible if a CC set is not the consequence of the 
brain’s own activity.
14  This technology is dramatized in the 1995 film Strange Days. It is different 
from a virtual reality system, which only mimics the sensory input 
produced by an environment and has little effect on our conscious 
experience of our body.
15  Patterns in electromagnetic fields, glia and blood can be indirectly 
manipulated by changing the neuron activity.
16  See Legon et al. (2014).
17  For example, electrodes have been used to modify the memories of mice 
(de Lavilleon et al. 2015; Ramirez et al. 2013).
18  For example, see Nikolenko et al. (2007). Electrodes and optogenetics are 
unlikely to be able to increase a neuron’s firing rate beyond a certain point 
because of metabolic constraints.
19  Chen et al. (2015) have developed a method for brain stimulation that 
uses magnetic nanoparticles. Seo et al. (2013) have outlined a design 
for a wireless brain interface that uses thousands of biologically neutral 
microsensors to convert electrical signals into ultrasound that can be read 
outside the brain. This could potentially be extended to deliver signals to 
the brain. 
20  This might be required if we want to expand our spatial and temporal 
consciousness.
21  Whether a synthetic neuron is a valid member of a CC set will depend on 
how neurons are p-described (see Section 5.1). 
22  Additional neurons would only alter consciousness if CC sets consist of 
neuron activity patterns or if the additional neurons altered CC sets in 
some other way—for example, by changing the electromagnetic fields.
23  For example, Yin et al. (2013) have developed a wireless electrode interface 
that is implanted below the skin.
24  A further problem is that invasive technologies are only allowed under 
very specific conditions on human subjects. This may change if the safety 
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of these techniques is demonstrated and there is demand or demonstrable 
benefits. A workable technology will also be appropriated by the public at 
large regardless of the safety issues or legal constraints. For example, you 
can buy tDCS kits on the Internet.
25  Huxley (1965, pp. 71-2).
11. Machine Consciousness
1  Metzinger (2003, p. 618).
2  Searle (1980, p. 424).
3  Machine consciousness is also called artificial consciousness. I have 
presented a version of these types of machine consciousness elsewhere 
(Gamez 2008b). They overlap with Seth’s (2009) distinction between 
strong and weak artificial consciousness and have some similarity with 
Searle’s (1980) distinction between strong and weak artificial intelligence. 
More information about previous work on machine consciousness is given 
by Holland (2003), Chella and Manzotti (2007), Gamez (2008b) and Reggia 
(2013). The International Journal of Machine Consciousness has published 
many papers on this topic.
4  This is sometimes known as artificial general intelligence (AGI). 
5  Arrabales’ (2010) ConsScale ranks systems according to their MC1 
consciousness. The Turing test and Harnad’s (1994) variations of it are 
designed to test whether a system exhibits the full spectrum of human 
behaviour. There has been a large amount of work on MC1 systems—
virtually any computer capable of perception and learning can be 
interpreted as a MC1 machine.
6  For example, computer models of global workspaces have been built 
(Franklin 2003; Gamez et al. 2013; Shanahan 2008; Zylberberg et al. 2010).
7  A number of people have used internal models that are updated with 
sensory data to control robots—for example, Chella, Liotta and Macaluso 
(2007). Computer models have also been built of imagination (Gravato 
Marques and Holland 2009) and of sensorimotor theories of consciousness 
(Chrisley and Parthemore 2007).
8  For example, I have collaborated on a global workspace model implemented 
in spiking neurons (MC2), which produced human-like behaviour (MC1) 
in the Unreal Tournament computer game (Gamez et al. 2013). 
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9  Digital computers that are simulating neurons produce very different 
electromagnetic fields from biological neurons. Neuromorphic chips use 
the flow of electrons to model the movement of ions in biological neurons 
(Indiveri et al. 2011). This type of chip is more likely to produce similar 
electromagnetic fields to biological neurons.
10  Neurons cultured in a Petri dish have been used to control a virtual animal 
(Demarse et al. 2001) and a robot (Warwick et al. 2010).
11  I have carried out preliminary experiments that illustrate how deductions 
can be made about the consciousness of an artificial system (Gamez 2008a; 
Gamez 2010). 
12  The implantation of non-conscious chips that modify CC sets in the brain is 
covered in Section 10.4. The implantation of chips to study the relationship 
between consciousness and the physical world is covered in Section 5.4.
13  See Footnote 9.
14  The connections between neurons have traditionally been identified by the 
laborious method of injecting tracers (Zingg et al. 2014). More promising 
techniques are starting to emerge that might be able to automatically scan 
dead human brains. For example, knife-edge scanning microscopes can 
automatically slice and photograph brain tissue, which enables some 
of the neurons and connections to be discovered (Mayerich et al. 2008). 
However, this technique can only identify a limited number of neurons and 
it cannot reveal the direction of connections. A more promising direction 
is the automation of electron microscopy to mill and scan blocks of brain 
tissue. With further development this approach might be able to identify 
all of the neurons and connections in an adult human brain (Knott et al. 
2008). There has also been research into techniques for making dead tissue 
transparent, which could help us to map the neurons and connections 
(Yang et al. 2014).
When the neurons and connections have been identified the next 
challenge is to simulate them on a computer. The adult human brain has 
approximately 100 billion neurons and 1014 connections. Networks with 
around a billion point neurons and 1013 connections have been simulated 
much slower than real time (Ananthanarayanan et al. 2009) and the 
SpiNNaker project is working towards the goal of simulating a billion 
neurons in real time (Furber and Temple 2007; Rast et al. 2011). One critical 
question is how much of the neurons’ structure will need to be simulated 
to reproduce the brain’s large-scale behaviour. If it is a large amount, 
then it is going to take a lot longer to reach the point at which it can be 
done in real time. It is also unlikely that we will be able to realize CC 
196 Human and Machine Consciousness
sets in artificial systems by simulating neurons. Neuromorphic chips have 
a greater chance of reproducing the electromagnetic fields of biological 
neurons, and it should soon be possible to run a million of these in real 
time (Benjamin et al. 2014).
15  This possibility has been dramatized in the 2014 film Transcendence. 
Carbon Copies is a non-profit organization that promotes the scanning 
and uploading of brains (www.carboncopies.org).
16  Imagine a scenario in which an artificial implant (made from appropriate 
materials) was added to your brain and the pattern associated with 1% of 
your consciousness was on the implant, with the rest of the pattern in your 
brain. The proportion on the implant could be progressively increased 
until the entire pattern was on the implant. This would still be a process of 
copying in which the original is progressively lost. At the beginning of this 
process there would be a consciousness associated with your brain and 
no consciousness associated with the implant. At the end, a copy of your 
consciousness would be associated with the implant and your brain would 
have lost consciousness. In the intermediate cases, there would be some 
of the original consciousness and some of the copy. This type of gradual 
replacement of materials happens all the time in the brain as it exchanges 
atoms with its surroundings. So in practice we cannot avoid the gradual 
replacement of our consciousness as the material in our brains changes. 
At best we can minimize such changes—for example, by not agreeing to 
copies of our consciousness that destroy the original.
The identity of bubbles of experience over time is similar to the identity 
of physical objects over time. Some changes to a motorbike have minimal 
impact on our sense of its continuity—for example, replacing the spark 
plugs. Other changes, such as swapping the chassis or making an atom-
for-atom copy have a bigger effect. When large changes are made, I 
might prefer the original because of its history—it is my motorbike, the 
motorbike that I rode around the world, and so on. Other people might 
not care whether they have the original or an atom-for-atom copy. In a 
similar way, some people might believe that the arrangement of their 
bubble of experience is what is important—these people are happy as long 
as this arrangement exists somewhere. This is equivalent to the atom-for-
atom copy of the motorbike. Other people prefer the consciousness that is 
linked to their brain and believe that they will die when this consciousness 
ceases, regardless of whether a copy has been made somewhere. This is 
equivalent to preferring the original motorbike with none of its parts 
replaced.
17  Kaczynski (1996) and Joy (2000) believe that we will increasingly pass 
responsibility to intelligent machines until we are unable to do without 
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them—in the same way that we are increasingly unable to live without 
the Internet today. This might eventually leave us at the mercy of super-
intelligent machines who could use their power against us. Kaczynski 
killed three people and injured twenty-three others to raise awareness of 
this issue.
18  Most people are concerned about machines that behave like conscious 
human beings, so I am setting aside the possibility that machines could 
produce non-conscious external behaviour that threatens humanity. 
19  We might be able to produce a MC1 machine by scanning a human brain 
and simulating it on a computer (see Footnote 14). This would not be 
any more intelligent than us or any more of a threat to humanity than 
an intelligent human. However, it would be easier to understand and 
improve than a human brain, so it could be the starting point for more 
advanced forms of intelligence. In the medium term it might become 
possible to run simulations of brains faster than biological brains and 
to run multiple simulated brains in parallel. Deep learning is another 
promising method for producing MC1 machines. For example, Mnih et al. 
(2015) used deep reinforcement learning to train a neural network to play 
1980s video games with human-level performance.
20  For example, machines would have to have human level intelligence; they 
would have to be capable of powering and maintaining themselves for 
long periods of time; military computers would have to be connected to 
the Internet and inadequately defended against hackers; etc. Machines 
would also become a threat if they became good at manipulating human 
behaviour.
21  Chalmers (2010) has a good discussion of the singularity. Eden et al. (2012) 
have edited a collection of papers on this topic.
22  If we had a mathematical way of measuring intelligence, then genetic 
algorithms could be used to create systems with a high value of this 
measure. A number of universal intelligence measures have been put 
forward (Hernández-Orallo and Dowe 2010; Hibbard 2011; Legg and 
Hutter 2007), but I am not aware of any that would be suitable for this task.
23  The construction of a system that can produce something that is more 
intelligent than itself is extremely challenging. It will not happen by 
accident, but through many years of laborious trial and error. Papers 
will be published on prototypes, there will be early versions that are 
partly functional, and so on. Only when the technology has been tried 
in many different ways is there any possibility that it could create a 
super-intelligence.
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24  One of the most dangerous computer errors was a malfunction in the Soviet 
nuclear early warning system in 1983, which almost led to a third world 
war. Asimov (1952) dramatizes some of the problems with malfunctioning 
intelligent machines.
25  Sloman (2006).
26  This position is put forward by Moravec (1988) and Asimov (1952).
27  For example, murder entails the premature loss of the victim’s 
consciousness and creates suffering in the bubbles of experience of the 
bereaved. On the other hand, switching off the life support of a coma 
patient is not generally considered wrong if the patient is not conscious 
and if they have no chance of regaining consciousness.
28  This might be the only way in which consciousness and our cultural 
traditions could survive the death of the sun in 5.4 billion years. It is 
unlikely that humans will be able to physically travel beyond our solar 
system to escape the dying sun. Machines can go much further because 
they can accelerate faster, feed on light and shut down for thousands of 
years while travelling. 
29  Metzinger (2003, p. 621).
12. Conclusion
1  Popper (2002, p. 94).
2  Metzinger describes the current state of consciousness research as follows: 
‘The interdisciplinary project of consciousness research, now experiencing 
such an impressive renaissance with the turn of the century, faces two 
fundamental problems. First, there is yet no single, unified and paradigmatic 
theory of consciousness in existence which could serve as an object for 
constructive criticism and as a backdrop against which new attempts could 
be formulated. Consciousness research is still in a preparadigmatic stage. 
Second, there is no systematic and comprehensive catalogue of explananda. 
Although philosophers have done considerable work on the analysanda, 
the interdisciplinary community has nothing remotely resembling an 
agenda for research. We do not yet have a precisely formulated list of 
explanatory targets which could be used in the construction of systematic 
research programs.’ (Metzinger 2003, pp. 116-7).
3  For example, whether consciousness is a non-physical substance, the hard 
problem, solipsism, zombies, colour inversion and the causal relationship 
between consciousness and the physical world.
 199Endnotes
4  In the standard version of dualism there is a bidirectional e-causal 
relationship between non-physical consciousness and the physical world. 
This is ruled out by assumption A5.
5  Assumptions A7-A9 are more pragmatic and might not be needed by the 
science of consciousness.
6  NeuroNexus sells electrodes that can record from 256 locations. It is 
working to expand this to 1,000 electrodes (Marx 2014).
7  See Ahrens and Keller (2013).
8  For example, Shanahan and Wildie (2012) have proposed a ‘knotty 
centrality’ measure that might be linked to consciousness. 
9  An assumption that a mammalian brain is a platinum standard system 
will have much less impact on the science of consciousness than a similar 
assumption about an artificial system.
10  Wittgenstein (1969, remark 94).
11  For example, consider the assumption that all conscious states associated 
with a platinum standard system are linked to c-reports (A2). We could 
disprove this assumption if we could show that there are aspects of 
consciousness that are not accessible through c-reports. But since these 
aspects of consciousness cannot be accessed, we cannot prove that they do 
or do not exist.
12  This is the position of Berkeley (1957). Husserl (1960) developed his 
phenomenological program by suspending commitment to the reality of 
the physical world.
13  Hume (1993, p. 114).
14  At present the most mathematical theories of consciousness are information 
c-theories, which can be re-interpreted as physical c-theories. For example, 
Tononi’s (2008) information integration theory of consciousness can be 
re-interpreted as a theory about the relationship between neuron activity 
and consciousness. Causal density (Seth et al. 2006), liveliness (Gamez 
and Aleksander 2011) and Casali et al.’s (2013) perturbational complexity 
index can also be reinterpreted as physical c-theories.
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Consciousness is widely perceived as one of the most fundamental, interes� ng and diﬃ  cult 
problems of our � me. However, we s� ll know next to nothing about the rela� onship 
between consciousness and the brain and we can only speculate about the consciousness 
of animals and machines. 
Human and Machine Consciousness presents a new founda� on for the scien� ﬁ c study 
of consciousness. It sets out a bold interpreta� on of consciousness that neutralizes the 
philosophical problems and explains how we can make scien� ﬁ c predic� ons about the 
consciousness of animals, brain-damaged pa� ents and machines. 
Gamez interprets the scien� ﬁ c study of consciousness as a search for mathema� cal 
theories that map between measurements of consciousness and measurements of the 
physical world. We can use ar� ﬁ cial intelligence to discover these theories and they could 
make accurate predic� ons about the consciousness of humans, animals and ar� ﬁ cial 
systems. Human and Machine Consciousness also provides original insights into unusual 
conscious experiences, such as hallucina� ons, religious experiences and out-of-body states, 
and demonstrates how ‘designer’ states of consciousness could be created in the future.
Gamez explains diﬃ  cult concepts in a clear way that closely engages with scien� ﬁ c 
research. His punchy, concise prose is packed with vivid examples, making it suitable for 
the educated general reader as well as philosophers and scien� sts. Problems are brought 
to life in colourful illustra� ons and a helpful summary is given at the end of each chapter. 
The endnotes provide detailed discussions of individual points and full references to the 
scien� ﬁ c and philosophical literature.
As with all Open Book publica� ons, this en� re book is available to read for free on the 
publisher’s website. Printed and digital edi� ons, together with supplementary digital 
material, can also be found at www.openbookpublishers.com.
Cover image: Stereogram created by David Gamez with data from Anderson Winkler (CC BY-SA 3.0).
ebook
ebook and OA edi� ons 
also available
Human and Machine Consciousness
DAVID GAMEZ
